St. Louis Housing Authority v. Magafas

• Decision Date: 08 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 47116,No. 1,47116,1
• Citation: 324 S.W.2d 697
• Parties: ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. Nicholas MAGAFAS and Rose Magafas, Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 697

324 S.W.2d 697

ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. Nicholas MAGAFAS and Rose Magafas, Respondents.

No. 47116.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 8, 1959.

James E. Crowe, John J. Shanahan, James J. Gallagher, St. Louis, for appellant, St. Louis Housing Authority.

Jesse E. Bishop, St. Louis, for respondents.

HOLMAN, Commissioner.

In this condemnation case the commissioners awarded defendants the sum of $26,500 as damages for the appropriation of certain improved real estate located in the City of St. Louis. Defendants filed exceptions, and a subsequent trial before the court resulted in a finding that defendants were entitled to recover damages in the sum of $33,848, together with interest at the rate of 6%, from the date of appropriation to the date of judgment, upon the sum of $7,348, the amount by which the circuit court award exceeded the allowance of the commissioners. The interest allowed amounted to $1,819.03 and the court accordingly entered a total judgment for defendants in the sum of $35,666.03, from which plaintiff has duly appealed.

In this court plaintiff contends (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the aforementioned item of interest, and (2) that there was no competent evidence to support an award of more than $25,162 and hence the judgment is excessive in the sum of at least $10,504.03. We have appellate jurisdiction since the amount in dispute exceeds the sum of $7,500. Article V, Section 3, Constitution of Missouri, 1945, V.A.M.S.

We will first consider the contention that the court erred in allowing interest upon the amount by which the circuit court award exceeded that of the commissioners from February 19, 1954 (the agreed date of appropriation) to the date of the circuit court judgment. 'In the great majority of the jurisdictions interest is allowed as part of the damages or compensation to which one whose property has been taken under the power of eminent domain is entitled as part of the just compensation required by the Constitution.' Annotation, 96 A.L.R. 150. 'Generally, in condemnation proceedings, where there is a substantial lapse of time between actual taking of property and payment, interest on the damages for the taking of the property from the time of the taking until the time of the final payment, or damages in the nature of interest for the delay in payment of compensation, is properly allowed.' Annotation, 36 A.L.R.2d 418. In 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain Sec. 176(a), p. 1053, there appears a somewhat similar statement of the applicable principles, as follows: 'Where payment of compensation does not accompany the taking of property for public use but is postponed to a later date, the owner of the property ordinarily is entitled to the award of an additional sum which will compensate for the delay, or which will, in other words, produce the full equivalent of the value of the property paid contemporaneously with the taking. According to the weight of authority, the owner is in such circumstances entitled to interest, or, what is similar, to damages in the nature of interest for delay in payment. The right to such interest or damages is not dependent on statutory provision or a special agreement.' See also 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, Section 272, p. 912, and Annotation 111 A.L.R. 1299, 1304.

The early Missouri cases held (or at least indicated the view) that the landowner was entitled to interest upon the delayed payment. Miller v. St. Louis & K. C. Ry. Co., 162 Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85; Webster v. Kansas City & S. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 114, 22 S.W. 474; St. Louis O. H. & C. Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 113 Mo. 458, 20 S.W. 1069. More recently, the Springfield Court of Appeals had occasion to consider the question in Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Hamlin, Mo.App., 288 S.W.2d 14. Therein, the court thoroughly considered the various aspects of the problem and concluded that the landowner (if timely request is made therefor) is entitled to recover interest (or damages for delay in payment), from the date of appropriation until the date of judgment, upon the amount whereby the circuit court determination exceeds the award of the commissioners. We refer those interested to the Hamlin opinion for a most comprehensive collection of the annotations, texts, and leading cases supporting the majority view upon the instant question. The same court, in the later case of State ex rel. State Highway Commission, v. Galloway, Mo.App., 292 S.W.2d 904, reaffirmed the view expressed in the Hamlin case upon the problem with which we are here concerned.

In the recent case of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Green, Mo. Sup., 305 S.W.2d 688, we gave consideration to the landowners' claim for interest upon the delayed payment but found it unnecessary to decide the question. In that case the claim for interest was not made until after the jury had returned its verdict fixing the amount of damages and the case was disposed of by a holding that, absent statutory authority, the trial court did not have the power to compute interest and add the amount thereof the sum fixed by the jury in its verdict and enter judgment for the total of the two sums. It will be noted that in the instant case the claim for interest was presented before trial and the court had the power or jurisdiction to include an allowance therefor in its finding and judgment. The question presented is whether the defendants may properly be allowed interest (or damages for delay in payment) under the circumstances existing herein.

Plaintiff contends that the court erred in allowing interest because the claim was unliquidated and there was no statutory or constitutional authority for the allowance of same. It points to the general rule that interest is not usually allowed on unliquidated demands for the reason that the person liable does not know the amount he owes and hence cannot be in default because of his failure to pay. 15 Am.Jur., Damages, Section 161, p. 579. However, we have the view that cases involving the determination of the amount of damages that should be paid a landowner as the result of the condemnation of his property are clearly distinguishable from the ordinary damage suit or other unliquidated claim.

The constitution provides 'That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascertained by a jury or board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such manner as may be provided by law; and until the same shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of the owner therein diversted.' Art. 1, Section 26, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S. In the case before us the property was taken on February 19, 1954. At that time there had been a tentative determination that the property had a value of $26,500. That amount was accordingly paid into court for the benefit...