St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe
| Decision Date | 30 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-2321,96-2971 and 96-3320,s. 96-2321 |
| Citation | 699 So.2d 1017 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1853 ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL, INC., and Women's Health Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Charles PHILLIPE, as Personal Representative of Juslin Phillipe, deceased, and all survivors of Juslin Phillipe, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Certification Question Oct. 22, 1997.
Joseph H. Lowe of Winitz, Minkin & Lowe, Miami, for appellants.
Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., and Theodore Babbitt and Joseph R. Johnson of Babbitt and Johnson, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Kristy C. Brown of Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Wack & Dickson, P.A., Orlando, for amicus curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association.
Neil H. Butler of Butler & Long, and William A. Bell, Tallahassee, for amici curiae The Florida Hospital Association, Inc. and the Association of Voluntary Hospitals of Florida, Inc.
Claudia B. Greenberg of Grossman and Roth, P.A., for amicus curiae Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
These consolidated appeals present unsettled questions relating to voluntary arbitration under the Medical Malpractice Act and the statutory limits on claims for non-economic damages. We must first, however, take up the equally unsettled issue as to the defendants' right under the Medical Malpractice Act to a stay pending review of the arbitration award.
Since the entry of the medical malpractice arbitration award, the defendants have made multiple attempts to obtain a stay pending appellate review of the judgment on the award. First, they filed a motion for stay pending review in this court pursuant to section 766.212(2), which allows the district court to stay an arbitration award entered pursuant to section 766.207 but only to prevent manifest injustice. See §§ 766.207 and 766.212(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). A motion panel of this court denied the motion. Upon the circuit court's entry of the final judgment ratifying the arbitration award, defendants posted a supersedeas bond in the lower court under rule 9.310. 1 In response to this filing, claimants filed a motion for contempt and for directions to the sheriff to levy execution. The circuit court denied a stay of execution, directing the sheriff to levy on defendants' assets.
In reviewing the claimed error from the denial of the stay, we turn first to section 766.212. 2 Defendants contend that this statute, especially subsection (2), infringes on the supreme court's exclusive authority to prescribe rules of procedure for the appellate courts. The court has prescribed a procedure for stays pending review in rule 9.310, which affords an unfettered right to a stay of a money judgment upon furnishing a good and sufficient supersedeas bond. Accordingly, they argue, section 766.212(2) is unconstitutional to the extent that it abrogates the automatic stay provision of rule 9.310. We disagree.
As we read the text of this statute, the legislature has created a modified right to judicial review of arbitration awards under chapter 766. This limited review includes an equally substantive right to payment of the award during review unless the court finds that a stay is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Defendants have the burden of showing us some "manifest injustice" if a stay were denied. Their only showing was that they would have to pay the arbitration award now, even though they might later prevail on this appeal. We conclude that defendants have failed to show that a stay is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.
According to the text of subsection (1) of section 766.212, the stay is reviewed by an appellate court in the same manner as a final order from an administrative agency under section 120.68. Stays from final administrative action are not uniformly granted as a matter of substantive right by the legislature. In subsection (3) of section 120.68, for example, the legislature has provided:
The only instance where the legislature has created a substantive right to a stay pending review of final agency action is where the agency order has the effect of suspending or revoking a license. So it is clear that in section 120.68 the legislature has considered the question of which agency orders should be subject to a stay as of right, and has just as clearly provided in section 766.212 that no such right should be given.
Moreover, as the supreme court itself noted in University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So.2d 189 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 915, 114 S.Ct. 304, 126 L.Ed.2d 252 (1993), prompt payment of an award in medical malpractice arbitration is one of the trade-offs for claimants who give up their right to a trial by jury and agree to arbitration. We cannot say that such substantive legislation infringes on the supreme court's power to regulate procedures in appellate proceedings. Consequently we find section 766.212 constitutional but certify the question of constitutionality to the supreme court for its definitive resolution. 3
We now to turn to the principal issue raised in this appeal, whether the statutory limit on non-economic damages in a medical malpractice arbitration applies in the aggregate to all claimants or whether each claimant is limited to the statutory amount. To begin to analyze this problem, it is necessary first to set the stage.
This medical malpractice action arose from the death of Juslin Phillipe, who died while giving birth to her daughter, Ecclesianne Phillipe. 4 Because of the death of the patient, the Wrongful Death Act requires that the action be brought by the personal representative of her estate. That happens to be her surviving husband, who in turn has claims on behalf of himself and her four surviving children. The written agreement to arbitrate pursuant to section 766.201, Florida Statutes, states that:
After hearing the evidence and arguments of the parties, the arbitrators awarded separate amounts of non-economic damages. The surviving husband and Ecclesianne each received $250,000; the three other children each received $175,000. The arbitrators then awarded $2,284,804 for lost support and services to the family, and $943,000 for lost services for the special care of the baby, in economic damages. They also awarded $3,398 in funeral expenses. In awarding attorney's fees, the arbitrators awarded separate sums for each claimant: $153,750 for non-economic damages; $252,244 for economic damages to the family; $104,128 for economic damages to the baby; and $509.70 for funeral expenses. The economic damages were made payable in equal yearly installments for 10 years, but were not reduced to present value. The circuit court entered a final judgment ratifying and confirming this award, and this appeal followed in due course.
As a preliminary matter, we are asked to address the standard of review applicable to voluntary binding arbitration awards pursuant to chapter 766. We first note that there are two different sets of statutes providing for arbitration of medical malpractice claims. Under section 766.106, a defendant's insurer may make an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the issue of damages. Section 766.106(12) provides that: "To the extent not inconsistent with this part, the provisions of chapter 682, the Florida Arbitration Code, shall be applicable to such proceedings." On the other hand, the parties may elect to submit the issue of damages to an arbitration panel in accordance with section 766.207, and review of the award will be in accordance with section 766.212. Unlike section 766.106, section 766.207 does not contain a provision applying the arbitration code in chapter 682. In this case, arbitration was clearly initiated by the parties themselves under section 766.207. Therefore, our review of this case should follow section 766.212.
We again refer to section 766.212(1). It provides that an arbitration award is final agency action for purposes of section 120.68 and that an appeal shall be limited to a review of the record and otherwise proceed in accord with section 120.68. Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (1995), which is a part of the Administrative Procedures Act, empowered the reviewing court as follows:
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