St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Crabtree
| Decision Date | 09 March 1901 |
| Citation | 62 S.W. 64 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. v. CRABTREE. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Crawford county; Jeptha H. Evans, Judge.
Action by Solomon Crabtree against St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Plaintiff's team, frightened by a train, ran over him and broke his arm. He sued for damages. On the trial the presiding judge refused to give the following instructions asked by defendant: The court, in his charge to the jury, told the jury that plaintiff must himself exercise ordinary care, and further said on that point: There was a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $1,350, and the railroad company appealed.
L. F. Parker and B. R. Davidson, for appellant. Chew & Fitzhugh and C. B. Moore, for appellee.
RIDDICK, J. (after stating the facts).
This is an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the failure of the engineer of a railroad train to give the statutory signals for crossings. The plaintiff, with a yoke of oxen and wagon, was approaching and about to cross defendant's railway at a public crossing, when, as he states, the train approached suddenly and without warning, and frightened the oxen and injured him. The evidence tends to show that plaintiff was on the lookout for trains, but was expecting a train from the south, which was about due, when the train that caused the injury came from the north. The railway lay directly ahead of plaintiff as he approached, and crossed the road on which he was traveling at right angles, upon a trestle 10 or 15 feet above the road. There was evidence showing that, had plaintiff looked to the north, he could have seen the train as it came through a cut in a hill some 400 feet before it reached the trestle, and that from the cut to the trestle the train was in plain view of plaintiff, had he looked in that direction. Plaintiff stated that he was keeping a careful lookout, but did not see the train until the engine was on the trestle. Under this state of facts, the presiding judge was asked by the defendant company to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff "to look up and down the track" while approaching the crossing. He refused to give this instruction, but told the jury that the law requires of one about to cross a railroad that he shall "look out and listen for approaching trains." The charge given by the learned judge contains a very clear and accurate statement of the law, as far as it goes, though stated in rather general terms; but as there seems no doubt from the evidence that plaintiff did look and listen for trains, while there is conflict in the evidence as to whether he looked for a train from the north, or kept any lookout in that direction, from which the train causing the injury came, we think instructions numbered 8 and 9 asked by defendant, and which are set out in the statement of facts, should have been given. It is true that plaintiff says he looked both ways, but as he did not see the train until it reached the trestle, when, according to the evidence, he might, by looking, have seen it over 400 feet before it reached that point, we think the question as to whether he exercised ordinary care in keeping a lookout in that direction should have been directly submitted to the jury. A lawyer would, of course, understand that the charge of the judge was intended to convey the idea that the traveler about to cross a railroad track must look for trains from both directions, and must continue on his guard until the danger is passed. But jurors are not usually learned in the law. They may have concluded in this case that plaintiff discharged the duty to look and...
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