St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Faulkner

• Citation: 164 S.W. 763,111 Ark. 430
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. FAULKNER. [*]
• Decision Date: 16 February 1914
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

164 S.W. 763

111 Ark. 430

ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. FAULKNER. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Arkansas

February 16, 1914

Appeal from Phillips Circuit Court; Edwin Bevens, Special Judge affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

The appellees sued appellant, alleging that they were passengers of appellant and connecting carriers, from Helena, Arkansas to Dallas, Texas; that they delivered to appellant their trunk to be transported as baggage between those points, and that appellant failed to deliver the same to appellees. They alleged that the value of the trunk and contents was $ 425.40.

The appellant answered and alleged that it was liable only for the sum of $ 100 under rule 12 of its local and joint tariff.

The cause was heard upon an agreed statement of facts substantially as follows: That the appellees purchased their tickets at the regular published tariff rate; that the trunk was lost as alleged. Its contents were valued at $ 425.40 that appellees made no declaration as to the value of the baggage; that appellant, at the time the trunk was checked, had no knowledge of its contents or its value; that at said time appellant had in force a rule or rate for carrying baggage designated as "Local and Joint Tariff No. 12," which was on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the station of appellant at Helena, Arkansas, subject to appellee's inspection; that appellees had no knowledge of rule No. 12 of the tariff rates, and that appellant did not inform them of same. Rule No. 12 of the tariff rates provides, that unless a greater sum is declared by the passenger and charges paid for increased value, the baggage shall be deemed and agreed to be not in excess of $ 100 in value. The defendant moved the court to declare the law to be that under the law and agreed statement of facts, the plaintiffs can not recover in excess of $ 100, which the court refused, and to which defendant duly excepted, and appealed from the judgment.

Judgment Affirmed.

E. B. Kinsworthy, P. R. Andrews and T. D. Crawford, for appellant.

It is well settled that the interstate commerce act, with the amendments thereto, has entire control of the subject of liability of carriers by railroads on account of interstate shipments, and has superseded all State laws on that subject. 227 U.S. 639; Id. 657; 226 U.S. 491; 157 S.W. 837; 201 F. 727; 108 Ark. 115.

If the rule adopted by the appellant is reasonable, it is binding upon both appellant and passengers who deal with it. 133 P.42; 112 U.S. 331; 222 U.S. 509; 204 U.S. 425.

Moore Vineyard & Satterfield, for appellees.

In order for appellant to escape liability and before it could rely upon its rule 12, which it pleads as a defense, it would have been required to have issued to appellees a receipt or bill of lading, showing the rate, and embracing the alleged contract upon which its defense is based. 206 U.S. 491.

OPINION

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts).

The only question presented by this appeal is, did the failure of the appellees to declare the value of their baggage to be greater than the sum of $ 100 when they offered and appellant accepted same for shipment, and their failure to pay the regular rates for such baggage when above the value of $ 100, according to the schedule of appellant's tariff rates as provided under rule 12, subdivision C thereof, relieve the appellant from liability for the loss of such baggage, in excess of the value of $ 100.

The relation of carrier and shipper was complete when appellees paid their fares as passengers and offered their baggage for shipment, and same was received and accepted by the appellant for that purpose. Appellees then became liable for the payment of the tariff rates in excess of the value of $ 100, according to the schedule of such tariff contained in rule No. 12 filed with and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Ignorance on the part of appellees of the tariff rates thus adopted did not relieve them from liability for such rates. In St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wolf, 100 Ark. 22, 139 S.W. 536, we said: "It is also immaterial as to whether the shipper was ignorant of what the published rate was; that the shipper and the agent making the shipment were ignorant of the published rate, or made a mistake as to the rate could make no difference. The shipper, under the authorities, must pay according to the published rates as fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission." St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 103 Ark. 37, 145 S.W. 889; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Tonn, 102 Ark. 20, 143 S.W. 577. See, also, Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 57 L.Ed. 683, 33 S.Ct. 391, decided since Ry. v. Wolf, supra.

It is now the established rule that the interstate commerce act, with its amendments, controls as to the liability of carriers by railroad in interstate shipments, regardless of State laws and policies on the subject. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, supra; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 57 L.Ed. 314, 33 S.Ct. 148; Mo., Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 57 L.Ed. 690, 33 S.Ct. 397.

In the case of United States Express Co. v. Cohn, 108 Ark. 115, 157 S.W. 144, we recognized the controlling authority of the interstate commerce act and its amendments over interstate shipments as that act had been construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in several recent cases. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, supra; Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Neiman-Marcus Company, 227 U.S. 469, 57 L.Ed. 600, 33 S.Ct. 267; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513, 57 L.Ed. 323, 33 S.Ct. 155; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra; Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519, 57 L.Ed. 328, 33 S.Ct. 155.

The above cases hold that "an interstate carrier may, by a fair and reasonable agreement, limit the amount recoverable by the shipper to an agreed value named...