St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Ed. of City of St. Louis
| Citation | 456 S.W.2d 16 |
| Decision Date | 13 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 54801,54801,2 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al., Respondents |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Donald L. James, James E. Whaley, Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary & Jaeckel, St. Louis, for appellants.
Leo Lyng, Russell N. MacLeod, St. Louis, for respondents.
HENRY I. EAGER, Special Commissioner.
The petition of plaintiffs for a declaratory judgment and each of its two counts were dismissed with prejudice on motion of the defendants, and this appeal followed. The plaintiffs are St. Louis Teachers Association, alleged to be a not-for-profit corporation, and nine individuals who are alleged to be residents, citizens, taxpayers, teachers and parents of school children in St. Louis. Obviously, each individual is not intended to be a member of all such classes. The defendants are the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis and its members, and the Superintendent of Schools. We shall refer to the corporate plaintiff as the 'Association,' and where we use the word 'plaintiff' in the singular we are referring to it.
In Count I plaintiffs alleged that defendant Board had refused to recognize it as a legitimate negotiating agent for the teachers of St. Louis, and that the members of the Board had stated to the news media that it would be illegal for it to 'enter into negotiating agreements with an organization,' to the damage of the teaching profession. The prayer of this count included the request for a declaration that the Board 'may enter into an agreement with a teacher organization' to negotiate sundry stated matters of 'mutual concern' and others, and that such agreement be reduced to writing with formal procedures established; several other associated requests were made for other declarations, including one that the Board might elect to deal with one organization to be selected by an election. Plaintiffs further prayed that the members of the Board be enjoined from making such statements as are referred to above.
In Count II plaintiffs adopted the allegations of Count I and further alleged: that the refusal of the Board, as alleged, prevented the taxpayers and parents of St. Louis from obtaining the best possible education for the children, since educational problems and methods are properly of concern to the teaching profession and that the Board has thus abandoned 'the major expertise applicable * * *'; that such refusal 'to meet with duly appointed representatives of the teachers constitutes an abridgement of the right of the teachers to petition their government for the redress of grievances, and thus and thereby violates the Constitution of the State of Missouri, Article I, Section 9 (V.A.M.S.).' The prayer of Count II was (in the alternative): that the Board must meet with a duly authorized representative of the teachers 'within the guidelines as prayed by these petitioners in Count I * * *.'
The motion to dismiss was as follows:
The trial court filed no opinion or memorandum. The whole situation is somewhat vague and nebulous, partly because of insufficient facts. We are met immediately with a question as to our jurisdiction. No specific damages are claimed, and we have no jurisdiction on that ground. The only possible constitutional point pleaded is in Count II where plaintiffs state that the Board's action abridges the right of the teachers to 'petition their government for the redress of grievances' in violation of Art. I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Missouri. The ruling of the Court on the motion was general, and we have no way of knowing whether this point was considered and ruled by it or not, especially since several grounds were set out in the motion to dismiss all of which were independent of the supposed constitutional question.
We have determined that this Court does not have jurisdiction, since the supposed constitutional point has not been properly preserved, if indeed it was properly pleaded. There was no motion for a new trial; such a motion was not a prerequisite to an appeal in this type of action. Rule 73.01(d), V.A.M.R.; Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., Banc, 355 Mo. 1153, 200 S.W.2d 55, 63; Mo.Bar Journal, Feb. 1970, Appellate Review in Non-Jury Cases, by Judge Laurance M. Hyde. The jurisdictional statement in the brief of appellants states that the cause 'involves a Constitutional issue' concerning the power of the Board to negotiate, but cites only Article V, Sections 3 and 13 of the...
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