St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dawson

• Decision Date: 13 January 1906
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. DAWSON.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

92 S.W. 27

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. DAWSON.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

January 13, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Antonio B. Grace, Judge.

Action by S. W. Dawson against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

B. S. Johnson, for appellant. Taylor & Jones, for appellee.

McCULLOCH, J.

This is an action against the railway company to recover damages caused by destruction by fire of plaintiff's property, a lot of seed cotton stored in a house near the railroad track.

It is contended that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence. The facts are similar to those in St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Coombes (Ark.) 88 S. W. 595, and the principles of law announced in that case are controlling in this.

The plaintiff introduced testimony tending to show that the house containing the cotton was discovered to be on fire a few minutes after the engine passed, and that there was no other evidence to explain the origin of the fire. The jury were justified, therefore, in finding that the fire was caused by sparks from the engine, which raised a presumption of negligence and placed upon the defendant the onus of exonerating itself. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Coombes, supra. It is not required that the evidence should exclude all possibility of another origin, or that it be undisputed. It is sufficient if all the facts and circumstances in evidence fairly warrant the conclusion that the fire did not originate from some other cause. Crist v. Erie Ry. Co., 58 N. Y. 638.

The testimony was conflicting as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to provide proper appliances to prevent the escape of sparks, or in failing to operate the engine with due care. We cannot say that the proof was insufficient to warrant a finding of negligence on the part of appellant.

It is claimed that the court erred in permitting a witness introduced by the plaintiff to state his opinion as to the duty of a railroad engineer in the exercise of due care in handling an engine when passing combustible matter. The witness was shown to have been a practical engineer who was qualified by experience to testify on the subject. This was not erroneous. The inquiry was as to whether the engineer was guilty of negligence in the operation of his engine, which is alleged to have caused the fire, and it was competent to show by opinions of men experienced in the operation of railroad locomotives the manner in which the same should be properly operated in order to prevent the emission of sparks when passing combustible matter. The court removed all possible prejudice improperly resulting from this evidence, by giving the following instruction asked by defendant: "The court instructs the jury that, unless it is shown from the evidence that the engineer in charge of said train knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that there was stored in the said cotton house loose cotton or other highly inflammable material, it was not his duty to shut off his steam in approaching or passing that part of the track along which said house was situated, and he was guilty of no negligence in failing so to do."

The court gave the following instruction, over the objection of the defendant, and the giving of the same is assigned as error, viz.: "The court instructs the jury that railway companies, being authorized by law to use steam in the operation of their trains, are bound to use locomotive engines which are of the safest construction for protection against the communication of fire therefrom to property along the lines of their roads, and to supply them with the best approved appliances and contrivances used to prevent the escape of sparks and coals...