St. Louis & N. A. R. Co. v. Bratton
Decision Date | 17 January 1910 |
Citation | 124 S.W. 752 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS & N. A. R. CO. v. BRATTON. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Searcy County; Brice B. Hudgins, Judge.
Action by Benjamin Bratton, administrator of Benjamin Bratton, Sr., against the St. Louis & North Arkansas Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff amending a former judgment nunc pro tunc, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
W. B. Smith and J. Merrick Moore, for appellant. U. S. Bratton, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Searcy circuit court correcting or amending by a nunc pro tunc order a former judgment of that court entered at a former term. At the February, 1909, term of the Searcy circuit court the plaintiff below, Benjamin Bratton, administrator, filed this motion for a nunc pro tunc order, in which he stated that on January 10, 1906, he filed a complaint against the defendant to recover damages for the wrongful killing of one Benjamin Bratton, Sr., and that on March 16, 1907, said cause was tried in said court, and a verdict returned by a jury in favor of the plaintiff for $2,500, that a judgment was entered upon said verdict at that term of said court, but that by oversight it failed to mention the lien which goes with such a judgment. He asked that the judgment as entered at said former term of the court "be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order so as to mention the fact that a lien goes with the judgment as against the property of the defendant, which it owned at the time the cause of action accrued." Upon the trial of the original action the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff, Benjamin Bratton, administrator of the estate of Benjamin Bratton, Sr., deceased, the sum of $2,500" — and the following judgment was entered thereon: The motion for the nunc pro tunc order was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. This statement includes the complaint and answer in the original suit, the verdict of the jury upon the trial of the action, and the former judgment entered therein, and also the following: The circuit court granted said motion, and entered in full a judgment nunc pro tunc, in which it stated in substance that "the judgment, being a lien" on the property of the defendant which belonged to it at the time the cause of action upon which the verdict was rendered, accrued. From this judgment thus correcting or amending the judgment entered at the former term of the Searcy circuit court, the defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The plaintiff bases his right to the above lien by virtue of section 6661, Kirby's Dig., which in substance provides that every person who shall sustain loss or damage to person or property from any railroad, for which a liability may exist at law, shall have a lien for said damage on said railroad and its property. And he contends that he is entitled to have said lien mentioned as a matter of right and of course in the judgment for the recovery of the damages, by virtue of section 6663, Kirby's Dig., which provides that: "Said lien shall be mentioned in the judgment rendered for the claimant in the ordinary suit for the claim * * * and may be enforced by ordinary levy and sale under final or other process of law or equity." The plaintiff urges that he is entitled to have the former judgment of the court which failed to mention said lien amended in that regard, either because of the clerical misprision of the clerk in entering the judgment, or because the mention of the lien is necessarily and properly a part of the judgment, by reason of the fact that he was entitled to it as a matter of course. The question that is thus presented for determination by this appeal is in what regard and to what extent can a court amend or correct its judgment after the expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered and entered. In order to give to the record of a court the utmost sanctity and an absolute verity the common law declared that no judgment could be amended after the term at which it was rendered. But where the entry, through...
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Mellon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
... ... decree, or in any wise void the force of any part of the ... judgment or decree as originally intended and pronounced ... Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U.S. 415, 418, 12 Sup.Ct ... 9, 35 L.Ed. 775; St. Louis & N.A.R.R. Co. v ... Bratton, 93 Ark. 234, 124 S.W. 752; 1 Black on Judgments ... (2d Ed.) Sec. 516; 23 Cyc. 873 ... 2 ... That, ordinarily, a court loses all control over its judgment ... after the expiration of the term at which it was rendered, is ... too well settled to require the citation of authorities ... ...
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294 Ark. 506-A, Cigna Ins. Co. v. Brison
...of Equalization, Washington County v. Evelyn Hills Shopping Center, 251 Ark. 1055, 476 S.W.2d 211 (1972). In St. Louis and N.A. Ry. Co. v. Bratton, 93 Ark. 234, 124 S.W. 752 (1920), we pointed out there is no authority after the term of court has expired for a trial court to revise a judgme......