St. Francis Mill Co. v. Sugg.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1907
• Parties: ST. FRANCIS MILL CO. et al. v. SUGG et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

104 S.W. 45

206 Mo. 148

ST. FRANCIS MILL CO. et al. v. SUGG et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July 2, 1907.

1. JUDGMENT — PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT.

Where creditors obtained judgments in 1871, and an action by them to set aside as fraudulent a deed from the debtor to his brother has been pending since 1875, no presumption that the judgments have been paid arises.

2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — INSOLVENCY.

Evidence in an action to set aside a deed as fraudulent held to show that the grantor was insolvent when he made it.

3. SAME — INTENT OF GRANTOR.

Evidence in an action to set aside a deed as fraudulent held to show that the grantor intended to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors.

4. SAME — KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT OF GRANTEE.

Evidence in an action to set aside a deed as fraudulent held to show that the grantee knew of and participated in the grantor's fraudulent intent.

5. SAME.

A conveyance of land to a brother, made while the grantor was insolvent and just before judgments were awarded against him, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, was fraudulent and void.

6. ESTOPPEL — EQUITABLE — CLAIM TO PROPERTY.

Where in 1880, in a suit set aside a deed as in fraud of creditors, involving about 20,000 acres of land, plaintiffs agreed to a decree whereby 2,000 acres was exempted from the judgment finding the conveyance fraudulent, and during the pendency of the suit on appeals and retrials the grantees' heirs have sold at least 700 acres and other portions may have passed into the hands of innocent persons upon the faith of the decree, on a final determination of the case plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree as to the 2,000 acres.

In banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; E. M. Dearing, Judge.

Action by the St. Francis Mill Company and others against W. O. Sugg and others. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for defendants. Reversed and remanded.

W. M. Williams, M. L. Clardy, John M. Wood, Joseph A. Wright, R. T. Railey, Wm. H. Clopton, C. P. Hawkins, Ely & Kelso, and Walker & Cox, for appellants. Wilson Cramer and R. B. Oliver, for respondents.

GRAVES, J.

This is an action originally instituted in the circuit court of Dunklin county, April 2, 1875. It is a suit in equity in the nature of a creditors' bill to set aside for fraud a deed from Wm. S. Sugg to Wylie P. Sugg, of date May 24, 1871, but acknowledged on May 27, 1871, and therefore not delivered until said last-named date. The name of the grantee in this deed appears in the record and briefs in different ways. In some places it is Willie P. Sugg, in others Wylie P. Sugg, and further as W. P. Sugg. This is a mere matter of detail, however. This deed covers something like 20,000 acres of land in Dunklin county, formerly overflowed or swamp lands, the title to which was at one time in said county. The plaintiffs are and were judgment creditors of Wm. S. Sugg, lawyer, merchant, and navigation contractor, as appears from the evidence, but not especially successful along legitimate lines, in either avocation. The defendants are the heirs at law of Wylie P. Sugg, deceased. The case has a checkered career, and some of the prior history, as traced from the record, will not be inapropos. Wm. S. Sugg, then a merchant and lawyer in southeast Missouri, some time prior to May 16, 1870, conceived the idea that he was engineer enough to make Varner river navigable from its head to its mouth, and the St. Francis river from the mouth of Varner river to the southern line of Missouri. Accordingly, he entered into a contract to that effect with Dunklin county, and for this feat of engineering was to receive from Dunklin county 40,000 acres of swamp land, to be selected by said Sugg. June 22, 1870, he obtained patents to something less than one-half of the lands called for in this contract. The title thus conveyed he held until May 27, 1871, at which time he conveyed or attempted to convey the same to his brother, Wylie P. Sugg, for the expressed consideration of $1,380, and the assumption and performance of the contract with Dunklin county as to these two rivers. This deed was acknowledged on May 27, 1871, and on May 29th, the following Monday, the regular May term of the circuit court of Dunklin county was to, and did, begin. A number of the creditors, including several of the plaintiffs in this action, had previously instituted their suits in said court to recover judgments against Wm. S. Sugg, merchant, for goods sold, delivered, and used, but not paid for, and these suits were about to culminate into judgments, and did, in due course of time and at said May term, result in judgments. After unsuccessful executions, these judgment creditors, at the date aforesaid, instituted this suit. On August 20, 1880, this suit finally reached a judgment in the circuit court of Dunklin county, the effect of which judgment is to find this deed in controversy fraudulent except as to 2,000 acres of the land conveyed. The defendants therein. the then heirs at law of Wylie P. Sugg, deceased, duly lodged their motion for new trial, which motion was permitted to lie dormant until January, 1895, at which time a motion was filed in said circuit court for a nunc pro tunc entry showing the overruling of said motion for new trial, which motion for a nunc pro tune entry was overruled by the trial court, and the judgment overruling the same was sustained by this court. 142 Mo. 358, 44 S. W. 247. At the same term of said circuit court the trial court overruled the motion for a new trial, in the language of the judge, "for the reason that the court deems the said motion to have been abandoned and to be not now pending in said cause." This judgment was reversed by this court. 142 Mo. 364, 44 S. W. 249. Following the ruling of this court, the trial court sustained the motion for new trial, and the cause was opened up for a trial de novo. It might be well to remark here that the judge before whom the cause was tried had been succeeded by another. This furnished the reason for the sustaining of the motion. The cause was retried, and at such trial all the issues were found for the plaintiffs, but the trial court, after finding all the issues as to fraud in favor of the plaintiffs, dismissed plaintiffs' bill for the reason that the title to the land was yet in Dunklin county. Upon motion for new trial, the trial court set aside its judgment dismissing plaintiffs' bill, and from this order the defendants appealed, but the action of the trial court was sustained by this court. 169 Mo. 130, 69 S. W. 359. The cause was thus again left pending in Dunklin county for trial de novo. Defendants, evidently having in view the opinion of the trial judge upon the question of fraud, discovered prejudice in the mind of said judge and made application for a change of venue, which application was sustained and the cause sent to the circuit court of Jefferson county, where it was tried again, with the result that the deed from W. S. Sugg to Wylie P. Sugg was sustained and plaintiffs' bill dismissed, and judgment to this effect entered, as also judgment against plaintiffs for costs. From this judgment the plaintiffs duly perfected their appeal, and it is this record before us now for review. This is the court history of this case, save and except, in going through our reports, we find that at an early day we were charged with the duty of investigating a side issue growing out of this case. St. Francis Mill Co. v. Sugg, 83 Mo. 476. This court had the cause and expressed opinion thereon as above indicated. This was at a time when the memory had not been dimmed by time, and the facts then and there involved will not be amiss here. From our opinion in 83 Mo. 476, it appears that the plaintiffs under the decree of 1880 had an execution for costs issued. This execution was levied upon the 2,000 acres of land which was given to defendants by this decree of 1880. Defendants filed motion to quash the execution, assigning, among other things, that the costs for which said execution was issued had been fully paid. There was a trial upon this motion before Hon. R. P. Owen, the same judge who had shortly prior thereto entered the original decree of 1880. This motion to quash was sustained by Judge Owen, and his judgment thereon affirmed by this court. 83 Mo. 476. With this we have the complete court history of the case entitled the St. Francis Mill Co. v. Sugg, except the chapter which we now proceed to write.

We question the views of this court as expressed in 142 Mo. 364, 44 S. W. 249. We are of opinion that the trial court was right in holding that there had been an abandonment of the old motion for new trial, and for that reason there was no motion really pending, and that this court was in error in reversing that judgment. However, we did reverse it, and that opinion is the law of this case, the parties have acted upon it, and for that reason alone we shall recognize it in the disposition of the present issues. If it were an original proposition in another case, we would not feel bound by the views expressed in 142 Mo. 364, 44 S. W. 249. To our mind, notwithstanding the voluminous record and great number of briefs in the case, the issues are few and simple. They are: (1) Was this deed made by W. S. Sugg with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors? (2) Did Wylie P. Sugg know of and participate in said fraudulent intent? And, (3) if the deed is found to be fraudulent, are there any equities to be invoked in favor of the defendants as to all or any portion of the lands covered by said deed? In our judgment, answers to these questions solve the problems of this case. We will discuss the evidence in the course of the opinion.

1. One contention made by the defendants is that these judgments of the plaintiffs are presumed to be paid owing to the lapse of time. These judgments constitute the foundation of the present action. They were such at its institution...