St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Theodore Maxfield Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1910
• Citation: 126 S.W. 83
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. R. CO. v. THEODORE MAXFIELD CO.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

126 S.W. 83

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. R. CO. v. THEODORE MAXFIELD CO.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 28, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Independence County; Charles Coffin, Judge.

Proceeding by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Company against the Theodore Maxfield Company to condemn land for a railroad right of way. From a judgment assessing damages, the railroad company appeals. Affirmed.

W. E. Hemingway, E. B. Kinsworthy, S. D. Campbell, and Jas. H. Stevenson, for appellant. Oldfield & Cole, for appellee.

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This was an action instituted by the appellant, a railroad corporation, for the condemnation of a right of way over certain land owned by the appellee and for the assessment of the damages therefor. The sole question involved in the case is as to the amount of the damages which the appellee should recover. The appellee owned a tract of land adjacent to the city of Batesville, and in 1899 it laid same out into lots and blocks as an addition to said city with the purpose of having it regularly annexed to said city at some future time; but it has never been so annexed. In September, 1899, it filed for record in the recorder's office of the county a deed of assurance, to which was attached a plat of said addition on which were indicated the various lots and blocks and also streets, the free use of which was granted to the public by said deed. Some time after this, and long before the institution of this condemnation proceeding, it sold four of said lots by reference to said plat. The entire tract was inclosed and portions of it had been cultivated by the appellee up to the date of these proceedings. The right of way varied in width, but it extended substantially 100 feet in width across the entire tract. It extended across the lower portion of four blocks of the lands as same are laid out and designated on said plat. The appellee alleged that the appellant took and appropriated for its right of way 23 of the lots as indicated on said plat which were of the value of $2,875, and that the construction of the railroad depreciated the value of the remaining land to the extent of $2,500; and it asked for judgment for its damages in the sum of $5,375. The appellee made a deposit and tender of $1,000, which it claimed was a full and fair assessment of the damages. The cause was tried by a jury, who, in addition to hearing a number of witnesses as to the value of the land, viewed the same. A verdict was returned in favor of appellee for $2,325; and from the judgment rendered thereon the railroad company prosecutes this appeal.

The measure of the compensation which an owner is entitled to recover from a railroad corporation which takes a portion of his land under the right of eminent domain for the construction of its railroad is the market value of the land actually taken and the depreciation of the market value of the remaining portion. The chief question involved in this case is whether or not in determining the value of the land the fact can be taken into consideration that the land is suitable for division into lots and blocks and an addition to the adjacent city; and whether or not the witnesses can take into consideration the value of such lots and blocks in arriving at their opinion as to the market value of the land. It is contended by the appellant that the land, although thus laid out on the plat in lots and blocks, was actually inclosed and cultivated as a farm, and, while one or two streets had been opened up along the sides of the tract, the streets were not actually opened up through the tract and the lots were not actually at the institution of the suit indicated on the land; and it urges that the value of the lots as laid out on the plat should not be considered in arriving at the value of the tract of land. But the measure of the damages which the owner is entitled to recover for property taken for public use or depreciated by such use is the market value of it. This market value is determined not solely by the uses to which the property has been put or is put at the time of the condemnation proceeding, but by all the purposes to which it is adapted. It may not be used at the time for any purpose that is profitable, but the use to which it may reasonably and probably be put profitably must necessarily be taken into consideration in determining the market value of the land.

In the case of L. R. & F. S. Ry. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202, this court quotes with approval the following language from the case of Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206: "In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be: What is the property worth in the market viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to say what, is it worth from its availability for valuable uses? * * * As a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the owner is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future." In speaking of the character of testimony that is admissible in arriving at the value of land taken under condemnation proceedings this court in L. R. Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S....