St. Joe Paper Co. v. Brown, s. I-392

• Decision Date: 16 April 1968
• Docket Number: I-393,Nos. I-392,s. I-392
• Citation: 210 So.2d 725
• Parties: ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Tom I. BROWN, H. G. Easterwood, Jack Levins, Fred O. Drake, Jr., and Jack Whiddon, constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County, Florida, and ex officio, the Board of Equalization of said County; John Brown, as Tax Assessor of Leon County, Florida; Roy E. Lett, as Tax Collector of Leon County, Florida; Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and Florida Power Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 725

210 So.2d 725

ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Tom I. BROWN, H. G. Easterwood, Jack Levins, Fred O. Drake, Jr., and Jack Whiddon, constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County, Florida, and ex officio, the Board of Equalization of said County; John Brown, as Tax Assessor of Leon County, Florida; Roy E. Lett, as Tax Collector of Leon County, Florida; Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and Florida Power Corporation, a Florida corporation, Appellees.

Nos. I-392, I-393.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 16, 1968.

Isler & Welch, Panama City, and Starry & Thompson, Tallahassee, for appellant.

F. E. Steinmeyer, III, J., Klein Wigginton, of Parker, Foster & Madigan, Tallahassee, Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles D. McClure, and Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, O'Bryan, Michaels & McGehee, Tallahassee, for appellees.

SPECTOR, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final decree in an action challenging the valuations placed on appellant's agricultural lands by the tax assessor for the years 1964 and 1965. Two separate cases were filed by the appellant as to each of said taxing years. Both cases were consolidated for trial by the lower court and were consolidated for review before this court.

Appellant is the owner of some 54,000 acres of real estate in Leon County and also the lessee of 7,000 additional acres. Under the terms of the said lease, appellant is obligated to pay all of the ad valorem taxes on the leased land over a fixed amount. The lands in question are agricultural lands within the meaning of Section 193.11(3), Florida Statutes, 1965, F.S.A. Said lands were treated by the parties and the court below in two categories according to their use. The bulk, some 52,000 acres including the leased land, is devoted to forest and timberland purposes. The remainder, some 9,000 acres, consists of appellant's Southward Farm property which has its highest and best agricultural use in a pasture and beef production operation.

The valuations placed upon the farm property by the assessor in 1964 ranged from $120 per acre to $774.65 per acre. The average valuation per acre made by the assessor on the farm property was $194.64. In pursuance of its contention that the valuations made by the assessor were illegally excessive, appellant submitted an exhibit reflecting its view of 'just value' per acre on the same farm property to range from $38.03 to $100. The average 'just value' per acre asserted by the taxpayer was $81.66--an average of less than half that resulting from the assessor's valuations.

The owned forestry or timberlands involved were valued by the assessor in 1964 at a range of $31.99 upwards to.$398.78 for an average valuation per acre of $84.06. The leased forestry or timberland of appellant was assessed at a range of $34.53 to $160 for an average of $98.39. By its pleadings appellant contends its owned lands to be valued at a range of $2.57 upwards to $100. Average value per acre alleged as to its owned land was $30. Its leased lands are alleged to be valued at a range of $19.91 to $39.87 per acre for an average of $31.50. Similar allegations were made by appellant that the valuations placed on its forestry lands were illegally excessive. The foregoing figures were taken from the pleadings and exhibits filed in the 1964 case. The figures applicable for the year 1965 differ from the cited amounts only slightly, and no useful purpose would be served by a recitation of the 1965 figures which would reflect only slight and immaterial variations.

The essence of appellant's complaint is that the taxing officials arbitrarily and illegally assessed its lands for ad valorem tax purposes in that the assessed value was in excess of the full value for agricultural purposes as provided for by Section 193.11(3), Florida Statutes, 1965, F.S.A., as said statutory provision was construed by the Supreme Court in Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833.

At the final hearing before the trial court, the appellant taxpayer was permitted to introduce evidence of the value for agricultural purposes of the lands in question in order to overcome the presumption of validity and correctness accorded the assessment made by the tax assessor. In Harbond, Inc. v. Anderson, 134 So.2d 816 at page 820 (Fla.App.2d 1961), the court in speaking of the weight to be given such official actions, stated:

'* * * When made by proper officers, the prima facie correctness of an assessment, to be overcome, must be affirmatively assailed by appropriate and sufficient allegations and proofs, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of legal assessment. * * *'

After the taking of testimony in the instant case, the trial court entered an order stating in part the following:

'The Court finds that the process or method used by the Plaintiff's witnesses for the establishment of the taxable value of the Plaintiff's owned and leased forestry lands by their version of the income approach while ignoring the value of the standing timber, is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, for the valuations of forestry property and, therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to established a prima facie case as to the alleged excessive assessments for the year 1964 on the Plaintiff's owned and leased forestry and timber lands which is the subject matter of this litigation.'

The above quoted excerpt from the decree being...