St. Joe Paper Co. v. Adkinson, AH-111
| Decision Date | 14 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. AH-111,AH-111 |
| Citation | 413 So.2d 107 |
| Parties | ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, Appellant, v. Hubert R. ADKINSON, Property Appraiser of Walton County, Florida; Jack Little, Tax Collector of Walton County, Florida; Bob Anderson, Lawton Mathews, Hughie Infinger, Milford Bass and Johnnie Moore, as members of the Board of Tax Adjustment of Walton County, Florida; and J. Ed Straughn, Director, Department of Revenue, State of Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Fred H. Kent, Jr., of Kent, Watts, Durden, Kent & Mickler, Jacksonville, for appellant.
George Ralph Miller, Defuniak, and Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
This is an appeal from a nonfinal order entered by the trial court upon remand following our opinion in St. Joe Paper Company v. Adkinson, 400 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The nonfinal order does not qualify for review under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. We treat it as a petition for common law writ of certiorari.
The order entered by the trial court on remand finds that as a result of the appraisal testimony excluded by this Court's mandate, there is insufficient evidence upon which to render a competent decision as to the assessed value of the properties in question. The trial court further finds that justice will best be served by allowing both plaintiff and defendants to present additional evidence on the assessed value of the property in question, and it authorizes the parties to submit such additional evidence. The excluded testimony referred to in the trial court's order was the appraisal testimony of the two expert witnesses of appellee property appraiser and part of the testimony of one expert witness of appellant. The excluded testimony related only to the gulf-front property and had no relation to the agricultural land values.
Upon reversal and remand with general directions for further proceedings, the trial judge has broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause thereafter. Lucom v. Potter, 131 So.2d 724 (Fla.1961); The City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., Inc., (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), Case No. AF-45, opinion filed March 29, 1982. Insofar as the trial court's order reopens the proceedings below for further evidence as to the value of the gulf-front property, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law. While the trial court may not intend to allow additional testimony...
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...cause thereafter. City of Pensacola v. Capital Realty Holding Co., Inc., 417 So.2d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Adkinson, 413 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The trial court reacquired jurisdiction over the cause upon the issuance of our mandate. Murphy v. Murphy, 378 S......
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