St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Mann
| Decision Date | 07 September 1920 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 9775 |
| Citation | 1920 OK 293,192 P. 231,79 Okla. 160 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. et al. v. MANN. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Eminent Domain--Appropriation of Land--Acquiescence of Owner--Remedies--Action for Damages.
Where a public service corporation, vested with the power of eminent domain, enters into actual possession of land necessary for its corporate purposes, with or without the consent of the owner, and the owner remains inactive, stands by and permits such corporation to go on and spend large sums of money in constructing its railroad, or telegraph wires, or pipe lines, or mains, or plants, or other necessary fixtures, the owner is estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment, and will be regarded as having acquiesced therein, and is restricted to a suit for damages for the value of the land, on the theory that the public has acquired an interest in the appropriation. Under such circumstances an appropriation will be treated as equivalent to title by condemnation.
2. Eminent Domain--Extent of Power of Acquisition by Public Service Corporation.
A public service corporation's delegated power of eminent domain is not unlimited, and cannot be used for the purpose of acquiring property other than whatever is reasonably necessary for its corporate purposes.
3. Estoppel--Essentials--Knowledge of Facts.
An estoppel cannot be set up against a party ignorant of the true state of affairs. or whose conduct was based on pure mistake.
4. Same--Estoppel by Conduct-- Intent.
To establish estoppel by conduct it is necessary that the conduct relied upon should have been intended to influence the other party to act, and if there was no such intent, the estoppel is not made out.
5. Eminent Domain--Self-Appropriation by Public Service Corporation--Estoppel of Landowner.
The doctrine of estoppel based on self-appropriation by a public service corporation is no greater than its power of eminent domain; and what a public service corporation cannot condemn, it cannot acquire by self- appropriation, without the consent of the owner.
Error from District Court, Pawnee County; Conn Linn, Judge.
Action by T. E. Mann against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company and others, its receivers, for usable value of real estate. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.
W. F. Evans, R. A. Kleinschmidt, and Fred E Suits, for plaintiffs in error
Edwin R. McNeill, for defendant in error.
¶1 T. E. Mann, defendant in error, as plaintiff below, commenced this action against plaintiff in error, defendant below, to recover the usable value of a strip of land approximately 60 feet wide by 250 feet long. The strip is part of the land allotted to the plaintiff as a citizen of the Creek Nation. The plaintiff's allotment deed was executed March 30, 1903, and approved by the Secretary of the Interior January 21, 1904, and recorded February 1, 1904. The evidence shows that the strip borders on the defendant's right of way, and that one of the defendant's section houses, situated on the right of way extends over on the plaintiff's land about 11 inches, also that the defendant has under fence about 25 additional feet of plaintiff's land and has rendered a strip of about 25 or 30 feet of plaintiff's land on the outside of its fence unusable for agricultural purposes. Just when the defendant took possession of said strip is not shown but it has been in possession since sometime in 1903. But how long before that if at all is not disclosed by the record. Plaintiff sought to recover $ 50 a year for fourteen years. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $ 350. It does not appear that plaintiff objected to the railroad occupying the land and in fact he testified that the railroad had a board fence around there and that he prevailed upon the railroad to put a wire fence in lieu of the board fence. There is no evidence that plaintiff at that time knew the boundary line or that defendant was using his land. Just when he learned that is not shown. On this strip, in addition to the 11 inches covered by the section house, the railroad built some outhouses, constructed a cistern, and in all respects treated the strip as belonging to it. The defendant invokes the proposition that where a public service corporation endowed with the power of eminent domain enters upon another's land and appropriates it to its own use with or without the express consent of the owner and proceeds to build and construct its railroad, telegraph line, or other essential plant, appliance, etc., the owner cannot maintain ejectment, but must sue for the value of the land, on the theory that suit for the value is practically a condemnation action. In other words, that either party may institute condemnation proceedings. Where a public service corporation (prior to statehood), vested with the power of eminent domain, enters into actual possession of land necessary for its corporate purposes, with or without the consent of the owner, and the owner remains inactive, stands by and permits a railroad or public service corporation to go on and spend large sums of money in constructing its roads, telegraph or telephone lines, pipe lines, plants, or other necessary fixtures, the owner is estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment, and will be regarded as having acquiesced therein, and is restricted to a suit for damages for the value of the land, on the theory that the appropriation by the public service corporation under such circumstances is equivalent to title by condemnation. Roberts v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 158 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 873, 15 S. Ct. 756; Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co. (Cal.) 117 P. 906; Jones on Telegraphs and Telephones, sec. 53; Indiana B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 113 Ind. 581, 15 N.E. 446; Goodin v. Cincinnati & W. Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98 Am. Dec. 95; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 111 Ill. 202, 53 Am. Rep. 622; Northern P. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U.S. 260, 43 L. Ed. 157, 18 S. Ct. 794; Kindred v. Union Pacific R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 42 L. Ed. 626, 18 S. Ct. 223; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 28 L. Ed. 846, 5 S. Ct. 306; Boise Valley Const. Co. v. Kroeger (Idaho) 105 P. 1070; Buckwalter v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 64 Kan. 403, 67 P. 831; Northern P. R. Co. v. Murray, 87 F. 648. This principle is recognized in Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Madden, 55 Okla. 322, 155 P. 540, and Blackwell, etc., R. Co. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63, 91 P. 877.
¶2 It does not appear either from the pleadings or the evidence exactly when the defendant took possession of its right of way. However, the construction of the section house over its right of way, extending about 11 inches over on plaintiff's land, warrants the conclusion that defendant acquired its right of way prior to its appropriation of plaintiff's land. It nowhere appears from the pleadings or the evidence that the strip of land in question was necessary for the defendant's purposes. There is no evidence on that point. To authorize the condemnation of land under a power delegated by the state, it must appear that the land is necessary for the defendant's purposes; that is, necessary to enable it to carry on its corporate business as a public service corporation. The extent to which property may be taken for public use rests wholly in the discretion of the Legislature, and the Legislature may determine the amount necessary and also its location. 15 Cyc. 632.
¶3 The rights of the parties must be determined as of the time the railroad appropriated the land in question and made the improvements. Roberts v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 158 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 873, 15 S. Ct. 756. If the railroad company took possession and made the improvements prior to the allotment of the land and while the title was in the Creek Nation, it was necessary to plead and prove some legal authority. Entry and construction of a fence and section house would not operate to estop the Creek Nation or the federal government. See section 2118, R. L. of U.S. (section 3529, Barnes' F. Code 1919). It is well settled that corporations have only such powers as are expressly granted and such implied incidental powers as are necessary to enable them to enjoy their express powers. All other powers are prohibited.
¶4 The railroad company had neither express nor implied powers to appropriate lands of the Creek Nation in addition to those required for its right of way and station grounds. The implied power of a corporation to acquire and hold real property is limited by the purposes of the corporation. And while real property need not be necessary in the sense of indispensable, it must be reasonably necessary. Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 2, sec. 1086. And suppose the land had been allotted to the plaintiff at...
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