St Louis Ry Co v. Paul

• Decision Date: 06 March 1899
• Docket Number: No. 120,120
• Citation: 173 U.S. 404,19 S.Ct. 419,43 L.Ed. 746
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. PAUL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

173 U.S. 404

19 S.Ct. 419

43 L.Ed. 746

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO.

v PAUL.

No. 120.

March 6, 1899.

This action was commenced in a justice's court in Saline township, Saline county, Ark., by Charles Paul against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Arkansas, and owning and operating a railroad within that state, to recover $21.80 due him as a laborer, and a penalty of $1.25 per day for failure to pay him what was due him when he was discharged. The case was carried by appeal to the circuit court of Saline county, and there tried de novo. Defendant demurred to so much of the complaint as sought to recover the penalty, on the ground that the act of the general assembly of Arkansas entitled 'An act to provide for the protection of servants and employees of railroads,' approved March 25, 1889 (Acts Ark. 1889, p. 76), which provided therefor, was in violation of articles 5 and 14 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, and also in violation of the constitution of the state of Arkansas. The demurrer was overruled, and defendant answered, setting up certain matters not material here, and reiterating in its third paragraph the objection that the act was unconstitutional and void. To this paragraph plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer was sustained. The case was then heard by the court, the parties having waived a trial by jury, and the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum claimed and the penalty at the rate of daily wages from the date of the discharge until the date of the commencement of the suit, and entered judgment ac ordingly. Defendant appealed to the supreme court of the state of Arkansas, which affirmed the judgment (64 Ark. 83, 40 S. W. 705), and this writ of error was then brought.

The act in question is as follows:

'Section 1. Whenever any railroad company or any company, corporation or person engaged in the business of operating or constructing any railroad or railroad bridge, or any contractor or sub-contractor engaged in the construction of any such road or bridge, shall discharge, with or without cause, or refuse to further employ any servant or employee thereof, the unpaid wages of any such servant or employee, then earned at the contract rate, without abatement or deduction, shall be, and become due and payable on the day of such discharge, or refusal to longer employ; and if the same be not paid on such day then, as a penalty for such nonpayment, the wages of such servant or employee shall continue at the same rate until paid: provided, such wages shall not continue more than sixty days unless an action therefor shall be commenced within that time.

'Sec. 5. That no such servant or employee who secretes or absents himself to avoid payment to him, or refuses to receive the same when fully tendered, shall be entitled to any benefit under this act for such time as he so avoids payment.

'Sec. 3. That any such servant or employee whose employment is for a definite period of time, and who is discharged without cause before the expiration of such time may, in addition to the penalties prescribed by this act, have an action against any such employer for any damages he may have sustained by reason of such wrongful discharge, and such action may be joined with an action for unpaid wages and penalty.

'Sec. 4. That this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.'

John F. Dillon, Winslow F. Pierce, and D. D. Duncan, for plaintiff in error.

A. H. Garland and R. C. Garland, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error was a corporation duly organized under the laws of Arkansas and engaged in operating a railroad in that state.

The state constitution provided: 'Corporations may be formed under general laws; which laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed. The general assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke, or annul any charter of incorporation now existing and revocable at the adoption of this constitution, or any that may hereafter the created, whenever in their opinion, it may be injurious to the citizens of this state; in such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the corporators.' Article 12, § 6. This constitution was adopted in 1874, but, prior to that, the constitution of 1868 had declared: ,'The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers. Corporations may be formed under general laws; and all such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.' Article 5, § 48.

In Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 75, section 1 of the act of March 25, 1889, was considered by the supreme court of Arkansas, and was held unconstitutional so far as affecting natural persons, but sustained in respect of corporations, as a valid exercise of the right reserved by the constitution 'to alter, revoke, or annul any charter of incorporation.'

The court conceded that the legislature could not, under the power to amend, take from corporations the right to contract but adjudged that it could regulate that right by amendment when demanded by the public interest, though not to such an extent as to render it ineffectual, or substantially impair the object of incorporation.

As the constitution expressly provided that the power to amend might be exercised whenever, in the opinion of the legislature, the charter might 'be injurious to the citicens,' and as railroad corporations were organized for a public purpose, their roads were public highways, and they were common carriers, it was held that, whenever their charters became obstacles to such legislative regulations as would make their roads subserve the public interest to the fullest extent practicable, they would be in that respect...