St. Louis- San Francisco Railway Co. v. Bryan
Decision Date | 17 January 1938 |
Docket Number | 4-4886 |
Citation | 112 S.W.2d 641,195 Ark. 350 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS- SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY v. BRYAN |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; J. O. Kincannon, Judge reversed.
Judgment reversed and cause dismissed.
J W. Jamison and Warner & Warner, for appellant.
Partain & Agee, for appellee.
This suit to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been suffered on September 25, 1935, October 28, 1936, and November 6, 1936, three separate and distinct occurrences, was begun December 15, 1936.
After the development of the suit by the introduction of all evidence, as we understand, the appellee elected to dismiss or take nonsuit as to the causes of action alleged to have occurred on October 28, 1936, and on November 6, 1936.
The first action proceeded to a verdict and judgment for $ 3,000, from which is this appeal.
It will, therefore, not be necessary to consider any matters not related to the one occurrence alleged to have taken place September 25, 1935. The complaint in regard thereto is as follows:
The most favorable testimony for appellee was that given by himself. He was thirty-two years old, had worked occasionally, or as needed, for the railroad, since May, 1933. At the time of the alleged injury they were moving old ties off of the right-of- way, or moving them to places where they might be hidden because they didn't have time to burn them before an inspection was to be made by officers of the railroad company. He testified substantially as follows:
This selection from the testimony appears to cover completely appellee's theory in detail, insofar as liability may be considered and determined.
The crosstie that split while Perryman and appellee were carrying it, weighed perhaps 250 or 300 pounds, according to some evidence. It, perhaps, did not differ very materially from a large fence post or gate post farmers frequently handle. Before beginning employment with the railroad, appellee had been a farmer.
There is very little of art or skill in moving crossties, but whatever of either was necessary appellee had acquired by his experience. The other principal qualification of such laborer was his strength; "There were no complications," he says. As we understand the witness, the procedure is simple. "Just pick it up and carry it." At the time of the accident Perryman was walking in front with his hands behind him holding the crosstie; the appellee followed. They might have changed places, or they might have walked side by side, each carrying an end. In fact, there seems to be no particular or approved method of carrying a crosstie or similar stick of timber.
It is argued that Perryman took one hand off of the crosstie, and this caused it to split. This is an erroneous deduction. There was no causative force in the mere removal of the hand by either of them. Decay through the center of the timber caused it to split apart. Appellee's knowledge of this condition was as great as that of Perryman. He really had a better opportunity for observation. Perryman did not drop the timber, but a part split off and fell. Neither of the men knew it was going to split and fall, and there is no reason to believe either could have anticipated such a result. At all events, the appellee admitted he was a good laborer. There was no complaint about his work. He had done the usual work of section hands. We are giving his declarations in that respect full credit as a simple statement of fact freed from any taint of boastfulness. His foreman, Hess, tried to induce him to continue working because his services were satisfactory.
He had the maturity of years, the training and experience to equip him for his job. He knew what any other employee knew concerning his employment, particularly that part of it in which he was engaged when injured. Whatever reason there was for Perryman to remove his hand, perhaps, appellee or any other laborer might have done the...
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