St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors of St. Louis Cnty.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1874
• Citation: 56 Mo. 503
• Parties: ST. LOUIS MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

56 Mo. 503

ST. LOUIS MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., Appellant,

v.THE BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1874.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Cline Jamison & Day, for Appellant.

I. There is nothing in rule 57 that authorizes the issuing of a writ of error--the rule relates merely to the filing of briefs.

II. If writs of error are allowed in cases of this character, they might lie for an indefinite time after judgment in the Circuit Court, and then might be taken up to the General Term, and after being disposed of there, plaintiff in error would still have three years more within which to go to the Supreme Court.

III. A writ of error will not lie to bring up any matter from an inferior court where an appeal is provided for. In such case the party must take his appeal in the manner provided for by the statute. (Matson vs. Dickerson, 3 Mo., 339; North Mo. R. R. Co. vs. Parks, 34 Mo., 159.)

IV. The assessment of the “loans, securities and bonds” amounted to a double assessment of the property of the company, and so far forth was it illegal and void. All of the provisions of the law relating to the assessment of the property of corporations having a capital stock, contemplate that assessments shall be made on the capital stock, and on that alone. (Wagn. Stat., 752, § 40; Id. 1169, §§ 19, 23, 24, 25; Id. 1188, §§ 28, 29; St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co. vs. Charles, 47 Mo., 462; State vs. Han. & St. J. R. R. Co., 37 Mo., 265.)

So far as the tax is a double one, it is illegal, not being authorized by the legislature, and is, in fact, impliedly, if not expressly, prohibited by the provision of the bill of rights, wherein it is declared that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. The personal property of a corporation and its capital stock cannot be taxed at the same time. (Tax Cases, 12 Gill. & Johns, 117; Gordon's Ex'r vs. Mayor of Baltimore, 5 Gill., 231; State vs. Tunis, 3 Zab., 546.)

Thomas C. Reynolds, for Respondents.

I. The St. Louis Circuit Court can review, by writ of error, in General Term, decisions made at Special Term. In rule 57, (p. 20) in force when this suit was pending before it, “a writ of error” is expressly named. But this court will not interfere with a Circuit Court's construction of its own rules and practice, except in an extreme case. (Funkhouser vs. How, 18 Mo., 49.)

By § 15 of Art. VI of the Constitution, the judges of the St. Louis Circuit Court are explicitly constituted “a court in bank, to decide questions of law, and correct errors occurring in trials.” Of course this included the power to issue the old common law writ of error. Even had the legislature the right to regulate that constitutional power of the St. Louis Circuit Court, it has not done so except to confirm it. Section 14 of the act of Dec. 19 1865, to provide for the organization of the St. Louis Circuit Court, &c., (Gen. Stat., 1865, p. 889) not substantially changed by act of 1869 (pp. 16, 17), recognizes the amplest power of the court to make its own rules and regulate the practice under them.

II. The question of legality of the assessment in this case was decided in Life Association vs. Board of Assessors, &c.,

(49 Mo., 512.) The assessment was not void on the ground that it subjected the same property to double taxation. The State taxes the holder of a note, and also the property of the maker, although the value of the former depends on the latter, or it may be valueless because the maker's property is mortgaged to its full value. So, also, stock may be valued and taxed at its value, and also the corporation property, on the net value on which the value of the stock depends. A corporation may own millions of taxable property, and yet its contingent liabilities be so great that its stock becomes utterly valueless. Shall the former therefore escape taxation?

VORIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff filed in the St. Louis Circuit Court a petition for a writ of certiorari against the defendants, in which it was charged, in substance, that it was a corporation duly organized for the purpose of making assurance upon the lives of individuals, and every assurance connected with the business of Life Insurance Companies; that by virtue of an act entitled “An act for the incorporation and regulation of Life Insurance Companies,” approved March 10, 1869, it was provided that every company doing said business in this State shall pay to the Superintendent of the Insurance Department, certain fees and sums of money, which shall be in lieu of all taxes, fees and licenses whatever, collected for the benefit of the State, and should further be in lieu of all fees or taxes whatsoever, except that said companies might be taxed upon their paid up capital stock, in the same manner as other property in the county, for county and municipal purposes.

The petition avers that the plaintiff had paid all of the fees required by the law, and that the plaintiff had a paid up capital of one hundred thousand dollars, and that by the law it was only liable to pay the fees provided for, and the taxes assessed on the paid up capital stock; that the board of assessors had assessed a tax for the year 1870, not only on said capital stock, but also on personal property belonging to the plaintiff, of the value of $1,150,000, which is described in the assessment as “loans, securities or bonds,” which said assessment is charged to be illegal; that plaintiff duly appealed from said assessment, and had asked defendant sitting as a board of appeals, by virtue of the provisions of the statute, to correct and adjust said assessment, and strike out the assessment on said “loans, securities or bonds,” from the book of assessments, which said board of appeals refused to do; and avers that a warrant will be issued to the collector of St. Louis county, for the collection of the same, and irreparable damage done the plaintiff. Wherefore a writ of certiorari is prayed, &c., and that said assessment be annulled and set aside, &c. The record sent up with the return of the defendants to the writ was as follows:

“Appeal No. 217.” “To the Court of Appeals of St. Louis county, District No. 3.”

“St. Louis County, Mo., May 14, 1870.”

“I hereby appeal from the present assessment upon property listed in the name of St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co., and described as follows: ‘Loans, securities or bonds $1,150,000.’ The reasons for making this appeal are the following: That the said loans, securities or bonds belonging to the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, designated in said assessment, as of the value of $1,150,000, and which are assessed or listed against said Company, are improperly, wrongfully and illegally assessed as aforesaid against said Company, inasmuch as by section 40, and other sections of an act entitled “an act for the incorporation and regulation of Life Insurance Companies,” enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, approved March 10, 1869, said Company is made liable for the payment of certain fees in said section 10 mentioned, which by said act is made in lieu of all taxes or fees against said Company, except that said Company may be taxed upon its paid up capital stock in the same manner as other property in the county, for county and municipal purposes, and said Company has already, and separately, or in a separate item from the said “loan, securities or bonds,” been assessed for its paid up capital stock.” “Second, because the said assessment on the said ““loans, securities or bonds,” amounts to a double assessment against said Company, the said paid up stock of said Company, being represented in and comprehended in said loans, securities or bonds.”

The record further shows, that the points made by the plaintiff before said board of appeals were overruled, and disallowed.

The case was heard in the St. Louis Circuit Court, upon the return of the writ of certiorari, and the court held said taxes to be wrongfully and illegally assessed, and declared the same to be of no effect, and declared the same to be reversed and in all things made void.

The defendants filed a motion for a new trial, which being overruled, they excepted and appealed to the General Term of the St. Louis Circuit Court. This appeal was dismissed on the motion of the plaintiff on the ground that the appeal had not been taken and the bill of exceptions filed in the time required by the rules of the court.

The defendant then moved the court at General Term for a writ of error to the Special Term to send up the record and proceedings in that court to the General Term, on the ground that manifest error appeared on the record in the cause. This motion was sustained and the record sent up to General Term by virtue of said writ of error.

The plaintiff afterwards appeared in the court at General Term, and moved the court to dismiss the cause for the reason that there was no law nor rule of court authorizing a cause to be removed from Special to General Term by writ of error, after final judgment in Special Term. This motion being overruled by the court, the plaintiff excepted.

The court then, upon a hearing and consideration of the cause, reversed the judgment rendered at Special Term and remanded the case. The plaintiff appealed to this court.

It is insisted by the plaintiff that the Circuit Court in General Term erred in overruling the motion filed by plaintiff to dismiss the cause, on the ground that a writ of error would not lie, or could not be issued by the General Term of the St. Louis Circuit Court upon a final judgment rendered at Special Term.

By the 15th section of the 6th article of the constitution it is provided that “from and after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, the Circuit Court of the county of St. Louis, shall be composed of three judges, each of whom shall try causes separately, and all, or a majority of whom, shall constitute a...