St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff

• Decision Date: 26 August 1999
• Citation: 999 S.W.2d 579
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Austin 1999) St. Joseph Hospital, Appellant v. Stacy Lynn Wolff, Individually; and Ray Wolff and Sandra Wolff, Individually and as Next Friends of Stacy Lynn Wolff, Appellees NO. 03-97-00718-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 579

999 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999)

St. Joseph Hospital, Appellant v. Stacy Lynn Wolff, Individually; and Ray Wolff and Sandra Wolff Individually and as Next Friends of Stacy Lynn Wolff, Appellees

NO. 03-97-00718-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

August 26, 1999

Rehearing Overruled Oct. 14, 1999.

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 201ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 95-11336, HONORABLE JOSEPH H. HART, JUDGE PRESIDING

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel

Lee Yeakel, Justice

Affirmed

Appellees, Stacy Lynn Wolff ("Stacy") and her parents, Ray and Sandra Wolff individually and as next friends of Stacy,¹ brought a medical-malpractice action against appellant St. Joseph Hospital ("St. Joseph") for the alleged negligent treatment of Stacy by one of St. Joseph's surgical residents, Dr. Mario Villafani. Following a jury trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor of the Wolffs. St. Joseph appeals the judgment on the primary assertion that it is not liable for Dr. Villafani's negligence. St. Joseph also asserts various jury charge, evidentiary, and statutory errors. We will affirm the district-court judgment.

BACKGROUND

St. Joseph, a private hospital located in Houston, operates a general surgery residency program ("General Program").² To provide its surgical residents with "extensive experience in general surgery" and to ensure its surgical program accreditation, St. Joseph established the Integrated General Surgery Residency Program ("Integrated Program") with the Central Texas Medical Foundation (the "Foundation"), a nonprofit organization that renders medical treatment to patients at Brackenridge Hospital ("Brackenridge") in Austin by operating accredited medical-residency training programs. Through this program, St. Joseph assigns surgical residents in its General Program to train in the Integrated Program with the Foundation at Brackenridge.

In May 1994, Stacy Wolff was in a serious car accident while a passenger in an automobile operated by a friend. After initial emergency treatment at the scene of the accident, the unconscious Stacy was taken to Brackenridge by helicopter where she was admitted to the hospital's intensive-care unit and placed on a ventilator because she could not breathe without assistance. Upon her admission to Brackenridge, Stacy's attending physician was Dr. David Harshaw, an experienced surgeon and the director of surgical education for the Foundation. The next day Stacy was assigned to Dr. Villafani, a third-year surgical resident from St. Joseph on assignment at Brackenridge through the Integrated Program. At that time all of the surgery residents at Brackenridge were from St. Joseph.

Several days later, due to Stacy's continued dependence on a ventilator, Doctors Harshaw and Villafani performed a tracheostomy³ on Stacy. A few days following the procedure, Stacy began to lose a significant amount of blood from the area where the tracheostomy had been performed. Dr. Villafani examined Stacy when the blood loss was first realized, but, after running several tests, decided not to call the attending physician or chief resident for assistance. Within a few hours of his examination, Stacy suffered from a tracheoinnominate fistula⁴ and began to bleed profusely. Because of this blood loss, Stacy's heart began to fibrillate and she eventually went into cardiac arrest. As a result, Stacy suffered permanent brain damage.

The Wolffs brought a medical-malpractice claim against Doctors Villafani and Harshaw, Brackenridge, St. Joseph, the Foundation, and other persons on the medical staff at Brackenridge involved in Stacy's treatment, alleging, inter alia, that (1) the defendants were vicariously liable for Dr. Villafani's negligence; and (2) St. Joseph and the Foundation were engaged in a joint venture or joint enterprise and are thus jointly liable for any negligent acts or omissions of Dr. Villafani. At the time of trial, all defendants had settled except St. Joseph.

Following a trial on the Wolffs' claims against St. Joseph, the jury found, in pertinent part, that the cardiac respiratory arrest that resulted from Stacy's tracheoinnominate fistula was a serious, permanent, and disabling injury proximately caused by the negligence of Dr. Villafani while he was employed by the Foundation and acting within the scope of such employment.⁵ The jury awarded Stacy $8,000,000 and Ray and Sandra Wolff $750,000 each for past and future damages. The district court rendered a final judgment in favor of the Wolffs, ordering St. Joseph to pay Stacy $6,887,332.31, and Ray and Sandra Wolff each $645,683.27.⁶ The district court also ordered St. Joseph to pay all court costs and the Wolffs' attorney's fees up to $10,000.

On appeal, St. Joseph argues: (1) it is not responsible for Dr. Villafani's conduct in treating Stacy; (2) the district court failed to properly instruct the jury; (3) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of insurance during the trial; and (4) statutory caps on damages should apply in this case.

DISCUSSION

St Joseph's Liability

St. Joseph contends that it is not responsible for Stacy's injury because: (1) Dr. Villafani was not an employee of St. Joseph while treating Stacy; (2) there is legally or factually insufficient evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture between St. Joseph and the Foundation; (3) the jury's finding that St. Joseph ratified the conduct of Dr. Villafani was legally or, in the alternative, factually insufficient; and (4) St. Joseph owed no duty to Stacy.

We will first address St. Joseph's assertion that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that St. Joseph and the Foundation engaged in a joint enterprise in establishing and operating the Integrated Program of which Dr. Villafani was a part when he treated Stacy at Brackenridge. We review such challenges under a sufficiency of the evidence standard of review.⁷ In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the record evidence in a light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered, and every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in that party's favor. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998) (citing Harbin v. Seale, 461 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. 1970)). We will uphold the jury's finding if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support it. See id.; Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Casarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995). Thus, if there is any evidence of probative force to support the jury's finding "'that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions,'" the no-evidence challenge will fail. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994)); see ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997) (citing Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1989)).

When reviewing a jury verdict to determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). The appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact simply because it disagrees with the result;⁸ instead, it should set aside the verdict only if it is so clearly wrong as to be manifestly unjust. See id.

Joint Enterprise

A joint enterprise, in the context of the law of negligence, is a legal relationship between two or more parties that imposes on each participant the responsibility for the negligent acts of the other while acting in furtherance of their common undertaking. See Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. 1974); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 981 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted). The jury found that St. Joseph and the Foundation were engaged in a joint enterprise, that Dr. Villafani was employed by St. Joseph and the Foundation, and that he was acting in furtherance of the mission of both during his treatment of Stacy. St. Joseph does not dispute that Dr. Villafani was an employee of the Foundation. Thus, if the evidence supports the jury's finding that St. Joseph and the Foundation were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time of the injury to Stacy arising from her surgery, St. Joseph is responsible for any negligence of Dr. Villafani.

St. Joseph argues that not only is the evidence legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of a joint enterprise between itself and the Foundation, but also that the district court improperly submitted the definition of joint enterprise in his charge to the jury.

Prior to 1974, the doctrine of joint enterprise was more broadly applied in Texas than it is today. Its application covered enterprises having a personal purpose as well as those related to a commercial or business purpose. See Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 15. In Shoemaker, the supreme court adopted the characterization of joint enterprise set forth in the Restatement of Torts:

The elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly stated to be four: (1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control. Whether these elements exist is frequently a question for the jury, under proper direction from the court.

Id. at 16-17 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 491 cmt. c (1965)). The court then specifically noted that it was "limiting the application of the doctrine to an enterprise having a...