St. Louis Car Co. v. Stillwater St. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 April 1893 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS CAR CO. v STILLWATER ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. An appearance for any other purpose than to question the jurisdiction of the court is general, and gives the court jurisdiction of the person.
2. A receivership in a suit to foreclose a mortgage on property of a corporation will not prevent another receivership, under Gen. St. 1878, c. 76, in proceedings to sequestrate all the property and effects of the corporation for the benefit of all its creditors.
Appeal from district court, Washington county; Crosby, Judge.
Action by the St. Louis Car Company against the Stillwater Street Railway Company. From an order refusing to appoint a receiver for defendant corporation, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Searles & Gail, for appellant.
J. C. Nethaway, for respondent.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, as judgment creditor, for the appointment of a receiver of the defendant corporation, under the provisions of St. 1878, c. 76. A receiver had previously been appointed in a foreclosure suit brought by one Curtis against the same defendant. The plaintiff having made a motion in the present action, the defendant appeared by attorney, the appearance being stated to be special, and objected to “any further proceedings, or any proceedings, in the action looking towards the appointment of a receiver thereof,” upon the grounds-First, that “there is a receiver already appointed therein, under and by virtue of an order of this court in an action already pending therein;” second, because the plaintiff has never acquired “jurisdiction in this action of either subject-matter or of the person of the defendant corporation.”
Giving counsel the benefit of the assumption that by “plaintiff” is meant “court,” we still think that this amounted to a general appearance, which gave the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The rule is that an appearance for any other purpose than to question the jurisdiction of the court is general. The first ground of objection to plaintiff's application for the appointment of a receiver did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, either over the subject-matter or over the person of the defendant, and did not purport to be made as such, but merely as a defense on the merits to plaintiff's motion, to wit, that a receiver had been already appointed in another action.
2. The fact that a receiver had already been appointed in the foreclosure suit constituted no reason why a receiver should not be appointed under chapter 76. A...
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