St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Worthen

• Decision Date: 15 February 1890
• Citation: 13 S.W. 254
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. <I>v.</I> WORTHEN <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

13 S.W. 254

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO.

v. WORTHEN et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 15, 1890.

Appeal from Pulaski chancery court; D. W. CARROLL, Chancellor.

This was a bill for injunction brought by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company against R. W. Worthen, as collector of taxes for Pulaski county, and others, to restrain the collection of certain taxes on plaintiff's property. The statutes of Arkansas (Mansf. Dig. § 5647 et seq.) relating to the taxation of railroad property provide as follows: (1) A sworn schedule or statement of such property is required to be filed annually with the secretary of state by every person, company or corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state. (2) The board, consisting of the governor, secretary of state, and auditor of public accounts, at a time and place fixed by law, are required annually to examine such lists or schedules, and to appraise the value of such property. (3) There is no provision in the law requiring the giving of any notice to the railroads, nor for any formal public hearing, contest, or review of the board's action; nor is any appeal to any revisory board or court provided. In short, the board's finding or assessment is final and conclusive. The law provides that all property other than railroad rolling stock and tracks shall be assessed by the county assessor,—real estate, biennially; and personalty, annually. The statute makes railroad tracks realty, and rolling stock personalty. Plaintiff's bill alleges that all of plaintiff's property was duly assessed for the year 1885; that plaintiff duly made its report to the commissioners, as required by law, in March, 1886, of all its property, giving its value, etc., as required; that the commissioners proceeded thereafter to appraise plaintiff's property, and raised said appraisement and assessment greatly in excess of the value as appraised in 1885, the year before. The bill then charges: "(1) That the meeting of the board of railroad commissioners was without notice to plaintiff. (2) That, regardless of the fact that it had appraised and assessed plaintiff's railroad tracks, classed by the revenue law as real estate, in April, 1885, it did on April 1, 1886, arbitrarily, unjustly, and illegally, assess the railroad tracks, denominated `real estate,' for the year 1886, by doubling the values upon said property. (3) That the law authorizing the appraisement of plaintiff's railroad tracks, denominated `real estate,' every year, was in violation of section 21, art. 2, of the constitution of Arkansas, and of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States. (4) That the law under which the assessment was made was void, because it deprived plaintiff of all right of appeal." The bill, after tendering and offering to pay into court the taxes upon its personal property, amounting to about $50,000, prayed for a temporary injunction restraining the said several collectors from attempting to collect the tax so made under said illegal assessment, and, upon final hearing, that a perpetual injunction be granted. The defendants filed a demurrer upon the ground that there was no equity in the bill. After argument, the court sustained the demurrer; and, plaintiff declining to amend, the bill was dismissed. All proper exceptions were saved, and plaintiff appealed.

Dodge & Johnson, for appellant. W. E. Atkinson, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

COCKRILL, C. J.

This appeal raises the question of the constitutionality of the provisions of the revenue act of 1883, creating the state board of railroad commissioners for the assessment of railway property for taxation. Section 5647 et seq., Mansf. Dig. It is an attempt to enjoin the collection of the taxes on account of the alleged invalidity or nullity of the assessment. The legality of the proceedings of the board in assessing railway property was affirmed by this court in the case of Railway Co. v. Worthen, 46 Ark. 312, and by the supreme court of the United States in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U. S. 97, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; and thus the constitutionality of the act creating the board was impliedly recognized by both tribunals. But the question was not argued in either case, and we are now asked to overthrow the act because (1) it authorizes the assessment of railways by a different instrumentality from that employed to assess other property; because (2) it authorizes the assessment of "railway tracks"—a term which includes the right of way — annually, whereas other real estate is assessed biennially; because (3) it is said the board meets without notice to the railway; and because (4) no appeal is provided from the assessment of the board, whereas that privilege is accorded to the owners of all other property. Similar statutory provisions exist in many states of the Union; and numerous decisions are reported from various states, and from the supreme court of the United States, affirming the validity of the acts, in some one of which every question here raised has been pressed upon the attention of the court; but no case is cited denying their legality. The constitution of this state provides that the value of property for taxation shall be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform. Section 5, art. 16. There is nothing in this or any other provision of the constitution which either expressly, or by necessary implication, denies the legislature the power to classify property for the purpose of taxation, (Railway Co. v. Worthen, 46 Ark. 330, supra;) and that classification is not prohibited by the federal constitution, so long as the law operates equally and uniformly upon all property of like kind, is definitely settled by the supreme court of the United States, (State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 601; Cummings v. Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57.) From the peculiar nature of railroad property, its dissimilarity in use and value from the mass of other property, and its continuous extent through different localities, it is commonly regarded by the states that it cannot, in justice to the owners, be as fairly and uniformly valued by the numerous local instrumentalities provided for assessing other property as by a state board created for the purpose. The industry of the attorney general has furnished us references to the statutes of a large number of states showing that the practice of assessment of railways as units by state boards is almost universal. In considering a statute of the state of Kentucky which pursued this system, the supreme court of the United States, in the case cited, says: "There is nothing in the constitution of Kentucky that requires taxes to be levied by a uniform method...