St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Stewart
Decision Date | 12 June 1916 |
Docket Number | (No. 48.) |
Citation | 187 S.W. 920 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. R. CO. v. STEWART. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lincoln County; A. H. Rowell, Special Judge.
Action by Charles Stewart against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
E. B. Kinsworthy and R. E. Wiley, both of Little Rock, for appellant. Pace, Seawell & Davis, of Little Rock, for appellee.
The plaintiff, Charles Stewart, was engaged in the service of the defendant as a locomotive engineer, and received personal injuries while he was running a train through the railroad yards at Little Rock. This is an action against the company to recover compensation for his injuries, which are alleged to have been caused by negligence of other servants of the company. It is conceded that the service being performed by the plaintiff at the time of his injury was connected with interstate traffic so as to bring the case within the operation of the federal Employers' Liability Act. Plaintiff was bringing an extra freight train from Pine Bluff to Little Rock, and as he came through the Little Rock yards, his fireman discovered a switch engine on the track ahead, and when plaintiff discovered that a collision was impending, he shut off the throttle and put on the emergency brakes and jumped from the engine; and in doing so he fell upon the edge of the track and received serious injuries.
Plaintiff's testimony was that he was coming along at a speed of 8 or 9 miles an hour, and that as he approached a curve of the track the yardmaster came out from the yard office and first looked around the curve, and then turned and gave him the "highball" signal, which meant that the track was clear, and that he could proceed expeditiously, and that as the engine started around the curve the fireman discovered the switch engine ahead and called out to him "jump!" which he did, after having, as before stated, shut off the throttle, put on the brakes, and opened the sand. Plaintiff's train was running north, and the switch engine was coming south. Plaintiff's fireman stepped from the engine when it lacked a few feet of striking the switch engine, and was not injured. The engineer on the switch engine and the other operatives also escaped unhurt. The testimony of the plaintiff tends to show that his engine would have come to a stop before it reached the switch engine if the latter had been properly controlled, but that the switch engine was allowed to run on and produce the collision. On the other hand, all the other eyewitnesses testified that the switch engine came to a stop and turned backward and ran about 35 feet before plaintiff's engine struck. The testimony of the plaintiff also tended to show that the yardmaster could have seen the switch engine from the point where he was standing when plaintiff says that the "high-ball" signal was given.
Mr. Brown, the yardmaster, was introduced as a witness, and testified that he did not give the plaintiff any signal at all, but that the plaintiff's engine came along, running a speed of at least 15 miles an hour, and that just before it reached the yard office he heard the switch engine whistle back up the track, and he looked around, and it was in sight and appeared to have come to a stop, and that when he looked toward plaintiff's engine again he saw the plaintiff making the jump. Other testimony adduced by the defendant tends to show that the plaintiff was running his engine at the rate of from 15 to 20 miles an hour when he approached the curve and jumped from the engine.
Certain rules of the company, regulating the handling of trains through the yards, were introduced in evidence, and they are relied on as establishing negligence on the part of the plaintiff in violating those rules. Rule A-12 reads in part as follows:
"Freight trains will not exceed a speed of ten (10) miles per hour between Argenta and south yards limits East Little Rock yard."
Rule A-16 reads as follows:
Those rules were in force at the time of the injury, and plaintiff had a copy of the book of rules with him on his engine, and was familiar with them.
It is agreed that running "under control" means to run trains so as to stop within vision, or, in other words, to keep the engine under such control that it can be stopped within vision of any object which may appear ahead on the track. Plaintiff's train was "the approaching train" within the meaning of the rules. It was also conceded that the switch engine belonged to the same class of trains and had equal right of way, that the switch engine was rightfully on the main track at the time of the collision, and that the only limitations upon the right to operate it there were those prescribed by the rules herein mentioned. In order, however, to obviate the force and effect of the rules as written, plaintiff undertook to show that a custom had been built up, whereby the giving of the "high-ball" signal by the yardmaster was construed to be an assurance that the track was clear, and as a direction to hurry on without regard to the rule requiring that the engine be kept under control. There is a sharp conflict in the testimony on this branch of the case. Several witnesses introduced by plaintiff testified as to that custom. In view of the controversy concerning the effect of the testimony, it is well to set out that which appears to be the strongest in favor of the plaintiff. The following extracts are taken from the testimony of witness Smith, who had worked for defendant as a locomotive engineer and showed familiarity with the customs and the operation of trains:
Cross-examination:
Other witnesses testified to the same effect. Plaintiff testified...
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