St. Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines

• Decision Date: 16 November 1999
• Citation: 8 S.W.3d 143
• Parties: (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . Debbie St. Lawrence, Appellant, v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Respondent. Case Number: ED75774 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date:
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

8 S.W.3d 143 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

Debbie St. Lawrence, Appellant, v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Respondent.

Case Number: ED75774

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District

Handdown Date: 11/16/99

Appeal From: Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. Robert H. Dierker, Jr.

Counsel for Appellant: MaDouglas Brian Salsbury

Counsel for Respondent: John B. Renick and Geoffrey Macdonald Gilbert

Opinion Summary: Debbie St. Lawrence ("Appellant") brought a civil action for damages against her former employer Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("Respondent") asserting a common law tort claim for negligent training and resulting economic losses and a section 287.780 retaliatory discharge claim. Appellant appeals from the following judgments: (1) a summary judgment as to Appellant's common law tort claim; and (2) a summary judgment as to Appellant's section 287.780 retaliatory discharge claim.

REVERSED and REMANDED, as to Count I, with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED, as to Count II.

Division Two Holds: (1) As to Count I, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission had original and exclusive jurisdiction, and accordingly, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (2) As to Count II, Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the exclusive causation element of Appellant's prima facie case.

Opinion Author: Sherri B. Sullivan, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED and REMANDED, as to Count I, with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. AFFIRMED, as to Count II. Crane, P.J., and Dowd, J., concur.

Opinion:

Debbie St. Lawrence ("Appellant") brought a civil action for damages against her former employer Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("Respondent") asserting a common law tort claim for negligent training and resulting economic losses and a section 287.780¹ retaliatory discharge claim. Appellant appeals from the following judgments: (1) a summary judgment as to Appellant's common law tort claim; and (2) a summary judgment as to Appellant's section 287.780 retaliatory discharge claim. As to Count I, we reverse and remand with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As to Count II, we affirm.

Respondent hired Appellant as a reservations sales agent in May 1994. Although she had attendance problems in 1995, Appellant received several commendations from customers for her work at the Frequent Flier Service Desk. In August 1995, Appellant applied to become and was accepted as a member of Respondent's Trauma Response Team ("Team") as a "Family Escort." The function of the Team is to represent Respondent and to provide services for survivors or victims' families in the event of a catastrophe such as an airplane crash.

After her acceptance onto the Team, Appellant attended a one-day training session, which included discussion on airplane catastrophes and the role of a Family Escort. She received and read a "Family Escort Manual" ("Manual"). Appellant also was advised that she could decline to serve if asked and that she could withdraw from the Team at any time. In May 1996, Appellant attended another one-day training session, which included a video of an airplane crash and role-playing. After these training sessions, Appellant felt inadequately trained to be a Family Escort, but she did not discuss those feelings with anyone in Respondent's management or in her union.

In July 1996, TWA Flight 800 crashed. As instructed in the Manual, Appellant contacted her team leader, Steve Oliver ("Oliver"), to let him know where she could be reached. Oliver asked Appellant to serve on the Team for the Flight 800 disaster, and she agreed. Appellant flew to New York to complete her service. Her service consisted of being a liaison between Respondent and three victims' families, making travel arrangements for them, and obtaining dental records. She also escorted three caskets with victims' remains that were flown to France for a funeral service. Appellant represented Respondent at this service. Appellant served in this capacity for approximately two and a half weeks, returning to work in August after Respondent provided her with a week off. During this week off, Appellant attended a group counseling session with a mental health professional provided by Respondent for Team members. Appellant received an appreciation card from the families with whom she worked during the crisis.

The day after Appellant returned to work, she contacted Respondent's Special Health Services ("SHS") to request a counselor with whom she could talk about stress that she was experiencing. She did not indicate the cause of her stress. The contact at SHS told Appellant to call her insurance company, which referred her to a psychologist. Appellant eventually took nine days off, beginning therapy on August 14, 1996. She again returned to work on August 26 with clearance from her psychologist. Appellant did not discuss filing a workers' compensation claim with anyone in Respondent's management in August 1996.

During this time, Appellant also began having angry outbursts at colleagues and supervisors over union issues. Although she was never disciplined or reprimanded for these actions, she did apologize. Additionally, in her capacity as shop steward, Appellant filed several grievances on behalf of her colleague Donald Smith ("Smith"), all of which were denied.

On September 24, 1996, Appellant signed Smith's name on Respondent's sign-in sheet, which is maintained for attendance and payment purposes. Prior to this incident, Appellant had received a copy of Respondent's General Rules of Conduct ("Rules"), applicable to company employees and effective in September 1996. Appellant knew at the time she signed Smith's name that a rule prohibited one employee from forging the name of another employee on the sign-in sheet. Appellant said she signed Smith's name to keep him from getting into trouble. Smith later called in sick for the day.

Appellant twice denied having forged Smith's name because she feared the termination of her job. However, at a discharge hearing, Appellant admitted doing so, and Respondent terminated Appellant on October 31, 1996. Respondent provided Appellant with a letter stating the reason for termination as signing "the check-in sheet for another employee using that employee's name indicating that he was present and should be paid. That employee had called in ill." No other reason was ever given to Appellant for her termination.

After her termination, Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim. In January 1999, she received an award for mental injury due to extraordinary and unusual work-related stress arising out of and in the course of her employment.

Appellant's point one on appeal argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for her common law tort claim.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the proper method to raise a workers' compensation exclusivity defense. James v. Union Elec. Co., 978 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Mo.App. E.D. 1998). Regardless of the manner in which it is raised, when a workers' compensation exclusivity defense is raised, the circuit court must initially treat it as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. J.E. Jones Constr. Co. v. Sanders, 875 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994). Here, the circuit court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I based on a workers' compensation exclusivity defense. The circuit court's summary judgment is null and void because the only power a court has when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is to dismiss the action. Heinle v. K & R Express Sys., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Mo.App. E.D. 1996).

When a workers' compensation exclusivity defense is raised, the summary judgment standard, i.e., whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, is not the appropriate standard of review. James, 978 S.W.2d at 374. Rather, the motion to dismiss should be granted where it appears, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of workers' compensation exclusivity. Id. Although the party raising the defense has the burden to prove lack of jurisdiction, the quantum of proof required is not high. Id. In determining whether it has jurisdiction, the circuit court may consider affidavits, exhibits, and evidence pursuant to Rules 55.27 and 55.28.² Burns v. Employer Health Serv., Inc., 976 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo.App. W.D. 1998).

Where a question of jurisdiction is in doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission"). James, 978 S.W.2d at 374. The determination of whether a case falls within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction is a question of fact. Burns, 976 S.W.2d at 641. When a court's jurisdiction depends on a factual determination, the decision should be left to the sound discretion of the circuit judge. Id. Thus, this Court's review is for an abuse of discretion. Id. The circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is "so arbitrary and unreasonable that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration." Id.

This Court reviews the merits of point one on appeal because lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during a proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. Brunig v. Humburg, 957 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Mo.App. E.D. 1997).

Section 287.120 provides in part that the rights and remedies granted to an employee under the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") are exclusive and preclude all common law remedies except those not provided for by the Act. The section also provides in part that, for those...