St. John v. State of NC Parole Com'n
| Decision Date | 02 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. C-C-90-286-P.,C-C-90-286-P. |
| Citation | 764 F. Supp. 403 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Jim ST. JOHN, Curtis Rene Peterson and Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., Petitioners, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA PAROLE COMMISSION, Louis Columbo, Chairman and John Patseavouras, Director of the State of North Carolina Parole Commission, Respondents. |
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Nelson Casstevens, Casstevens Hanner Gunter & Gordon, Harold Bender, Charlotte, N.C., Lee J. Klein, Bradley J. Shafer, Klein & Shafer, P.C., Okemos, Mich., for petitioners.
Richard N. League, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N.C., for respondents.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Respondents' motions, filed October 22, 1990, for summary judgment. The motions are in response to a petition filed by Petitioners on August 31, 1990 in which Petitioners St. John and Peterson seek relief from incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Petitioner Cinema Blue seeks relief from paying a fine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 4, 1991, Respondents filed amended motions for summary judgment. Petitioners, on March 7, 1991 and March 19, 1991, filed responses to the motions for summary judgment. On April 18, 1991, Petitioners filed an amended petition naming as Respondents those state officials currently maintaining custody over Petitioners.
Petitioners were indicted in 1988 by the Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Grand Jury on various counts of disseminating obscene materials in violation of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-190.1. Cinema Blue was an adult bookstore and theater located in Mecklenburg County. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioners St. John and Peterson were the owners/operators of Cinema Blue. The indictments charged Petitioners with selling six (6) obscene videotapes and one (1) obscene magazine in 1988. Prior to trial, the State dismissed the indictment as to three (3) of the videotapes.
In February, 1989, the Honorable Marvin Gray presided over the trial involving the remaining three (3) videotapes and the single magazine.1 The videotapes were shown to the jury as was the magazine. The principal evidence offered by Petitioners was the voir dire, proffered testimony of five (5) expert witnesses and documents derived from studies conducted by these experts. The studies included a random telephone survey of 407 adults from Mecklenburg County, a film evaluation study by 129 adults of the six (6) videotapes and the magazine listed in the indictment, a telephone study of 200 Cinema Blue customers, and a study of materials comparable to those at issue in the indictment. The expert witnesses testified that their studies indicated pursuant to the contemporary community standard of Mecklenburg County, the materials at issue would not appeal to a prurient interest and would not be patently offensive to the average person in the community.
After hearing the voir dire testimony, Judge Gray excluded all of the expert testimony, the documents from the studies, and the expert conclusions derived from the studies. Thereafter, the jury found the videotapes "Video Games Vol. X, Cum and Cum Again III" and "Cum Shot Review, Vol. Four" obscene. The jury failed to find the remaining videotape "the Big Switch" and the magazine to be obscene. Accordingly, the jury returned guilty verdicts against Petitioners. Judge Gray imposed terms of imprisonment of six (6) years each on Petitioners St. John and Peterson, and imposed a $150,000.00 fine on Petitioner Cinema Blue.
Petitioners appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. On June 5, 1990, that court affirmed the convictions and finding that the two (2) videotapes were obscene. The North Carolina Supreme Court entered a temporary stay of execution of sentence on June 27, 1990. On July 26, 1990, the North Carolina Supreme Court dissolved the stay and denied Petitioners' Petition for Discretionary Review. The court, on August 20, 1990, denied Petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
This action was filed on August 31, 1990 and assigned to the undersigned.2 On September 26, 1990, Petitioners filed a motion to stay the execution of sentence. The Court on October 1, 1990 denied Petitioners' motion. The Court is informed that thereafter Petitioners were taken into custody by the appropriate North Carolina officials. On January 23, 1991, the Court entered an Order staying this matter while Petitioners' writ of certiorari was pending before the United States Supreme Court.
The Court dissolved that stay on March 6, 1991 after learning that the Supreme Court had denied certiorari on February 19, 1991. On March 26, 1991, the Court granted Petitioners' motion to amend the petition in order to substitute the parties presently having custody of Petitioners as Respondents. On April 18, 1991, Petitioners filed the amended petition substituting as Respondents the appropriate North Carolina Parole Commission officials since Petitioners have been recently paroled. Because the amended petition is identical to the original petition and because the interests of the current Respondents are identical to that of the former Respondents, the Court does not believe it is necessary for Respondents to respond to the amended petition. Rather, the Court will treat the previously filed materials of the former Respondents as having been filed for the current Respondents.
Having given the parties ample time to brief the numerous issues presented in the Petition, the Court now believes that this matter is ripe for disposition. The Court for the reasons enunciated below finds that Petitioners' federal constitutional rights were not violated during the trial of this matter, and that Respondents motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, responses to discovery, and the record reveal that no genuine issue of any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that evidence exists to support its claims and that a genuine issue for trial exists. Id.; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see F.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (). When considering motions for summary judgment, courts must view facts and inferences from the facts in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1356-57; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). When, however, the evidence from the entire record could not lead a rational fact-finder to find for the non-moving party, no genuine issue for trial exists and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.
In this case, only legal issues are presented to the Court concerning the constitutionality of Petitioners' convictions. Thus, no issues of material fact are in dispute and summary judgment is appropriate. The Court has reviewed the entire record in this matter including the case file, the voluminous transcripts from the trial, relevant exhibits from the trial, and the applicable law.3 The Court's discussion follows.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the procedure utilized to challenge on federal constitutional grounds a state conviction. See Postconviction Relief and Prisoners' Civil Rights Law in the Fourth Circuit, at 1 (1991) (hereinafter "Postconviction Relief"). The Petitioner must show a substantial constitutional deprivation in order to prevail on the habeas petition, and the Petitioner carries the burden of proof. See Clayton v. Haynes, 517 F.2d 577 (4th Cir.1975).
In order to maintain standing in a § 2254 action, the Petitioner must raise a cognizable claim — one that alleges violations of the federal Constitution, laws or treaties. See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 96 S.Ct. 175, 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (1975). Moreover, the Petitioner must be in state custody. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 375-76, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). The Petitioner must also raise a "live case or controversy" — one that is not moot. See Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838 (4th Cir.1986). Additionally, the Petitioner must have exhausted all state remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). The Petitioner is further required to have complied with state procedural rules which would provide adequate and independent grounds for state relief. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). Finally, the Petitioner must demonstrate that the petition is not prejudicially delayed or successive. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); Johnson v. Riddle, 562 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1977).
In this case, Respondents have not raised any serious contentions that Petitioners have failed to meet their initial burden of standing as enunciated above.4 The basis of Respondents' motion for summary judgment is...
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St. John v. North Carolina Parole Bd. Com'n, 91-7581
...--- U.S. ----, 60 U.S.L.W. 4015 (Dec. 4, 1991), we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See St. John v. State of North Carolina Parole Comm'n, 764 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C.1991). ...