St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 49159
| Decision Date | 08 October 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 49159,49159 |
| Citation | 360 S.W.2d 638 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri, a Body Corporate and Politic, and James H. J. McNary, as Supervisor of St. Louis County, Missouri, and Herbert G. Poertner, Public Works Director of St. Louis County, Missouri, Appellants, v. The CITY OF MANCHESTER, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, and Gamble Construction Company, a Missouri Corporation, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
William E. Gallagher, County Counselor of St. Louis County, Walter H. Smith, First Asst. County Counselor, for appellants.
Boedeker, Weil & McMahon and Edgar G. Boedeker, Clayton, for respondent City of Manchester.
Stamm, Millar & Neuhoff, David L. Millar and Ray E. White, Jr., St. Louis, for respondent Gamble Const. Co.
This is an injunction suit wherein a Constitutional Home Rule Charter County seeks to enjoin a city of the fourth class from constructing and operating a sewage treatment plant and related facilities outside of the city limits in a district designated as residential under the zoning laws and building regulations enacted by the county pursuant to its home rule charter. The defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended petition was sustained and the petition dismissed. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a rehearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss was overruled and the plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiff St. Louis County is a body corporate and politic organized under a Constitutional Home Rule Charter pursuant to Art. VI, Sec. 18, of the Constitution, V.A.M.S. Plaintiffs McNary and Poertner are the supervisor and director of public works, respectively, of St. Louis County. The defendants are the City of Manchester, a fourth-class city located in St. Louis County, and the Gamble Construction Company, a Missouri corporation engaged in the general construction business. St. Louis County is a political subdivision of the state and a construction of the Constitution of this state is involved.
The defendant City of Manchester acquired by purchase a four-acre tract of land located in an unincorporated area of St. Louis County approximately one mile east of its city limits and notified St. Louis County of its intention to construct a sewage treatment plant and related facilities on the tract. The city entered into a contract with the defendant Gamble Construction Company for the erection of the plant and facilities.
The land in question is located exclusively within a district zoned residential and designated by Sec. 1003.040 and Sec. 1003.120 of the St. Louis County Revised Ordinances as a 'B' Single Family District. Section 1003.120 of the Ordinances specifically prohibits the construction, operation, or use of any business or industry not specifically enumerated therein. The section then enumerates the businesses permitted, and the construction and operation of a sewage treatment plant and related facilities are not uses permitted or enumerated. Chapter 1101 of the St. Louis County Revised Ordinances provides that it shall be unlawful to construct a building or structure within the areas of St. Louis County outside of incorporated cities without first obtaining a building permit; the defendants have not applied for, nor been granted, a building permit by St. Louis County or any of its officials.
With respect to the powers of a Home Rule Charter County, Sec. 18(c) of Art. VI of the Constitution provides that: 'The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county outside incorporated cities; * * *.' Pursuant to this constitutional authorization, the county enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance which designated as residential the district in which Manchester seeks to construct and operate its sewage disposal plant and related facilities.
The City of Manchester asserts that the zoning ordinance of St. Louis County has no application and that it is authorized by law to establish its sewage disposal plant where it chooses in St. Louis County limited only by the terms of the state statutes applicable to cities of the fourth class. Section 71.680, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., authorizes such cities to acquire sewage disposal plants within or without the city limits, and Sec. 79.380 provides that such cities may purchase or condemn within or without the city limits within five miles therefrom all necessary lands for sewer carriage and outfall. Art. IV. Sec. 37, of the Constitution, on which the city relies as the authority for the legislative grants, declares that the health and welfare of the people are matters of primary public concern and provides that the general assembly shall establish a department of public health and welfare and may grant power with respect to the health and general welfare to counties, cities or other political subdivisions of the state.
St. Louis County does not undertake to forbid or prohibit altogether the construction of a sewage disposal plant in the county outside of the city limits but contends that the location and construction of the sewage disposal plant under the statutes must be made in conformity with the county's laws and ordinances regulating the planning and zoning of the unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. Under the St. Louis County zoning law, locations for sewage treatment plants and related facilities are provided in 'K' districts. There is no contention that these provisions are arbitrary or unreasonable.
We are confronted here with adverse claims of two governmental units, each claiming to have the superior right and power to designate the location of the sewage disposal plant. In determining this question, we must construe the constitutional and legislative provisions together and harmonize them if it is reasonably possible to do so. State on inf. Wallach v. Loesch, 350 Mo. 989, 169 S.W.2d 675, 681[11, 12]; City of Olivette v. Graeler, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 827, 833.
Planning and zoning, as well as sewage disposal, is a governmental function referable to the police power. Casper v. Hetlage, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 781; Wippler v. Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 110 S.W.2d 409, 411[3, 4]; Dallas v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 39, 40. Statutory provisions for planning and zoning are expressed to be for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, comfort and general welfare. See Secs. 64.040 and 64.090 relating to counties of the first class, and Secs. 89.020 and 89.030 relating to cities, towns and villages. The planning and zoning powers which are vested in charter counties directly by the Constitution are of similar character and in some respects such constitutional powers take precedence over the legislative grants. See Casper v. Hetlage, supra, and cases therein cited.
The essential claim of the city is that it has the right to designate the location of the disposal plant in St. Louis County by reason of Secs. 71.680 and 79.380, authorizing it to acquire a sewage treatment plant beyond the city limits and giving the city the right to condemn land for this purpose. In this regard it relies primarily upon State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, Mo., 304 S.W.2d 896, and State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, Mo., 330 S.W.2d 882. In the Ferriss case the controversy was between the zoning authority of the City of Ladue and the power of a board of education to select school sites and condemn land for that purpose. The decision in the Ferriss case did not turn solely upon the existence of the right of condemnation because the statutes expressly provided that the board of education should select and locate sites for schoolhouses, which sites could be acquired by condemnation. The statutes upon which the City of Manchester relies do not expressly bestow upon it the right to select the precise location of a sewage disposal plant. The grant is general; it may be within or without the city limits. Furthermore, the nature of schools and the duties of school board members are such as justify vesting in them the right to locate schools where the school population and the public interest will best be served. The state...
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