St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dudgeon

• Decision Date: 08 May 1897
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. DUDGEON et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

40 S.W. 786

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. DUDGEON et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 8, 1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Clay county; Felix G. Taylor, Judge.

Action by Joseph Dudgeon and others against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Dodge & Johnson, for appellant. G. B. Oliver, for appellees.

BUNN, C. J.

The "Ditching Act," comprising sections 1203-1232, inclusive, of Sandels & Hill's Digest, under which this case arose, confers upon the several county courts of the state special jurisdiction to cause to be established and made public ditches in their respective counties, as therein directed and provided. The act itself is entitled "An act to enable the owners of lands to drain them and reclaim them when the same cannot be done without affecting the lands of others, prescribing the powers and duties of county courts and other officers in the premises, and to provide for the repair and enlargement of such drains." The first section of the act empowers the county court, at any regular session, to cause to be constructed, as the same provides, any ditch or drain within the county, "when the same shall be conducive to the public health or welfare, or when the same will be of public benefit or utility." Section 30 of the act is in this language: "The amount of assessment made by the viewers and confirmed by the county court shall be a lien upon the lands so assessed from the date of the order from the court establishing the ditch or drain, and such order, together with the report of the viewers, on which the ditch is established, shall be notice to all the world of the existence of such lien, and this act shall be liberally construed to promote the drainage and reclamation of wet or overflowed land; and amounts due contractors holding the viewers' certificate of acceptance shall not be defeated by reason of any defect in the proceedings occurring prior to the order of the county court establishing the ditch, but such order or judgment of said court shall be conclusive that all prior proceedings were regular and according to law. The lien provided for in this act may be enforced by proceeding at law in the circuit court in any county in which said ditch or drain or a part thereof is located." This section, in effect, cuts off all collateral attacks upon the orders of the county court establishing the ditch, on account of any mere defects or irregularities of proceedings prior to making of such order. It is not, however, to be conceived that the legislature intended to cut off all inquiry into jurisdictional facts, even on collateral attack. Grimmett v. Askew, 48 Ark. 151, 2 S. W. 707. The complaint in this case, omitting the merely formal facts, is as follows: That "on the...