St. George v. Mak, Civ. No. 5:92-587 (JAC)

• Decision Date: 29 December 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 5:92-587 (JAC),5:92-593 (JAC).
• Citation: 842 F. Supp. 625
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Ann Kennedy ST. GEORGE v. Edwin S. MAK, Warren Tingley, Gary Ingeme, and Betsy Dunham. Louis A. LEWIS v. Edwin S. MAK, Warren Tingley, and Gary Ingeme.

842 F. Supp. 625

Ann Kennedy ST. GEORGE v. Edwin S. MAK, Warren Tingley, Gary Ingeme, and Betsy Dunham.

Louis A. LEWIS v. Edwin S. MAK, Warren Tingley, and Gary Ingeme.

Civ. Nos. 5:92-587 (JAC), 5:92-593 (JAC).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

December 29, 1993.

Margaret J. Slez, Slez & Slez, Westport, CT, for plaintiffs.

Michael J. Lanoue, Margaret Q. Chapple, Asst. Attys. Gen. of the State of Conn., Hartford, CT, for defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Chief Judge:

The plaintiffs were at all relevant times Special Deputy Sheriffs for the Fairfield County Sheriff's Department.¹ The defendants include Edwin S. Mak, Fairfield County High Sheriff; Warren Tingley, Fairfield County Chief Deputy Sheriff; and Gary Ingeme and Betsy Dunham, Fairfield County Special Deputy Sheriffs. These actions² involve claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various Connecticut constitutional and statutory provisions, and Connecticut common law. Pending before the court are the defendants' motions for summary judgment (filed Aug. 23, 1993).

BACKGROUND

In St. George, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants retaliated against her for her involvement in efforts of the Fairfield County Special Deputy Sheriffs to organize for the purposes of collective bargaining. More specifically, the plaintiff claims that defendant Ingeme, on several occasions, threatened to terminate and/or hinder the plaintiff's employment if she continued her organizing efforts; that Ingeme made these threats on the authority of defendant Mak; that Ingeme repeatedly abused and harassed the plaintiff with degrading comments and vulgar gestures; that Ingeme falsely and maliciously accused the plaintiff of filing false reports and provoking state inmates to commit violent acts; that defendants Ingeme and Dunham told other Special Deputy Sheriffs that they intended to make the plaintiff's life "miserable"; that Dunham maliciously refused to provide the plaintiff with needed medical attention when she was injured in the course of performing her official duties; that defendants Tingley and Mak condoned and even encouraged the actions of Ingeme and Dunham; that the several defendants forced her, under the threat of termination of employment and abuse, to pay yearly dues to the Fairfield County Sheriff's Association; that these contributions were ultimately used for improper political purposes — namely, to finance the re-election campaign of defendant Mak to the office of High Sheriff; and, finally, that the defendants wrongfully terminated her employment for filing a workers' compensation claim.

In Count I, the plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated her constitutional rights by depriving her of equal protection of the laws; interfering with her rights to free speech and assembly; and subjecting her to a hostile, threatening, harassing, and unsafe work environment.

In Count II, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated her rights, under Article 1, Sections 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution, to free speech and to assemble in a peaceable manner with other Special Deputy Sheriffs.³

Count III, which largely echoes Count I, alleges that the defendants violated the plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Similarly, in Count IV, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated Conn.Gen.Stat. § 31-51q, Connecticut's so-called Free Speech Act.⁴

Count V sets forth a claim based on Article 1, Section 20 of the Connecticut Constitution — the state equal protection clause.⁵ Similarly, Count VI alleges a violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-71 — the Connecticut employment discrimination statute.⁶

In Count VII, the plaintiff asserts a claim against defendant Ingeme and Dunham, alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In Counts VIII and IX, the plaintiff contends that defendants Ingeme and Dunham conspired to interfere with the plaintiff's civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), while defendants Tingley and Mak failed to prevent a conspiratorial wrong, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

The plaintiff has withdrawn Count X, admitting that she is barred from pursuing in federal court an action under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-333x.⁷See Plaintiff's Memorandum in St. George (filed Sept. 21, 1993), at unnumbered page 17.

Finally, Count XI sets forth a claim pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 31-290a — the Connecticut workers' compensation statute, which prohibits any employer from discriminating against or discharging any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation.⁸

In Lewis, the plaintiff makes similar allegations against defendants Mak, Tingley, and Ingeme. In particular, the plaintiff alleges that — in retaliation for the exercise of his free speech and assembly rights with respect to his participation in union organizing activities — he was threatened with termination of his employment as a Special Deputy Sheriff by Ingeme, demoted by Tingley, and wrongfully terminated by Mak. Although the official reason for the termination of his employment was a minor and unintentional violation of a weapons policy regulation of the Fairfield County Sheriffs Department, Lewis claims that such violations were regularly punished previously only by verbal warning or reprimand. Lewis further maintains that his termination hearing was a sham, and that the real reasons for the termination of his employment were his union organizing activities and his testimony in support of St. George's claim of harassment.

Like the complaint in St. George, Count I of Lewis asserts a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws, interfered with his rights to free speech and assembly, and denied him procedural due process. Similarly, Count II sets forth a claim based on Article 1, Sections 4 and 14 of the Connecticut Constitution, while Count III alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count IV further alleges a violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-51q.

Count V, like Counts VIII and IX in St. George, alleges that the defendants conspired to interfere with the plaintiff's civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

Finally, Count VI sets forth a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In an oral ruling at a hearing on the record on March 22, 1993, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. In that ruling, the court, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims to the extent that the plaintiffs sought damages from the defendants in their official capacities. The court also dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on state law, holding that all claims under that provision must be based on alleged violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. Accordingly, any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the Connecticut State Labor Relations Act, Conn.Gen. Stat. § 5-270 et seq., or any such claim based on Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-100, 46a-101 — which prohibit discriminatory employment practices — is no longer before the court.⁹

On August 23, 1993, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment in both actions. After full briefing, the court heard oral argument on December 6, 1993, after which it reserved decision.

DISCUSSION

I.

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to show that no material facts are in dispute. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987). The court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities against the moving party. Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986) (Feinberg, C.J.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). The court must therefore view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

II.

A.

In support of their motions for summary judgment — which are, in effect motions for partial summary judgment¹⁰ — the defendants first argue that the plaintiffs' state statutory claims must fail.¹¹ The defendants claim that, in their individual capacities, they are not "employers" or "state agencies" for purposes of these provisions. In any event, the defendants further contend that the question of whether Special Deputy Sheriffs are actually "employees" under these provisions is an unsettled question of state law.

The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims¹² should be dismissed because the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies. The defendants claim that the doctrine of exhaustion applies even to constitutional claims. The defendants concede, however, that plaintiff St. George's case before the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations ("Labor Board") has been closed.¹³

With regard to the procedural due process claim in Lewis set forth in Count I, the defendants contend that the plaintiff does not have a property interest in continued employment as a Special Deputy Sheriff, and that he is therefore not entitled to due process protection. According to the defendants, the statute creating the position of Special Deputy Sheriff, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 6-43, is clear on its face: Special Deputy...