St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 11 October 1911
• Citation: 141 S.W. 135
• Parties: ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. ALEXANDER.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

141 S.W. 135

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. ALEXANDER.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

October 11, 1911.

Rehearing Denied November 29, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Hill County; W. C. Wear, Judge.

Action by W. J. Alexander against the St Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

E. B. Perkins, D. Upthegrove, and Scott, Sanford & Ross, for appellant. Collins & Cummings and Morrow & Morrow, for appellee.

KEY, C. J.

This case comes to this court by transfer from the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals. It has been appealed before and will be found reported in 122 S. W. 572. We refer to the opinion of Chief Justice Rainey on the appeal referred to for a statement of the nature of the case and the rulings made on the controlling questions of law.

At the last trial in the court below the rulings of the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals were properly accepted and followed as the law of the case; and the trial judge submitted to the jury the issues which the appellate court held proper to be submitted, in order to determine the question of appellant's liability. The jury decided the case in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $3,000 damages for the injuries which it is alleged his wife had sustained on account of the trespass and wrongful conduct of the defendant's agents. Some of the questions presented on this appeal were decided against appellant on the former appeal, and we are not prepared to say that they were not correctly decided. The only question we care to discuss is presented by the contention, which is stressed on this appeal, that the injuries complained of and the damages sought to be recovered therefor are too remote. Appellant relies upon the oft-repeated but not accurate general statement of the law, to the effect that damages can be recovered for only such injuries as could have been foreseen. The primary meaning of the word "foreseen" is to see or know beforehand, although it may sometimes be used in the sense of "anticipate" or "expect."

What results will flow from many wrongful acts cannot be known beforehand by any human being, and yet, when the wrongful conduct amounts to a tort, the wrongdoer is held responsible for such injuries as result directly and naturally from such wrongful conduct, if they are such as might reasonably have been anticipated or expected. And, when the tort constitutes a willful wrong, it has been held by high authority that the wrongdoer is responsible for the direct and immediate consequences thereof, whether or not they may be regarded as natural or probable, or whether they might have been contemplated, foreseen, or expected or not. 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 598, and cases there cited. However, in the case at bar the court instructed the jury, in effect, that the defendant was not liable unless the injuries complained of were the direct and proximate result of the defendant's wrongful conduct, and that such injuries ought to have been foreseen as a natural and probable consequence of such wrongful conduct.

In substance, the plaintiff's case, as made by the testimony given by his wife and supported by her attending physician as to the resulting injuries, is about this: The defendant's agent at the town of Hillsboro, where the plaintiff resided, charged the plaintiff with unlawfully taking from the defendant certain coal and lumber. The agent referred to was named Denman. The defendant company sent one Wheeler, a detective, to Hillsboro to investigate the charge referred to, as well, perhaps, as a counter charge made by the plaintiff against Mr. Denman. The defendant had another employé by the name of Scarborough, who was working under Denman. On the night in question the plaintiff, W. J. Alexander, was absent from Hillsboro, which fact was known to one or more of the defendant's three employés referred to. The plaintiff's wife was at their home in Hillsboro, and there was also present in the house her son, about 10 years of age, and a man about 60 years of age, who occupied a room in the house as a...