St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 16 December 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 2585.)
• Citation: 171 S.W. 703
• Parties: ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. GRIFFIN.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 703

171 S.W. 703

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. GRIFFIN.

(No. 2585.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 16, 1914.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by Thomas A. Griffin against the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas. Judgment (154 S. W. 583) for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

E. B. Perkins and Daniel Upthegrove, both of Dallas, for plaintiff in error. W. H. Clark and W. T. Strange, both of Dallas, for defendant in error.

BROWN, C. J.

We copy from the opinion of Justice Moursund the following statement of the facts found by the Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth District (154 S. W. 583):

"Thomas A. Griffin, appellee, sued the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas, appellant, to recover damages for its alleged failure and refusal to issue to him a true statement of the reasons why he was discharged by appellant, he having made demand for such statement under chapter 89, p. 160, General Laws of Texas of 1909, commonly known as the `Blacklisting Law.' On May 9, 1910, appellee was employed as a section foreman by appellant, and on July 18, 1910, was discharged, whereupon he made his demand for a statement in writing as to the cause of his discharge. Appellant issued a service letter, as follows: `This is to certify that Thomas A. Griffin has been employed in the capacity of section foreman at Renner on the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas from May 9, 1910, to July 18, 1910. Discharged for not distributing work properly and inability to surface and line track. Previous record. March 25, 1910, to April 1, 1910, assistant extra gang foreman. Resigned. Service satisfactory.'

"Appellee alleged that this statement was false and malicious; that he previously had several years' experience on section work and as section foreman, performing and directing said work, was capable, experienced, and skilled therein; that he could and did distribute his work properly, and could and did surface and line track; that the real cause of his discharge was on account of a personal difference which he had on July 10, 1910, with appellant's general roadmaster, J. J. Hughes.

"Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the Blacklisting Law, both by demurrer and plea, and alleged that it in good faith attempted to comply with said statute, and that the reasons stated in said service letter were the true reasons for appellee's discharge; that its assistant roadmaster, in making the report on which said letter was based, acted in good faith in an effort to perform his duty to appellant, and it would not be liable for a mistake in judgment made by its roadmaster. Appellant further alleged that it did not make such letter public, but furnished it to appellee in compliance with said statute, at his request, and without any malice, ill will, or evil intent towards appellee; that it had the right to exercise and act upon its own judgment as to the competency of those employed as section foremen, and if a mistake should be made in the discharge of such employé it would not be liable to him; that it was required by law to keep its track in proper condition for the operation of its trains; that it was necessary to employ careful and competent section foremen to keep the track in proper repair; that other railroad companies had a like interest in keeping their tracks and roadbed in repair; and that such communication was privileged, and, there being no malice, ill will, or evil intent shown, plaintiff could not recover.

"Defendant's exceptions were overruled, and upon trial the jury found that the statement furnished was false, and awarded plaintiff $500 damages. Judgment was entered for said amount, from which defendants appealed."

There is no conflict in the evidence to the fact of the employment and discharge of Griffin. The question presented to this court is the validity of a statute enacted by the Legislature as stated above, from which we copy the following provisions:

"Art. 594. Discrimination. — Either or any of the following acts shall constitute discrimination against persons seeking employment: * * * (3) Where any corporation, or receiver of the same, doing business in this state, or any agent or employé of such corporation or receiver, shall have discharged an employé, and such employé demands a statement in writing of the cause of his discharge, and such corporation, receiver, agent or employé thereof fails to furnish a true statement of the same to such discharged employé, within ten days after such demand, or where any corporation or receiver of the same, or any officer or agent of such corporation or receiver shall fail, within ten days after written demand for the same, to furnish to any employé voluntarily leaving the service of such corporation or receiver, a statement in writing that such employé did leave such service voluntarily, or where any corporation or receiver of the same, doing business within this state, shall fail to show in any statement under the provision of this title the number of years and months during which such employé was in the service of the said corporation or receiver in each and every separate capacity or position in which he was employed, and whether his services were satisfactory in each such capacity or not, or where any such corporation or receiver shall fail within ten days after written demand for the same to furnish to any such employé a true copy of the statement originally given to such employé for his use in case he shall have lost or is otherwise deprived of the use of the said original statement." R. S. 1911, vol. 1, art. 594, § 3.

The act gives no right of action to the employé for failure to furnish the "true statement," but provides that the state may sue for and recover a penalty of $1,000 for each failure to comply with the law.

For the purpose of testing the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in holding the act of the Legislature valid, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the claim that the statement of discharge furnished did not state a cause which was true in fact; but this does not concede that the statement of discharge furnished did not state truly the cause which operated upon the mind of the officer who discharged Griffin. We will first consider the validity of the statute relied upon by defendant in error, and if, by reasonably fair construction, it appears that the Legislature was empowered to enact the law, this court will recognize it as valid; that is, a serious doubt of the power must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law. Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 82, states the rule thus:

"Every presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of the Legislature, and all doubts are resolved in support of the act. `In determining the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, courts always presume in the first place that the act is constitutional. They also presume that the Legislature acted with integrity, and with an honest purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid down by the Constitution. The Legislature is a co-ordinate department of the government, invested with high and responsible duties, and it must be presumed that it has considered and discussed the constitutionality of all measures passed by it.' The unconstitutionality must be clear or the act will be sustained."

It is true that all legislative power is by the Constitution vested in the Legislature, and the judicial department cannot frame laws, nor change, nor mold them by construction. It is likewise true that the judicial power of the state is vested in the courts which are charged with the duty of enforcing the laws and with the duty to annul any law enacted by the Legislature which is clearly in violation of the constitutional rights of any person, natural or corporate, and with the same purpose with which the courts refrain from trespassing upon the privileges of the legislative power, they will, when necessary, exercise their power to prevent the destruction or impairment of rights vested in citizens or corporate bodies, by the unauthorized action of the Legislature.

The citizen has the liberty of contract as a natural right which is beyond the power of the government to take from him. The liberty to make contracts includes the corresponding right to refuse to accept a contract or to assume such liability as may be proposed. When Griffin entered the service of the railroad company for an indefinite time, the law reserved to him the right to quit the service at any time without cause or notice to the employer. The railroad company had the corresponding right to discharge him at any time without cause or notice. The rights of the parties were mutual. E. L. & R. R. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 75, 10 S. W. 102, 13 Am. St. Rep. 758. In the case cited, the court said:

"It is very generally if not uniformly held, when the term of service is left to the discretion of either party, or the term left indefinite or determinable by either party, that either may put an end to it at will, and so without cause. Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187; Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 431; Wood's Master and Servant, §§ 133, 136, and citations."

If the servant could quit without notice and the master could discharge him at will without notice, the effect of the statute in question would be to preserve the servant's unqualified right to leave the service without cause or notice, but to deny to the corporation the corresponding right to discharge without cause or notice.

The requirement that the corporation give to the discharged employé, on his demand, a statement of the "true cause" for his discharge, necessarily implies that there must have been a cause to justify the dismissal, else, how could the "true cause" be given? The value of the contract to each party consisted largely in the mutual right to dissolve the...