St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. State
| Decision Date | 08 March 1910 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 1070 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. v. STATE et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. COMMERCE--Interstate Commerce -- Interference -- Orders of Corporation Commission. That part of Order No. 167, Rule 10 of the State Corporation Commission, which provides that ten days' free storage shall be allowed on less than car load shipments, when destined to consignees who live at interior points five miles or more from the railroad station, in so far as it applies to interstate commerce, is void, for the reason that it is in conflict with and is superseded by sections 1 and 2 of an act entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to regulate commerce'" (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1149]), and for the further reason that it interferes with and imposes upon interstate commerce an unreasonable burden.
2. RAILROADS--Regulation--Contempt Proceedings Before Corporation Commission--Amendment to Affidavit. An amendment to an affidavit charging a railway company with having violated a certain order of the State Corporation Commission, so as to make the original affidavit charge the violation of an order other than that charged in the original affidavit, must be verified, and an order of the Corporation Commission directing that the original affidavit shall be amended and thereupon, over the objection of defendant, proceeds with the trial upon the theory that it has been amended, where such amendment was never made, verified, and filed, is reversible error.
Appeal from Corporation Commission.
Action by the State and J. D. Durksen against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. From an order of the State Corporation Commission fining defendant for contempt, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
On the 17th day of April, 1909, appellee J. D. Durksen filed his affidavit with the State Corporation Commission, in which he charges appellant with having violated two certain orders of said Corporation Commission, and asked that it be summoned to appear and show cause why it should not be fined for contempt. He avers in his affidavit that appellant in violation of Order No. 167, Rule 10 of the Corporation Commission, on April 7, 1909, at its Cordell station, demanded storage of appellee on less than a car load shipment, which, on April 1, 1909, had arrived at Cordell over appellant's railway, and which had been shipped to appellee as consignee; and that appellant, although appellee offered to pay the regular freight charges on the shipment, refused to deliver the same to him, unless he would pay, in addition to the regular freight charges, storage on the goods from 48 hours after their arrival until the date on which delivery was demanded. He complained, further, that appellant, in violation of Rule 4 of the same order, failed to promptly notify him of the arrival of said freight. By a second count in his petition, he charges appellant with having violated Order No. 168, Rule 3 of the Corporation Commission, in that on March 3, 1909, it refused to accept from him, at its freighthouse or platform, freight for shipment in less than car load lots, and required him to load the same into a car almost inaccessibly located. During the trial on the petition, appellee was permitted, over objections of appellant, to amend his petition, so as to charge that appellee had refused, on March 20, 1909, in violation of Order No. 10, § 2, of the Corporation Commission, to receive from him at its depot or platform a box of trees for shipment. The commission found that appellant had violated order No. 167 by refusing on April 7, 1909, to deliver the freight without payment to it of storage charges thereon demanded by its agent, and that it had, on March 20, 1909, violated its Order No. 10, § 2, as charged in the amended petition, and thereupon made an order, fining appellant for contempt in the sum of $ 100 on each count. It is to reverse this order that this proceeding is prosecuted.
R. A. Kleinschmidt, for appellant.--On question of interference with interstate commerce: Howard v. I. C. R. R., 207 U.S. 463; G., C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412; Kelley v. Rhoades, 188 U.S. 1; McNeil v. Southern R. Co., 202 U.S. 543; C. & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204; I. C. C. v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 186 U.S. 320; I. C. C. v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 167 U.S. 633.
Geo. A. Henshaw, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.--On same question: Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky (U. S.) 38 L. Ed. 966; Lake shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 90 Va. 297, 41 L. Ed. (U. S.) 1180; W. U. Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514; Wisconsin, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287; Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 90 Va. 393; Crammelien v. Railroad Co., 90 N. Y. 77; Nicallette Lbr. Co. v. Coal Co., 213 Pa. 379.
¶1 () Order No. 167, Rule 10 of the State Corporation Commission, with the violation of which appellant is charged and has been convicted by the Corporation Commission, reads as follows:
¶2 The shipment of freight involved in this case was a consignment of fruit trees of less than car load lot, which originated in Shenandoah, Iowa, and was consigned to appellee at Cordell, in this state. That such shipment involves interstate commerce is too evident to require citations of authorities. Appellee resides more than five miles from the town of Cordell. When he demanded delivery of the shipment to him, more than 48 hours had elapsed since the arrival of the shipment, and notice thereof had been mailed to appellee by appellant's agent, and appellant's agent at Cordell refused to deliver the shipment, without payment of storage charges for the excess time the freight had remained in the depot after the lapse of 48 hours after its arrival. Appellee refused to pay the storage charges, and appellant refused to deliver the freight. Counsel for the railway company attacks the order of the commission upon the ground that Order No. 167, Rule 10, is void. The alleged invalidity of said order is urged by counsel in his brief upon three grounds: First, that it is in violation of a certain act of the territorial Legislature extended in force in the state by the enabling act and the Constitution; second, that it is in violation of the act of Congress regulating interstate commerce, approved June 29, 1906, commonly known as the Hepburn act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1149]); third, that said order is a burden upon and interferes with interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
¶3 The first paragraph of section 18, art. 9, of the Constitution, confers upon the Corporation Commission power and authority, and charges it with the duty of supervising, regulating, and controlling, all transportation and transmission companies doing business in the state in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor. But the third paragraph of the section puts a limitation upon the power and authority granted in general terms by the first paragraph of the section in the following language:
"The authority of the commission (subject to review on appeal as hereinafter provided) to prescribe rates, charges, and classifications of traffic for transportation and transmission companies, shall, subject to regulation by law, be paramount; but its authority to prescribe any other rules, regulations or requirements for corporations or other persons shall be subject to the superior authority of the Legislature to legislate thereon by general laws. * * *" (Bunn's Constitution of Oklahoma, p. 60.)
¶4 This provision of the Constitution divides the subject-matters over which the Corporation Commission is given jurisdiction into two classes. The first class includes those matters over which its authority is paramount, to be exercised, however, under regulations prescribed by the Constitution or by law. The second class includes those matters over which its authority is inferior to the power of the Legislature to legislate thereon by general laws. It is contended by appellant that the promulgation by the commission of Order No. 167, Rule 10, was the exercise of an authority belonging to the second class; that such order is and can be effective only to the extent that it is not in conflict with any general act of the Legislature on the same subject- matter.
¶5 We think the contention that the making and promulgation of said order is by virtue of authority within the second class above described cannot be sustained. The matters over which the commission is given paramount authority are to prescribe all rates, charges, and classifications of transportation and transmission companies. Said Order No. 167, Rule 10, undertakes to fix the charges that transportation companies may make and collect for storage services rendered incidentally to the transportation and delivery of freight; and, in so far...
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