St. Francis Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Bowles

• Citation: 836 P.2d 1123,251 Kan. 334
• Decision Date: 10 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 66075,66075
• Parties: ST. FRANCIS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee, v. Edward D. BOWLES, Defendant, and Tamara Bowles, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Page 1123

836 P.2d 1123

251 Kan. 334

ST. FRANCIS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee, v. Edward D. BOWLES, Defendant and Tamara Bowles, Appellant.

No. 66075.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 10, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the traditional common-law doctrine of necessaries, a husband who was derelict in furnishing food, shelter, and medical services to his wife was liable to a third party who provided these necessaries to the wife. A wife, however, was deemed legally incapable of incurring an obligation independent of her husband.

2. The common-law doctrine of necessaries creates an obligation to provide necessaries, which gives rise to a presumption that the spouse procuring necessaries is acting as an agent for the other spouse.

3. One of the basic characteristics of the common-law is that it is not static, but is endowed with vitality and a capacity to grow. It never becomes permanently crystallized but changes and adjusts from time to time to new developments in social and economic life to meet the changing needs of a complex society.

4. Historically, the doctrine of necessaries applied only to husbands. Therefore, the doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because such a gender-based classification does not serve an important governmental objective.

5. The doctrine of necessaries is hereby expanded to apply to husbands and wives equally. However, before a creditor may seek payment from a spouse the creditor must first pursue collection from the person who received the necessary goods or services. Only if the spouse who received the benefits has insufficient resources to satisfy the debt may the other spouse be liable. Such liability is not automatic; the second spouse may raise any defenses available.

John Black of Black and Black, Salina, argued the cause and was on the briefs, for appellant.

Christopher A. McElgunn of Klenda, Mitchell, Austerman & Zuercher, Wichita, argued the cause, and John B. Gilliam and Troy H. Gott, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs, for appellee.

Curtis J. Waugh, Wayne T. Stratton, and David E. Bruns of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Hosp. Ass'n.

HERD, Justice:

St. Francis Regional Medical Center, Inc., sued Edward Bowles and his wife, Tamara Bowles, for the cost of unpaid medical services provided to Edward. Edward confessed judgment in the amount of $12,021.54 but was financially unable to satisfy the delinquent balance due; the trial court held Tamara was liable for Edward's medical expenses. Tamara appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowles, 16 Kan.App.2d 374, 823 P.2d 226 (1991). We granted Tamara's petition for review.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Tamara is liable for Edward's medical expenses as a matter of law even though she did not contract with St. Francis for her husband's care.

Relying upon the common-law rule which imposes liability on a husband for the wife's necessaries, the trial court extended the common-law rule to likewise impose liability on a wife for her husband's necessaries. The common-law doctrine was stated as follows:

"Under the common-law doctrine of necessaries, a husband who was derelict in furnishing food, shelter, and medical services to his wife was liable to a third party who provided these necessaries to the wife. However, because a wife was deemed legally incapable of incurring an obligation independent of her husband and because the husband was legally, and exclusively, responsible for providing the necessaries for the entire family unit, there was no reciprocal liability on the part of the wife to a third party for providing the necessaries of the husband." Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla.1986).

This court first recognized the doctrine of necessaries in Harttmann v. Tegart, 12 Kan. 177 (1873). In Harttmann, we stated:

"We suppose a mutual legal as well as moral obligation rests upon every husband and wife to furnish each other, so far as it is within their power, everything necessary for their mutual comfort and enjoyment. It is certainly the legal as well as moral duty of every husband to see that his wife is furnished, or has the means of furnishing herself, with everything necessary and suitable for a person in their station and condition. For this reason, it is always conclusively presumed that a wife who lives and cohabits with her husband has an agency from him, and upon his credit, to procure everything that is necessary for herself or family...." 12 Kan. at 179-80.

The Court of Appeals, relying upon Harttmann, disagreed with Tamara's claim that the doctrine of necessaries was based upon the concept of unity of marriage. Instead, the Court of Appeals found the doctrine of necessaries arose from agency principles. In her petition for review, Tamara disputed the Court of Appeals' holding, arguing that spousal agency arose from the doctrine of necessaries which is based upon the concept of unity of marriage. We agree. The obligation to provide necessaries gives rise to the presumption of agency.

There is no dispute over whether medical services are necessaries. The parties further agree the doctrine of necessaries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because historically the doctrine was applied to husbands only. Both parties cite Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979), to support this contention. In Orr, the United States Supreme Court struck down Alabama alimony statutes which required husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce. Finding this gender-based classification did not serve an important governmental objective, the Court stated,

"[T]he 'old notio[n]' that 'generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,' can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. 'No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas....' " 440 U.S. at 279-80, 99 S.Ct. at 1112 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14-15, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1378, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 [1975].

The parties, however, disagree upon the remedy. Tamara argues the doctrine should be abolished, while St. Francis contends the appropriate remedy is to apply the doctrine of necessaries to both husbands and wives, thereby making it gender neutral. Because no Kansas appellate court has addressed this issue, we look to other states for guidance.

When faced with the same issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held the traditional doctrine of necessaries violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court found that in a modern marriage husbands and wives are a financial unit whether they contribute income or domestic services. The court noted the common-law could be adapted to reflect societal changes. When considering possible changes in the common-law rule, the court stated:

"Neither equity nor reality justifies imposing unqualified liability on one spouse for the debts of the other or exempting one spouse from the liability for the necessary expenses of the other.

....

"[B]oth spouses are liable for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse. In a viable marriage, the marital partners can decide between themselves how to pay their debts. A creditor providing necessaries to one spouse can assume that the financial resources of both spouses are available for payment. However, in the absence of an agreement, the income and property of one spouse should not be exposed to satisfy a debt incurred by the other spouse unless the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt are insufficient." Jersey Shore, Etc. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 149-51, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).

Believing it would be unfair to apply this new rule retrospectively, the court did not find the defendant liable for her husband's hospital bill. 84 N.J. at 152, 417 A.2d 1003.

A less clear-cut rule has evolved in Florida. In Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, 497 So.2d 644, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a hospital could demand payment from a wife for the debt created by her husband's last illness. The wife had not agreed to pay her husband's medical bills when he was admitted to the hospital. The court refused to address the issue of whether application of the doctrine of necessaries violated equal protection because the court found the hospital lacked standing to raise this equal protection argument. The Florida Supreme Court believed any change was best left to the legislative branch and, thus, affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the suit. In so doing, the Florida Supreme Court disapproved of two earlier Florida Court of Appeals decisions that had held the wife liable for the necessaries of her husband. See Parkway General Hosp. Inc. v. Stern, 400 So.2d 166 (Fla.Dist.App.1981); Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDonald, 392 So.2d 1356 (Fla.Dist.App.1980).

More recently, however, the Florida Court of Appeals has applied the doctrine to both husbands and wives. Webb v. Hillsborough Cty. Hosp. Auth., 521 So.2d 199 (Fla.Dist.App.1988). In Webb, a husband appealed from the trial court's decision that held him responsible for his wife's hospital bill. The husband had not agreed with the...