St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Doe, Case No. 2D16–2122
Decision Date | 13 January 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D16–2122 |
Citation | 208 So.3d 1200 |
Parties | ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL, INC., Petitioner, v. Jane DOE, Respondent. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
H. Hamilton Rice, III, and Katherine M. Benson of Bush Graziano Rice & Platter, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.
Jennifer Erin Jones and John R. Hightower, Jr., of McIntyre, Thanasides, Bringgold, Elliott, Grimaldi & Guito, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.
St. Joseph's Hospital seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order denying its motion for summary judgment in Jane Doe's action against St. Joseph's. Ms. Doe's lawsuit stems from her allegation that she was sexually assaulted by a hospital employee while she was a patient in the hospital's mental health care facility. In its motion for summary judgment, St. Joseph's argued that Ms. Doe's claims sounded in medical negligence and that therefore she was required to adhere to the presuit notice requirements set forth in chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2010), which undisputedly she did not do. Because we conclude that count two of Ms. Doe's complaint was indeed a claim for medical negligence, we grant the petition as to that count only and deny the petition as to count one of the complaint.
In order to be entitled to certiorari relief, "[a] petitioner must establish (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal." Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc. , 658 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The latter two jurisdictional prongs of this standard are satisfied as "[t]he statutes requiring presuit notice and screening ‘cannot be meaningfully enforced postjudgment because the purpose of the presuit screening is to avoid the filing of the lawsuit in the first instance.’ " Fassy v. Crowley , 884 So.2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoting Parkway Bank , 658 So.2d at 649 ). Accordingly, "for certiorari relief to be granted, the trial court's order must depart from the essential requirements of the law." GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley , 59 So.3d 138, 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Here, St. Joseph's argued in its petition for writ of certiorari that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by determining that the allegations in Ms. Doe's complaint did not amount to medical negligence. Section 766.202(7) defines "medical negligence" as "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract," and section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Thus, the "key inquiry" in determining if a claim is one for medical malpractice under chapter 766 is "whether the action aris[es] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." Fassy , 884 So.2d at 364 (alteration in original) (quoting J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola , 635 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1994) ).
In her complaint, Ms. Doe alleged that while she was a mental health patient at St. Joseph's, a mental health technician employed by the hospital sexually assaulted her in her room. She further alleged that when she reported the incident to hospital officials, they tried to intimidate her and failed to investigate the allegation. Specifically, count one of the complaint was for negligence and alleged in part as follows:
It is clear that the allegations in count one do not "aris[e] out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care." See id. (quoting J.B. , 635 So.2d at 947 ). Ms. Doe alleged that St. Joseph's did not protect her from a sexual assault by its employee, who was able to enter and exit her room several times at night without supervision. Nothing about these allegations concerning negligent supervision and negligent security involved medical care or services. As such, the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law by denying St. Joseph's motion for summary judgment as to count one.
But in count two of her complaint, Ms. Doe alleged violations of section 766.110, which is entitled "Liability of healthcare facilities":
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Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Pusha, 1D17-4634
...because the purpose of the presuit screening is to avoid the filing of the lawsuit in the first instance." St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Doe , 208 So.3d 1200, 1201-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citations omitted). Thus, for certiorari relief to be granted, Shands was required to show that the order ......