St. John v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, s. 97-2108

• Decision Date: 01 April 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. 97-2108,97-2111,s. 97-2108
• Parties: 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2927 David ST. JOHN; Laura St. John, Plaintiffs--Appellees, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, LOCAL # 1010, DIST. # 118, LOCAL LODGE NO. 254; Mark Shore; David Lake; R.R. Donnelly Printing Company, L.P., Defendants--Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1214

139 F.3d 1214

157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2927

David ST. JOHN; Laura St. John, Plaintiffs--Appellees, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE

WORKERS, LOCAL # 1010, DIST. # 118, LOCAL LODGE

NO. 254; Mark Shore; David Lake; R.R.

Donnelly Printing Company,

L.P., Defendants--Appellants.

Nos. 97-2108, 97-2111.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 21, 1997.

Decided April 1, 1998.

Joe Walsh, Des Moines, IA, argued (Mark T. Hedberg, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants Lake Shore IAMAW.

Paul F. Gleeson, Chicago, IL, argued (Michael R. Rick, James R. Swanger, Richard H. Schnadig, Theodore J. Tierney and Gerald E. Ziebell, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant R.R. Donnelley Printing.

Curt Krull, Des Moines, IA, argued, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Before LOKEN, HEANEY, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Once again, we are called upon to decide whether the need for uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements requires that a state tort remedy be preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Local Lodge No. 254 of the International Association of Machinists ("the Union"), two Union agents, and R.R. Donnelly Printing Company ("Donnelly") appeal a district court order remanding pendent tort claims to state court after David St. John dismissed his federally preempted claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement between Donnelly and the Union. Because the amended complaint reveals that the remaining tort claims are at least in part preempted, we conclude that the district court erred in remanding those claims to state court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

David St. John and his wife, Laura, commenced this action in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. The record on appeal consists of their amended petition to that court. The petition alleges that: David St. John was a Donnelly employee in Des Moines, Iowa; the Union was the exclusive bargaining representative of Donnelly employees; the governing collective bargaining agreement "allowed the Union to set hours and assign shift duties for its employees, including David St. John"; St. John at some point withdrew from Union membership; St. John "was required to work excessive hours with little or no time off for mental and physical recuperation, contrary to medical advice"; the Union "deliberately changed shift assignments to prevent [St. John] from getting more time off work, contrary to medical advice"; St. John "would encounter vicious and harsh reactions" from Union members, including defendants Mark Shore and David Lake, and from Donnelly management, when he requested time off from work; and St. John was admitted to a psychiatric medical center on November 22, 1994, for treatment of the mental distress caused by defendants' actions. After setting forth these allegations, and attaching a copy of the collective bargaining agreement, the St. Johns pleaded five state law causes of action: intentional infliction of emotional distress by Shore and Lake; intentional infliction of emotional distress by the Union; breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the Union; intentional infliction of emotional distress by Donnelly; and loss of consortium, a claim by Laura St. John against all defendants.

Defendants removed to the Southern District of Iowa and moved to dismiss on the ground that the St. Johns' claims are both preempted by § 301 and barred by § 301's six-month statute of limitations. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). The St. Johns responded by seeking dismissal of their breach of contract claim and remand of the remaining state law tort claims as not preempted. After dismissing the breach of contract claim, the district court remanded the remaining claims to state court because resolution of those claims "does not require the construction or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement." This appeal followed.

I. Is the Remand Order Reviewable?

Before oral argument, we asked the parties to address whether the district court's remand order is "not reviewable on appeal" under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). We conclude the order is reviewable. Section 1447(d) is limited to remand orders issued under § 1447(c), the statute requiring remand when the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or the removal was procedurally defective. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 710-12, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 119 F.3d 619, 623 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 852, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998). Neither of those grounds for remand applies in this case. There was no procedural challenge to the removal, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because David St. John's breach of contract claim against the union was completely preempted by § 301. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429-30, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Moreover, that jurisdiction included supplemental jurisdiction over the entire action, because the St. Johns' tort claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Kansas Public Emp. Ret. System v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 359, 136 L.Ed.2d 250 (1996) (quotations omitted).

Dismissal of the breach of contract claim left the district court with two jurisdiction issues. First, if any of the St. Johns' remaining tort claims are preempted, the court continues to have federal question jurisdiction and must continue to exercise removal jurisdiction over the entire action. See In Re Otter Tail Power Co., 116 F.3d 1207, 1214 (8th Cir.1997). Second, if the remaining claims are not preempted, the court may exercise discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The court concluded that the tort claims are not preempted because they do not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and it then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claims. Normally, the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction results in a dismissal without prejudice. See Labickas v. Arkansas State Univ., 78 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 395, 136 L.Ed.2d 310 (1996). But the court upon declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a removed case may remand non-removable claims to state court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). This type of remand order, which results from the dismissal of federal claims over which the court had subject matter jurisdiction, puts the litigants "effectively out of court" and is therefore a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712-14, 116 S.Ct. at 1719; Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 541-42 (8th Cir.1996).

II. Should the Case Be Remanded?

With the dismissal of St John's breach of contract claim against the Union, this case primarily involves his state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Union, two of its agents, and Donnelly. ¹ If any of those claims are federally preempted, the district court may not remand the case to state court.

Though Congress has never occupied the entire labor field, the federal labor laws have powerful preemptive force. For example, § 301 has been construed "as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Preemption of inconsistent state law actions and remedies necessarily followed, because "[t]he possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements." Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). Thus, when a state law tort claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract," it is preempted under § 301. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. Conversely, when the state law claim is independent--in that its resolution "does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement"--it is not preempted. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); see Luecke v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 517, 136 L.Ed.2d 405 (1996).

A. The Claims Against the Union Defendants. This case is somewhat unusual in that St. John directs his allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace primarily at the Union and its agents, Shore and Lake, rather than his employer. The amended petition alleges, in part, that the collective bargaining agreement granted the Union control over his hours of work and shift assignments, and it exercised that power so as to exacerbate his mental and physical health problems, contrary to his physician's advice. This claim necessarily requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and is therefore preempted. As the Supreme Court explained in preempting a negligence claim against plaintiff's union in International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 862, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2168, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987):

In order to determine the Union's tort liability ... a court would have to...