Smith v. LOCAL UNION NO. 110, INTERN. BROTH., Civil No. 09-2528 (DWF/SRN).

• Decision Date: 13 January 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09-2528 (DWF/SRN).
• Citation: 681 F. Supp.2d 995
• Parties: Jerry SMITH, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 110, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

681 F. Supp.2d 995

Jerry SMITH, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 110, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant.

Civil No. 09-2528 (DWF/SRN).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

January 13, 2010.

George L. May, Esq., May & O'Brien, LLP, for Plaintiff.

Brendan D. Cummins, Esq., & Francis P. Rojas, Esq., Miller O'Brien Cummins, PLLP, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jerry Smith's motion to remand (Doc. No. 8) and Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 2). For the reasons stated below, this Court denies the remand motion and grants the dismissal motion, although without prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Smith is employed by Ideacom Mid-America St. Paul, Inc., which has a contract with Smith's union, Defendant Local Union No. 110, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The contract governs, among other terms of employment, the medical and dental insurance program that Ideacom provides its employees. In 2008 and again in 2009, Ideacom changed the terms of coverage to the detriment of its employees (for example, by increasing the deductibles under that coverage, by reducing the portion of coverage it would pay after deductibles would be met, and by increasing employees' out-of-pocket annual maximums).

Smith protested to Local 110 that Ideacom was violating the contractual provision requiring Ideacom "to maintain the existing medical and dental health program for the duration of the agreement" and asked the union to grieve the alleged breaches of contract and to arbitrate the grievances. Instead, the union mediated the dispute with the employer, which essentially resulted in the employer largely maintaining the changes in coverage and cost to the employees' detriment.

Smith then filed a Statement of Claim in Minnesota Conciliation Court alleging that due to the "Union's failure to represent" him and the other union members in enforcing the agreement, he has incurred (or would incur) damages in excess of $5,820. (Doc. No. 1, Attachment 1.) The union removed, contending that Smith asserts a federal "fair representation" claim. Smith now moves to remand the entire action back to state court, arguing that his action also involves four additional state-law claims, that federal jurisdiction exists over only the fair representation claim, and that such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 14.) Finally, the Union moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 2.)

DISCUSSION

Because this action was removed from Minnesota Conciliation Court, which is not subject to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure that would have required a plaintiff to file a complaint that would be comparable to a complaint filed in federal court, there is a temptation of convenience and efficiency to address first the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, thereby deferring the jurisdictional analysis required by Smith's motion to remand until an amended complaint could provide a more complete and proper basis from which to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists. But because this Court is one of limited jurisdiction, it is obligated to address the removal and remand issues first and to proceed to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if it is satisfied that federal subject matter jurisdiction is present.

I. Removal Was Proper And This Court Has Jurisdiction Over The Entire Action

A defendant may remove "only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). Where, as here, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction, "federal-question jurisdiction is required. The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Id.

But under "an `independent corollary' to the well-pleaded complaint rule, ... known as the `complete preemption' doctrine," certain federal statutes contain a preemption provision that does not simply provide the usual "federal defense" to a state-law claim—which thus would not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement that the federal claim appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint—but rather converts the state-law claim "`into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule'" such that the action is properly removable. Id. (internal citation omitted).

A. Smith's "Fair Representation" Claim Is Federal And Therefore Removable

The Union removed Smith's action on the ground that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over an employee's claim that a union breached its duty of fair representation. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 3.) The Union asserted that federal question jurisdiction existed under 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, et seq. and Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). (Id.)

As noted above, the basis for evaluating the existence of a federal question is confined, of course, to the plaintiff's complaint. By claiming that the Union "failed to represent" him in the negotiations with his employer, Smith's de facto Complaint (his Statement of Claim filed in Minnesota Conciliation Court) plainly alleges a "fair representation" claim.¹ Smith's "fair representation" claim is removable because it arises under federal law. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 83-84, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (explaining that such a claim arises under the NLRA, such that federal jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), granting federal jurisdiction of any civil action "arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce").

Indeed, Smith concedes as much, noting that of his five purported claims, "only one, the failure to adequately represent members, is a claim within the purview of this Court's jurisdiction." (Doc. No. 14 at 4.) Smith contends, however, that even if the fair representation claim is federal, jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the states, not exclusively federal. (Doc. No. 8, ¶¶ 2-3; doc. No. 14 at 6-7.) But concurrent jurisdiction provides no basis for remand. E.g., Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir.1998) (concluding that action alleging state-law claims in addition to Section 1983 claim was properly removed "notwithstanding the fact that federal courts share original jurisdiction with the courts of the state in which they sit").² While such a claim could have been brought originally in either state or federal court, where a plaintiff files such a claim in state court the defendant—at its election—may remove it to federal court. See id.³ Moreover, a federal claim that is properly removed is not subject to remand—that is, contrary to Smith's contention, this Court has no discretion to then remand to state court a federal claim simply because original jurisdiction was also proper in state court. Gaming Corp. Of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 542 (8th Cir.1996).⁴

B. Smith's Additional Claims Would Not Preclude Removal Or Warrant Remand

The fact that this case originated not in a Minnesota district court, but rather in Minnesota Conciliation Court, which is subject to its own rules of simplified pleading, adds a minor wrinkle to the analysis. The Statement of Claim does not separately delineate individual claims or causes of action.⁵ But any fair reading discloses that Smith's claim is premised on his union's handling of his grievance with his employer's changes to the insurance plan—that is, a federal "fair representation" claim.

Nevertheless, he now contends that his allegations also support four additional state-law claims.⁶ Smith contends that his de facto Complaint includes not only a claim that the Union failed to adequately represent its members—which Smith concedes is subject to federal jurisdiction—but also state-law claims for "breach of contract, breach of trust, failure to process a grievance pursuant to the Union's labor agreement ... and bad faith." (Doc. No. 14 at 4.)

But where an action involves multiple claims, only one of which is subject to federal jurisdiction, the entire action, including the otherwise non-removable state-law claims, is removable as long as the state-law claims fall within a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction (what used to be called pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction). Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that federal court would have supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367 over the state-law claims that arose from same case or controversy underlying federal question claim); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Here it appears beyond question that the four state-law claims Smith now contends are included in his de facto Complaint arise from the same case or controversy giving rise to his federal claim, that is, the Union's handling of the insurance plan negotiations with Smith's employer. Thus even assuming that Smith's action includes the additional claims that he characterizes as arising under state law, there still is no basis for remand. Because it is clear that Smith has alleged at least a federal "fair representation" claim, and that such a claim is subject to federal jurisdiction, the entire action was properly removed to federal court and this Court has supplemental federal jurisdiction over the additional claims because they arise from the same case or controversy supporting the federal claim.

And in any event, those claims are subject to the doctrine of so-called "complete preemption" and thus independently removable as federal claims.⁷ The four additional claims—"breach of contract, breach of trust, failure to process a grievance pursuant to...