St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 11 May 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 310.)
• Citation: 167 S.W. 489
• Parties: ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. v. CURTIS.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

167 S.W. 489

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. v. CURTIS.

(No. 310.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 11, 1914.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; J. F. Gautney, Judge.

Action by S. H. Curtis against the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Appellee alleged that on the 12th of April, 1909, he was the owner of an acre of land in Greene county, which he described, and that on the above date he conveyed the land to appellant by a deed which contained, among others, the following clause:

"For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar and the stipulations hereinafter mentioned to me in hand paid by the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company and unto its successors and assigns, the following lands [describing same]. This deed is made for the purpose of erecting and maintaining a section house on above-described land by the grantee herein and when it shall cease to be used as such the title to the land shall revert to and vest in said S. H. Curtis. To have and to hold the same unto the said St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, and unto its successors and assigns forever, with all the appurtenances thereunto belonging."

Then follows a covenant of warranty of title. The appellee alleged that in accordance with the conveyance the Railway Company (appellant) entered upon the land and erected a small section house thereon, and occupied the same as a section house until the 4th day of March, 1911, when it ceased to keep and occupy the house as a section house, and thereby breached its contract and forfeited the title acquired under the conveyance; that notwithstanding the forfeiture, the appellant held the house until the 27th day of December, 1912, when it vacated the same, and appellee on that day took possession of the property; that on the 30th of December, 1912, the appellant willfully and unlawfully entered upon the possession of the premises, and willfully, forcibly, and unlawfully proceeded to evict the appellee and to remove the above house from the land, to appellee's damage in the sum of $550. The appellant answered, admitting that it entered upon the property mentioned in the complaint, and that it constructed the house thereon, and alleged that the same was constructed by it to remain on the land so long as appellant desired to use the property, but no longer; that it was not intended for a permanent building. It denied that the house, or any part of it, reverted to the appellee; admitted that it moved the house, but denied that it did so unlawfully, and denied that the plaintiff was damaged in any sum; denied that the value of the house was more than $100. The case was sent to the jury, and appellee testified that appellant used the building as a section house for a year and a half, when it vacated the same as a section house and rented it to a tenant for other purposes. Appellee gave appellant and its tenant notice to vacate the house. The tenant moved out, and afterwards rented the property from appellee and moved back in the house. There was testimony on behalf of the appellee tending to show that the house was worth from $300 to $500. There was testimony on behalf of the appellant tending to show that the house was worth from $90 to $100. The house had a rental value of $2.50 per month. Letters of appellee to appellant's agent were introduced, tending to show that during negotiations between them in regard to a settlement appellee stated that he was willing to pay $40 to appellant for a quitclaim deed by way of settlement. The court instructed the jury as follows:

"The deed conveys the property to defendant for the purpose of maintaining a section house thereon, and provides when it ceases to be used for such purpose the title will revert to plaintiff. It is admitted defendant complied by building the house. When the defendant moved the house the condition of the conveyance was broken, and the house, being a part of said real estate, reverted to the plaintiff with...