St. Joseph & G.I.R. Co. v. Devereux

• Decision Date: 30 December 1889
• Citation: 41 F. 14
• Parties: ST. JOSEPH & G.I.R. CO. v. DEVEREUX, SHERIFF.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

41 F. 14

ST. JOSEPH & G.I.R. CO. v. DEVEREUX, SHERIFF.

United States Circuit Court, D. Kansas.

December 30, 1889

A. L Williams, for complainant.

J. L Gillpatrick, for defendant.

BREWER J.

This is a bill, filed by complainant, to enjoin the collection of taxes on a bridge crossing the Missouri river at St. Joseph. The entire bridge was assessed by the county authorities of Doniphan county as being an independent structure, and wholly within the limits of the county. The bridge was built under a special charter, but afterwards became the property of the railroad company, the complainant. Complainant returned the bridge to the railroad assessors of the state as a part of its mileage, and without in any wise specifying that it was a bridge. It cost over half a million of dollars, is now worth over three hundred thousand, and is used not simply as a railroad bridge, but also for general travel. It crosses the Missouri river from the city of St. Joseph, Mo., to the Kansas shore.

Two questions are presented: First. Is it wholly within the county of Doniphan? And that depends upon where the boundary line between the states of Kansas and Missouri is,-- whether in the center of the main channel or on the east bank of the river. Second. Did the return of this as a part of the railroad track exempt it from taxation as an independent structure in Doniphan county?

With respect to the latter question there can be little doubt. The bridge was not constructed as a part of the railroad. It is a costly structure, used for purposes of general travel; and the fact that the railroad company has its rails upon and runs its cars across it does not destroy its original character as an independent structure. It is clearly subject to local taxation.

The first question is, however, one of difficulty. Historically the original western boundary of the state of Missouri was defined by 'a meridian line passing through the middle of the mouth of the Kansas river, where the same empties into the Missouri river; thence, from the point aforesaid, north, along the said meridian line, to the intersection of the parallel of latitude which passes through the rapids of the river Des Moines. ' Act of March 6, 1820. This left a narrow strip between such western boundary and the Missouri river. At the session of 1834-- 35, an amendment of the constitution of Missouri was adopted, section 4 of which reads as follows:

'SEC. 4. That the boundary of the state be so altered and extended as to include all that tract of land lying on the north side of the Missouri river, and west of the present boundary of this state, so that the same shall be bounded on the south by the middle of the main channel of the Missouri river, and on the north by the present northern boundary line of the state, as established by the constitution, when the same is continued in a right line to the west, or to include so much of said tract of land as congress may assent.'

And by the act of congress approved June 7, 1836, this strip above mentioned, known as the 'Platte Purchase,' was ceded to the state of Missouri. The language of the act is as follows:

'Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that when the Indian title to all the lands lying between the state of Missouri and the Missouri river shall be extinguished, the jurisdiction over said lands shall be hereby ceded to the state of Missouri, and the western boundary of said state shall be then extended to the Missouri river, reserving to the United States the original right of soil in said lands, and of disposing of the same: provided, that this act shall not take effect until the president shall by proclamation declare that the Indian title to said lands has been extinguished; nor shall it take effect until the state of Missouri shall have assented to the provisions of this act.' 5 St.U.S. 34.

Now, the contention is that by this act the western boundary was fixed at the east bank of the river. This, I think, is a mistake; and that the center of the channel is the boundary line, and the limit of the cession made by this act. It will be seen that the petition was for a tract bounded by the middle of the channel of the Missouri river, and the grant of jurisdiction was over the lands 'between' the old state line and the 'Missouri river;' and this western boundary was 'extended to the Missouri river,' and this grant was made, and its boundary fixed, obviously, in response to the petition. Counsel for the defendant urge that this shall be taken as a grant from one proprietor to another, while to my mind it is to be regarded not only in the light of a grant, but also as an act, by competent authority, establishing the boundary line of a state, independent, in some respects, but within the general jurisdiction of the authority making the designation. It is true there is a cession of jurisdiction, and therefore something in the nature of a grant. So there is whenever any new state is carved out of the territories. The new political organization is granted jurisdiction over the prescribed territory; but, after all, the main idea is the governmental one,-- the declaration of the boundaries of the new jurisdiction. It is true, here was a state already in existence, and jurisdiction over this territory was transferred to it, and therefore there is in it more of the nature of a grant; but, even in this case, it is also to be regarded as a governmental declaration of the boundary. It will be noticed that the cession is to the river, and not to the bank. The words are general. There are no special words of exception or limitation. In the case of Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. 41, the question was presented as to the eastern boundary of the corporate limits of the city of St. Louis. The calls for boundary in the charter were:

'Beginning at Antoine Roy's mill, on the bank of the Mississippi; thence running sixty arpens west; thence south, on said line of sixty arpens, in the rear, until the same comes to the Barrieu Donoyer; thence due south, until it comes to the Sugar Loaf; thence due east, to the Mississippi; from thence, by the Mississippi, to the place first mentioned.'

And upon this the supreme court adjudged the boundary the center of the channel, saying, in the opinion:

'Many authorities resting on adjudged cases have been adduced to

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