St. Louis v. Babcock

• Decision Date: 08 May 1900
• Docket Number: 1
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, Plaintiff In Error, v. BABCOCK
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

56 S.W. 732

ST. LOUIS, Plaintiff In Error, v. BABCOCK

156 Mo. 148

No. 1

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

May 8, 1900

Error to St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction. -- Hon. David Murphy, Judge.

Affirmed.

B Schnurmacher and R. F. Walker for plaintiff in error.

(1) This is a proceeding under a city ordinance. Proceedings for violation of city ordinances, although partaking somewhat of the nature of criminal proceedings, are civil. Kansas City v. Neal, 122 Mo. 234; St. Louis v Schoenbush, 95 Mo. 618; Ex parte Holwedell, 74 Mo. 395; De Soto v. Brown, 44 Mo.App. 152. (2) The first clause of sec. 1062, ordinances of St. Louis, art. 6, chap 26, is divisible, each subdivision defining a different way in which persons may be guilty of vagrancy. One of these subdivisions declares it to be an offense for any of the persons designated "to be found trespassing upon the private premises of others and not give a good account of himself." The testimony offered by the plaintiff and excluded by the court was to show that the defendant was a trespasser in the exchange building; if this had been shown it would have devolved on defendant to account for his presence there. It was evidently not the purpose or intention of the law-making power to incorporate the portion above quoted into every definition of vagrancy, and thus make it a part of the descriptio personae of those against whom the ordinance is leveled. The persons described are "male and female persons over the ages of fourteen and sixteen, respectively," and the first subdivision above quoted is one of the offenses for which such persons may be found guilty of vagrancy, and is not a component part of each kind of vagrancy defined in the first clause. The foregoing is what clause 1 of section 1062 means if it were written out in full, and the interpretation given to it by the trial court not only does injustice to the intention of the lawmaking power, but would, if sustained, defeat many of the purposes for which the clause was enacted. (3) The case being civil in its nature, and the evidence excluded being material and calculated to change the result if it had been admitted, is a sufficient ground for the reversal of the judgment. This is true, although only general objections may have been interposed to the court's ruling, because the evidence excluded was admissible and competent for all purposes.

C. M. Napton and C. H. Krum for defendant in error.

The offense is not complete until the city proves not only that defendant was found trespassing on the private premises of others, but also that he could not give a good account of himself. Although the clause, as printed, has a comma after the word "others," yet it is followed by the conjunction "and," and shows that the offense has two elements -- first, trespassing on private property and, second, not being able to give a good account of himself.

OPINION

SHERWOOD, J.

The basis of this action is clause 1, section 1062, ordinance No. 17188, Revised Ordinances of St. Louis:

"Section 1062. Vagrants Defined. -- A vagrant, under the meaning and provisions of this article, shall be deemed to be:

"First. Any male or female person over the ages of fourteen and sixteen (females fourteen, and males sixteen) years, who, there is reason to believe, live idly, without proper and diligent effort to procure employment, and without any visible means to maintain themselves, and without any settled place of abode, and are of vicious character and depraved habits, or who shall be found loitering or rambling abroad, or wandering or lodging in groceries, tippling houses, beer houses, outhouses, bawdy houses, houses of bad repute, sheds, stables, market houses, lumber yards, or in the open air, or who shall be found trespassing on the private premises of others, and not give a good account of themselves, or who shall be found begging, or going from door to door begging, or appearing in any street, thoroughfare or other public place begging or receiving alms."

The report of the chief of police upon which defendant was tried is the following:

"Report of the Chief of Police.

"To the Police Justice of the 1st District Police Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, July 15th, 1897.

State of Missouri,

City of St. Louis.

A. E. Babcock,

To the City of St. Louis, Dr.

"To one hundred dollars for the violation of an ordinance of said city, entitled 'an ordinance in revision of the ordinance of the city of St. Louis and to establish new ordinance provisions for the government of said city,' being ordinance Number 17188, chapter 26, article 6, section 1062, clause 1, approved April 7th, 1893. In this, to-wit: In the city of St. Louis, and State of Missouri, on the 14th day of July, 1897, and on divers other days and times prior thereto, the said A. E. Babcock being a male person over the age of sixteen years, was then and there found trespassing on the private premises of others, and did then and there fail to give a good account of himself, contrary to the ordinance in such case made and provided.

"On information of Mathew Riley, Acting Chief of Police."

The turning point in this case is whether the litigated ordinance required that the trespasser in order to conviction shall not only commit the trespass, but in addition thereto, shall fail to give a good account of himself.

On this score no doubt is entertained; the language is too plain for construction. Under its plain...