St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Fick
| Decision Date | 01 June 1915 |
| Docket Number | 4180. |
| Citation | 149 P. 1126,47 Okla. 530,1915 OK 396 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. v. FICK. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The mere fact that an injury occurs carries with it no presumption of negligence; it is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence.
Record examined, and held that the evidence adduced at the trial does not reasonably tend to establish negligence on the part of the defendant.
Generally the contract of a carrier is that it will carry the passenger safely and in a proper carriage, and afford him safe and convenient means for entering cars and alighting therefrom but it does not contract to render him personal service or attention beyond that.
The recognized exceptions to the general rule are passengers who by reason of illness, great age, or other infirmity, are unable to help themselves.
The question of admissibility of statements as part of the res gestæ should, in a great measure, be left to the determination of the trial court.
Error from District Court, Bryan County; A. H. Ferguson, Judge.
Action by Daisy Fick against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions to grant new trial.
W. F Evans, of St. Louis, Mo., and R. A. Kleinschmidt and E. H Foster, both of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
W. E. Utterback and V. B. Hayes, both of Durant, for defendant in error.
This was an action for damages for personal injuries, commenced by the defendant in error, plaintiff below, against the plaintiff in error, defendant below. Upon trial to a jury there was a verdict for the plaintiff, upon which judgment was duly entered, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced.
For convenience hereafter the parties will be called "plaintiff" and "defendant," respectively, as they were designated in the trial court.
The petition states, in substance, that on the 18th day of March, 1910, the plaintiff was en route from Bennington, Okl., to Paris, Tex., and that it became necessary for her to change cars at defendant's station at Hugo, Okl.; that she purchased a ticket at Hugo to Paris, and upon the arrival of her train she approached the proper place for entering one of the coaches; that in order to enter such coach it was necessary for her to step upon a box provided for that purpose by the defendant, and from thence to the first step of the coach; that she was a low and heavy figure, which fact was observable to defendant's agents, whose duty it was to assist her; that upon stepping upon the box provided for such purpose, and just as she was in the act of reaching for the iron bars on the side of the steps and before she could reach the same, and at a time when it was the duty of the porter or conductor, or both, to render her assistance, said box turned over and threw her violently to the platform of the depot, causing her serious injuries; that said box was improperly placed, or was of inferior size for the purpose for which it was used; that a piece of coal or rock or a hole in the platform of the depot caused said box to turn, and that the failure of defendant's agents to properly assist her at the proper time contributed to the injury, and that if she had been properly assisted by the defendant's agents, said box might have been prevented from turning.
The answer of the defendant denied each and very allegation of said petition, and further alleged that if plaintiff sustained the injury complained of, the same was due to the plaintiff's own negligence and carelessness contributing thereto.
Counsel for defendant in their brief present their grounds of error in effect as follows: (1) There is no evidence tending to show that plaintiff's injury was the result of negligence on the part of the defendant, and therefore the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant; (2) the defendant was under no duty to render personal assistance to said plaintiff while in the act of boarding its train; (3) the railroad company is only required to exercise ordinary care with regard to the maintenance of its depots, platforms, and approaches thereto; (4) the court erred in admitting evidence of alleged statements of the defendant's train porter subsequent to the injury.
It seems to be conceded that the box used was of the kind and class ordinarily used for the purpose of assisting passengers to enter and alight from passenger coaches, so the only question of fact for consideration is whether a defect in the platform caused the box to turn, or was the injury the result of mere accident? There was abundant testimony tending to show that the defendant's station platform, which was composed of 2 1/2-inch planks, was in an ordinary state of repair. The plaintiff herself, who probably stated the facts in her own favor as strongly as the circumstances would justify, testified that when she attempted to board the train at Hugo, she stepped upon the box, and as she raised her foot to step upon the first step of the coach, the box quivered, as if it was on something, and turned to the left, throwing her backward. On cross-examination she stated that she did not know the condition of the platform where the box was placed, or whether the platform was in good or bad condition; she did not know what caused the box to quiver, and all she knew about whether there was a hole in the platform was what the porter told her a few minutes after the accident occurred.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that an injury occurs carries with it no presumption of negligence; it is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence. St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rushing, 31 Okl. 231, 120 P. 973. After a careful examination of the record before us, we are of the opinion that, aside from the statement made by the train porter, which will be noticed more in detail hereafter, there is not sufficient evidence to establish want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant in keeping its station platform in a reasonably safe condition. The exercise of ordinary care was the only duty the plaintiff could exact from the defendant.
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