St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Scott

Citation144 S.W. 917
PartiesST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. SCOTT.
Decision Date05 February 1912
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from Circuit Court, Conway County; Hugh Barham, Judge.

Action by J. M. Scott, administrator of Homer Scott, deceased, against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. E. Hemingway, Lovick P. Miles, and Thos. B. Pryor, for appellant. Bratton & Fraser and Sellers & Sellers, for appellee.

McCULLOCH, C. J.

Plaintiff's intestate, Homer Scott, was a deaf and dumb boy, 15 years of age, and was run over and killed by one of defendant's trains while he and two deaf-mute companions, about the same age, were walking the track near McAlmont, a station on the road six or seven miles north of Little Rock. The plaintiff is the father of Homer Scott, and sues as administrator to recover damages to the estate on account of the pain and suffering endured by deceased, and also damages to himself on account of the loss of services of deceased, to which he was entitled as parent. A trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing damages at $1,000 on each branch of the case, and defendant appealed.

The three boys were students at the Deaf Mute Institute near the city of Little Rock, and on the afternoon of the accident they crossed the river on the railroad bridge and walked northward on the track until they got nearly to McAlmont, where the accident occurred. The two survivors testified through an interpreter, and gave an account of the way the accident occurred. According to their testimony, they walked along the track, and once or twice got off to avoid approaching trains coming from the north. At the time of the accident they were walking along the track, one of the boys walking on the ends of the ties on the outside of the rail; Homer Scott was walking the right-hand rail, with his hand resting on the shoulder of the other boy; and the third one was walking the ends of the ties on the other side of the track. The testimony tends to show that the boys were conversing by signs as they walked along. A passenger train approached from the south, and the boys were seen both by the fireman and engineer for perhaps something more than a quarter of a mile. The whistle was sounded for a crossing several hundred yards distant, and the fireman continued to ring the bell. Another witness, who was near the track at the time, stated that alarm whistles were commenced about 300 yards from where the boy was struck. Neither of them gave any indication of having heard the alarm, and when the engine got within a short distance of them the emergency brake was applied, but too late to prevent striking this boy. The other two, who were walking on the ends of the ties, stepped aside in time to escape injury. The engineer testified that he saw the boys for a considerable distance, but did not know there was anything the matter with them, nor that they were unconscious of the approach of the train, and that he thought they would get off before the engine reached them. He testified that as soon as he realized that they were not going to get off he applied the emergency brake and did all he could to stop the engine.

The action is based upon alleged negligence of the engineer in failing to exercise care to avoid striking deceased after discovering his peril. It is insisted that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant the finding that the engineer discovered, in time to avoid the injury, the fact that the boys were unconscious of the approaching train. The testimony does not free the question from doubt; but we are of the opinion that, under the facts of the case, it was peculiarly within the province of the jury to determine whether the engineer was guilty of negligence in this respect. It is conceded that he saw the boys at least a quarter of a mile, walking along the track, and that alarms, both by bell and whistle, were given about that time. The boys...

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4 cases
  • St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Scott
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • February 5, 1912
  • Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • June 19, 1916
    ...46 Ark. 513; Memphis, Dallas & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 99 Ark. 422, 138 S. W. 965, and cases cited; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 102 Ark. 417-421, 144 S. W. 917; St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Newman, 105 Ark. 284-288, 289, 151 S. W. 255; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 107 Ark. 2......
  • St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • May 31, 1915
    ...brakes sooner than he did. We think there was testimony of a substantial character to support the verdict. See St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Scott, 102 Ark. 417, 144 S. W. 917; Memphis, D. & G. Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 99 Ark. 422, 138 S. W. 965; Railway v. Wilkerson, 46 Ark. One of the witnesses......
  • Kellett v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • May 5, 1919
    ...to avoid the injury. In that state of the proof, it was improper to take the case away from the jury. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Scott, 102 Ark. 417, 144 S. W. 917; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jones, 124 Ark. 523, 187 S. W. For the error in giving the perem......

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