St. Onge v. Media Group, Inc., 84 Conn. App. 88 (CT 7/20/2004)

• Citation: 84 Conn. App. 88
• Decision Date: 20 July 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 24287).
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ST. ONGE, STEWART, JOHNSON AND REENS, LLC <I>v.</I> MEDIA GROUP, INC.

Page 88

84 Conn. App. 88

ST. ONGE, STEWART, JOHNSON AND REENS, LLCv.

MEDIA GROUP, INC.

(AC 24287).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 2004.

Officially released July 20, 2004.

Syllabus

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover attorney's fees for patent and trademark services provided to the defendant. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendant's unopposed motion to preclude the plaintiff from presenting expert testimony on the value of the services rendered or the reasonableness of the fees charged. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict. The trial court reserved judgment, and the defendant presented no evidence. Upon finding that the plaintiff had proven the existence of an implied contract, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that in all cases in which a jury is asked to decide whether an attorney is entitled to collect legal fees, expert testimony is required because the reasonableness of such fees is outside of the knowledge of jurors; a jury's competence to make the required assessments depends on the extent to which the jurors' everyday experience has prepared them to undertake that responsibility, and, therefore, the need to present expert testimony in collection cases is best decided, not by a bright line rule, but by careful examination of the circumstances of each case to determine whether the evidence presented is sufficiently transparent to obviate the need for the testimony of experts.

2. The plaintiffs, having presented evidence of the complexity of the services performed, failed to present evidence as to the necessity of its services or the reasonableness of its fees in light of community standards; because the patent and trademark issues at the heart of this case were beyond the reach of the ordinary knowledge of a lay jury, the jury could not, in the absence of expert testimony, be presumed to have had the knowledge to evaluate the necessity of the services rendered or the propriety of the fees, and the trial court, therefore, improperly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

Procedural History

Action to recover payment for legal services rendered to the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the jury before Karazin, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.

Alexander H. Schwartz, with whom was Irene M. Patalano, for the appellant (defendant).

Judith Ellenthal, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Schaller, Bishop and Peters, Js.

Opinion

PETERS, J.

In this action for the collection of attorney's fees, a law firm seeks payment from its client for patent and trademark work that it performed over a two year period. The principal issue is whether, in order to recover in a jury trial, the law firm was required to present expert evidence about the reasonableness of its fees. The trial court denied a motion for a directed verdict that was based on the absence of such evidence and accepted a jury verdict in favor of the law firm. It rendered judgment accordingly. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, St. Onge, Stewart, Johnson and Reens, LLC, a law firm specializing in patent and trademark law, filed a three count complaint seeking the payment of $169,678.27 in attorney's fees allegedly due from its client, the defendant, Media Group, Inc. The plaintiff sought recovery for breach of an express contract, breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment of the defendant. In each count, the plaintiff alleged that the parties had agreed that the plaintiff "should charge reasonable fees" for services rendered. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations that the parties had, in any fashion, agreed to a fee arrangement.¹

Before the beginning of the trial, the defendant filed a motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 13-4 (4), to preclude the plaintiff from presenting expert testimony on the value of the services rendered or the reasonableness of its fee charges. In the absence of an objection by the plaintiff, the court granted the motion. As a result, the case was heard by the jury without the assistance of any expert testimony.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict. It alleged that, without such expert testimony, the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that would have enabled the jury properly to determine the reasonableness of the claimed attorney's fees. The court reserved judgment on the defendant's motion until the conclusion of the trial. Because the defendant did not present any evidence, the evidentiary phase of the trial ended immediately.

The jury found that the plaintiff had proven the existence of an implied contract that required the defendant to pay for legal services in accordance with the terms of a fee agreement. It rejected the plaintiff's claim that the parties had entered into an express contract and did not reach the plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the jury awarded the plaintiff $152,710.44 on the second count of its complaint.

The trial court accepted the verdict of the jury and denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. It ruled that "the jury could have reasonably found based on all the evidence that there was an implied contract and the damages could be ascertained without expert testimony being required under all the circumstances." The defendant appeals from the court's subsequent judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The underlying facts are undisputed. In the spring of 1999, in anticipation of a new partner's joining the plaintiff firm, the plaintiff took on the responsibility of seeing to the defendant's need for protection of its patent and trademark interests. In June, 1999, the plaintiff sent an engagement letter to the defendant, in which it described its hourly rate and requested a $50,000 retainer. The defendant did not respond and did not pay the retainer.

Nevertheless, between May, 1999, and March, 2001, the plaintiff performed various legal services for the defendant. These services included the processing and maintenance of patents and trademarks for the defendant and the pursuit of litigation to protect those rights. During that time, the plaintiff billed the defendant on a monthly basis. From time to time, the defendant made some partial payments to the plaintiff.

In April, 2001, after unsuccessful efforts at settlement, the plaintiff stopped representing the defendant and began this collection action. The action resulted in the $152,710.44 judgment in its favor from which the defendant appeals.

On appeal, the defendant claims that this judgment should be reversed because the trial court improperly denied its motion for a directed verdict. It maintains that the plaintiff was not entitled to prevail because the plaintiff (1) failed to present any expert testimony to establish the reasonableness of the attorney's fees it sought and (2) presented insufficient lay evidence about the reasonableness of the fees. Because we agree with the defendant's first claim, we do not reach the second one.

The defendant's argument about the necessity for expert testimony to support the plaintiff's collection action has two parts. Its broader argument is that expert testimony is required in all jury cases because the reasonableness of attorney's fees is always beyond the knowledge of jurors. Its narrower argument is that expert testimony was required in this case due to the factual complexities of this plaintiff's collection action.

Before addressing the merits of the defendant's arguments, we set forth our standard of review. "A verdict may be directed where the decisive question is one of law or where the claim is that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Rutkin, 79 Conn. App. 355, 363, 830 A.2d 340, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 920, 835 A.2d 60 (2003). Because the defendant's challenge to the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict raises a question of law about the necessity for expert testimony, our review is plenary. See Miller v. Westport, 268 Conn. 207, 214, 842 A.2d 558 (2004). We address each of the defendant's arguments separately.

I NECESSITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ALL JURY CASES

In its first claim, the defendant proposes the adoption of a bright line rule that expert testimony is required whenever a jury is asked to decide whether an attorney is entitled to collect legal fees. In its view, regardless of the circumstances, the reasonableness of legal fees is a subject outside of the knowledge base that we reasonably may expect jurors to have. We disagree.

It is common ground that, to establish a right to recover unpaid professional fees on a claim of implied contract, the plaintiff needed to provide an evidentiary foundation of reasonableness for the fees that it charged. See Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 804-805, 826 A.2d 1066 (2003) ("A true implied . . . contract can only exist . . . where there is no express one. It is one which is inferred from the conduct of the parties though not expressed in words. . . . In such a case, the law implies from the circumstances, a promise by the defendant to pay the plaintiff what those services are reasonably worth." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

Assessment of the reasonableness of attorney's fees traditionally has been guided by several factors. "These factors include the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the fee customarily...