St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 27 June 1910
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. HUDSON
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

130 S.W. 534

95 Ark. 506

ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. HUDSON

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 27, 1910

Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court; Brice B. Hudgins, Judge reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Lovick P. Miles and Thomas B. Pryor, for appellant.

When it appears that prejudicial error has been made in the trial this court will reverse. 58 Ark. 253; 123 Ill. 333. The conductor is the proper person to pass on the question as to whether a person desiring to take passage on a train is a proper person to be admitted to the train. 75 Ark. 490. Appellant is not liable for the humiliation or mortification if any, suffered by appellee on account of his arrest and imprisonment. 87 Ark. 524.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

The appellee brought this suit against appellant to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by appellee in being refused admission as a passenger on, and in being ejected from, one of appellant's trains while in the act of boarding same at Little Rock, Arkansas, for the purpose of taking passage to Batesville, Arkansas.

There was a jury trial, and the verdict and judgment were in favor of appellee for $ 700.

The evidence on behalf of appellee tended to show that he, in company with two other parties, one of whom had purchased a ticket for appellee, attempted to get on one of appellant's train at the depot in Little Rock, for the purpose of going to Batesville; that the officials in charge of the train refused to permit appellee to board the train, stating to him at the time that he was drunk; that appellee, notwithstanding such refusal, when the train going to Batesville began to move, attempted to board same; that the conductor shoved or threw him from the steps to the ground; that in the fall his leg was injured in the same part where it had been fractured some three years before; that the injury was severe and very painful; that the appellee had been a cripple, one limb being shorter than the other; that in consequence he limped; that as soon as he was ejected from the train a policeman arrested him, having been requested to do so by the one who ejected him from the train; that the policeman dragged him to the baggage room, and from there he was taken to police headquarters, and thence to jail.

The testimony on behalf of appellant tended to show that appellee, when he attempted to board appellant's train, was drunk; that because of that fact the conductor refused to permit him to board the train; that, on being refused, appellee became boisterous and profane, and that for this cause the policeman arrested him, and took him before the police court on a charge of breach of the peace; that appellee was not injured or hurt in any manner by the act of the conductor in refusing him admission to the train.

First. Section 3 of the act of March 2, 1909, provides as follows:

"All conductors on trains running in this State are hereby authorized and impowered to act in the capacity of peace officers on their respective trains in this State for the specific purpose only to arrest any and all persons on their respective trains that they find to be drunk or in an intoxicated condition, and deliver said person or persons together with the names of two witnesses, who are not railroad employees, to some peace officer at the first available opportunity, and said conductor is hereby authorized and impowered to deputize any person or persons present to assist him in the performance of said duty."

The appellant contends that the act "makes the conductor the absolute judge of the passenger's condition with reference to being drunk on any train in this State." That is not a correct construction of the statute. The conductor in the discharge of his duty under this statute must not act arbitrarily, and without due care. While the company, under this statute, could not be held liable for the conduct of the conductor in making the arrest of any person so long as such conductor was acting in good faith and with ordinary care, yet the company would be liable if the conductor in arresting any person did not exercise ordinary care to ascertain whether such person was drunk or did not act in good faith, i. e., with the honest purpose to discharge his duty under the circumstances.

Where one arrested by the conductor of a railway train shows that he was not drunk when he was arrested, the company, in order to escape liability for any damages that resulted proximately from such arrest, would have to show that its conductor acted in good faith in making such arrest, i. e., that he honestly believed, after the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances of the arrest, that the person arrested was drunk. The company would not be liable for the arrest, where the person arrested...