St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Akard
| Decision Date | 11 July 1916 |
| Docket Number | 5998. |
| Citation | 159 P. 344,60 Okla. 4 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. v. AKARD. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
When any competent evidence has been presented for the consideration of the jury reasonably tending to prove the issues, it is proper to overrule a demurrer to the evidence or deny a motion for peremptory instruction; for in such a condition, under proper instructions from the court, the cause should be submitted to the jury for their determination.
Where the evidence in a case leaves it doubtful whether the particular carrier who is sued for a loss of goods, or another from whom that carrier received the goods, is liable the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings in the court below.
The act to regulate commerce provides: "That any common carrier railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed." Carmack Amendment to Hepburn Act (Act June 29 1906, c. 3591, § 7, par. 11, 34 Stat. 595 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913,§ 8592]). The act provides that nothing in the above section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.
The statute provides: "That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof." Paragraph 12 (section 8592).
On February 29, 1908, the Circuit Court of the Western District of Arkansas (Smeltzer v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 158 F. 649), held that the provision in the Hepburn Act, commonly called the Carmack Amendment, which makes an initial carrier liable for loss, damage, or injury to through shipments, whether such losses occur on or off the line of the initial carrier, is constitutional, and that a clause in a bill of lading, providing that an initial carrier's liability on an interstate shipment of goods transported over the lines of several carriers from point of origin to destination shall be limited to losses occurring on its own line, is in conflict with the Carmack Amendment. The court said that Congress in adopting this amendment seems to have recognized the difficulty involved, on the part of shippers, when goods are lost, in tracing the goods, fixing the liability, and recovering their loss. It seems to have recognized the additional fact, that the facilities of the initial carrier are much greater than those of the shipper to locate the goods and fix the liability for loss or damage. The court further declared that these provisions rest on substantial grounds of public policy which inspired this remedial legislation for the regulation of the immense volume of interstate commerce.
Under the common law, independently of statute, where a common carrier receives property for carriage beyond its own line, issuing a through bill of lading therefor, specifying the freight for through carriage, it makes the connecting carriers its agents, and is responsible to the shipper for any loss or damage to such property, either on its own or the connecting lines, which liability it cannot limit by contract.
The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act, relating to the liability of common carriers of property in interstate commerce for loss or damage to such property, but which contains the proviso "that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law," leaves a shipper free to resort to the laws of a state applicable to his contract.
Although requested instructions may correctly state the law, yet, if the law applicable to the issues involved in the case is fairly and substantially given by the court in its charge, a judgment will not be reversed because of refusal to give such requested instructions. It is not required that the entire law of the case shall be stated in a single instruction, and it is therefore not improper to state the law, as applicable to particular questions, or particular parts of the case in separate instructions, and if there is no conflict in the law as stated in different instructions, and all the instructions considered as a series present the law applicable to the case fully and accurately, it is sufficient.
Where the jury is properly instructed upon an issue of fact joined by the pleadings, and there is evidence reasonably tending to support their finding on that issue, their verdict will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
The evidence in the case shows that these shipments were delivered to the initial carrier under a continuous contract to destination in a condition that was plenty good to ship, and the fact that the initial carrier received them for shipment and did ship them tends to show beyond a doubt that they were in a shipping condition. Under the rule laid down by this court in the case of St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Jamieson, 20 Okl. 654, 95 P. 417, if the carrier finally delivering the goods does not deliver them in the condition in which they were received by its agent, the initial carrier, then it must account for the injury.
The burden rests upon it, the delivering carrier, to show that the injury occurred without its fault or negligence. To the extent of involving it, the delivering carrier, in the liability of a common carrier after the goods shall have come to its custody, the initial or receiving carrier of the goods had such authority. The burden of proof in cases of loss or injury rests upon the carrier to exempt itself from liability, the law imposing the obligation of such duty upon it. The carrier, almost without exception, will be able to show the condition of the property when reaching its custody; the shipper or consignee can rarely, if ever, do so. This is a salutary rule, resulting in justice to the greatest number affected, leaving it also to the party to prove the fact in whose power it expressly lies.
Both sides brought forward their proofs before the jury touching these several matters and things, and the jury on the whole case found, by their verdict, that the cattle were injured while in the custody of the defendant, and through its fault or negligence. This court will not disturb the verdict, and will not, when the evidence in a case leaves it doubtful whether the particular carrier who is sued for a loss or an injury to live stock, or another from whom that carrier received such property, is liable, disturb the findings in the court below.
Again as to interstate shipments, the common-law liability of the carrier for the safe carriage of property may be limited by special contract with the shipper, when such contract, being supported by a consideration, is reasonable and fairly entered into by the shipper, and does not attempt to cover losses caused by the negligence or misconduct of the carrier.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 4. Error from County Court, Pushmataha County; L. P. Davenport, Judge.
Action by A. H. Akard against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
W. F. Evans, of St. Louis, Mo., and R. A. Kleinschmidt and Fred E. Suits, both of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Arnote & Powell, of Antlers, for defendant in error.
Reference will be made to the parties herein as they appeared in the court below. The amended petition of plaintiff is as follows, omitting caption and mere formal parts: "Comes now the plaintiff and for cause of action against the defendant states:
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