St. Louis v. State

• Decision Date: 09 April 1879
• Citation: 1 N.W. 371,8 Neb. 405
• Parties: GEORGE J. ST. LOUIS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

1 N.W. 371

8 Neb. 405

GEORGE J. ST. LOUIS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Supreme Court of Nebraska

April 9, 1879

PLAINTIFF in error was indicted at the October term, A.D 1877, of the district court for Dodge county, for the murder of his wife by poison on the thirtieth day of May previous. He was put upon trial there on the fifth day of February 1878, but the jury did not agree upon a verdict and were discharged. The cause was then taken upon change of venue to Saunders county, where a trial was had in April, 1878, a verdict of murder in the first degree returned against the plaintiff in error, and the date of execution of the sentence of death fixed for September 20, 1878. Having sued out this writ of error, the execution of the sentence was suspended until upon the affirmation of the judgment below, Friday, April 18, 1879, was fixed by this court as the date for the execution of said sentence.

The record brought here, is very voluminous, consisting of over fifteen hundred pages of manuscript, and it would not be practicable to state even its substance. There is, in the opinion, a review and summary of the testimony, as well as comments upon exceptions to instructions given to the jury, upon the trial below, sufficient to an understanding of the points passed upon and decided by this court.

AFFIRMED.

E. F. Gray and W. A. Gray, for plaintiff in error.

1. The district attorney should have been confined to the inquiry as to whether the juror's opinions were such as to preclude him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death. State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479. Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick, 153. One of these jurors might have conscientious convictions, "under some circumstances, on the circumstance of evidence alone." What good intelligent man might not? The other "would want to be well satisfied," would want to be "perfectly satisfied." Have we a right to hang men without the jury being well satisfied--perfectly satisfied--of the guilt of such men? I especially call the attention of the court to the fact that neither of these jurors answered, nor was there any evidence at all to the effect that "his opinions are such as to preclude him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death," as required by the third subdivision of section 468 of the criminal code. A juror is not subject to this challenge until his answers shall have brought him within the statute. His opinions must be such as to preclude him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush., 295. People v. Wilson, 3 Parker Crim. R., 199. Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568. People v. Steward, 7 Cal. 140. State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479.

2. There were some eight days consumed in the trial before the jury, and during this time there were eight several adjournments of the court over-night, and one over Sunday, and for aught that appears in the record the jury were not put in the charge of a sworn officer during these adjournments, nor were they admonished by the court as required by section 484 of the criminal code. The supreme court cannot, by intendment, supply any material proceeding which is entirely omitted, and these proceedings are fatally erroneous. Jones v. State, 2 Blackford, 475. Finke v. Hall, 8 Johnson, 437. Beekman v. Wright, 11 Johnson, 442. Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220. Burley v. State, 1 Neb. 385 (opinion of Mason, C. J., on page 301).

3. The evidence of Mrs. Ryan was discovered after the trial and verdict, and it could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before; and under the fifth subdivision of section 490 of the criminal code it was error to refuse a new trial for this reason. Gardner v. Mitchell, 6 Pick., 116. Baker v. French, 18 Verm., 460. Waller v. Graves, 20 Conn. 305. Cochran v. Ammon, 16 Ill. 316.

4. The court erred in giving its instruction numbered 23. Breen v. The People, 4 Park., Crim. R., 380. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush., 320. And in its instruction numbered 29, when the proof is equivocal, the jury should not convict. There must be unequivocal certainty of the defendant's guilt to warrant a conviction. Caw v. The People, 3 Neb. 357. U. S. v. Douglass, 2 Blatchford, 207. U. S. v. Martin, 2 McLean, 256.

5. It is error for the judge to intimate to the jury that a material witness for the accused has great interest in the result of the action. Lellgett v. Markham, 57 Ga. 13.

M. B. Reese, district attorney, and W. A. Marlow for the State.

1. Conscientious scruples entertained by a person against capital punishment, if so great as to affect his verdict in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, is sufficient reason to sustain a challenge for cause, even though such conscientious scruples would have no effect upon his verdict in a case where the evidence was direct. This was so decided by the court in Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 433.

2. The whole scope of the case shows ample evidence to sustain the verdict. The symptoms and post mortem appearances are consistent with arsenical poisoning, and the finding of the arsenic by Prof. Haines, in large quantities, some of it in an absolved condition, some in its free state, and some glued down to the inner coatings of the stomach by an exudation of coagulated lymph, showing vital action of the blood. The motive, opportunity of the accused, and subsequent conduct all show clearly his guilt.

3. Instruction No. 23, given by the court on its own motion, is a correct definition of a reasonable doubt, and when taken in connection with the instruction which followed (No. 24) is a clear, concise and distinct definition, and defines reasonable doubt in such a plain and comprehensive manner as would convey to the mind of any competent juror its true meaning. Instruction 29, taken as a whole, is a true exposition of the law on this subject. Instruction 36 was certainly favorable to the accused, as the only evidence to which the instruction could at all apply was to the testimony of the physicians, who, by the cross-examination of counsel for the accused, showed that they were on unfriendly terms with accused; and this instruction was in effect saying to the jury that position contended for by counsel for accused, that full credence should not necessarily be given to such testimony, to be correct; there was no other testimony to which it could at all have any reference, and hence instead of being injurious to accused, was for his benefit. Instruction 63 was correct, even standing alone; but when taken in connection with all the others, is a true explanation to the jurors of their duty, and in no way could tend even to confuse their minds regarding their duty, in giving the accused the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Instruction 52, 57, 58, and all the other instructions complained of, we do not think subject to the objections interposed.

OPINION

LAKE, J.

No foundation was laid either in the original or the supplemental motion for a new trial for reviewing any question decided by the district court upon the admission or rejection of evidence. Nevertheless, in view of the great importance of the case, we have carefully examined the record as to the several rulings complained of in these particulars, and fail to discover any just cause for complaint on the part of the prisoner.

In this connection we will refer to certain items specially mentioned in the brief of counsel as being prejudicial to the prisoner. The first is the answer of Dr. Crabbs, the coroner, to a question put to him by the district attorney as to what notice he had of the death of Mrs. St. Louis before holding the inquest, in which he said: "I received notice by petition with twenty-eight signers." We do not see how this answer of itself could have been in the least prejudicial. But, admitting its immateriality, as claimed on behalf of the prisoner at the time, it was promptly excluded from the jury, as was also the petition itself when subsequently offered in evidence on behalf of the prosecution.

Complaint is also made of the testimony of the witness Kief, who was called by the state, which tends very strongly to show improper if not even criminal intercourse between the prisoner and a Mrs. Bloomer, who then resided in Fremont. This testimony was clearly admissible, and, taken in connection with that of other witnesses, and especially when viewed in the light of the vile and lascivious letter written to this woman by the prisoner himself while incarcerated under suspicion of having poisoned his wife, furnishes a pretty reliable clew to the motive by which he may have been actuated in the commission of the crime. As tending to show a motive in the commission of the offense charged, it was proper evidence for the consideration of the jury.

Again it being disclosed by the cross-examination of Dr. Abbott, one of the state's witnesses, that, professionally, he was not on friendly terms with the prisoner, on his re-examination he was asked by the district attorney whether the sole reason of such unfriendliness to the prisoner were not the fact, "that he has pretended by a forged diploma to be a graduate of a medical college, which you afterwards found to be false." Although this question was not answered, an objection to it on the ground of incompetency having been sustained, still it is urged that the mere asking of it was so well calculated to prejudice the minds of the jury against the prisoner that a new trial should be granted. That the question was clearly incompetent there can be no doubt, and a prompt rebuke of the attorney propounding it would not have been out of place. But to hold the question a sufficient reason for a reversal of the judgment, even had it been specially urged in the motion...