St. Onge v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank
| Decision Date | 21 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | PC 16-4227,No. 2018-316-Appeal.,2018-316-Appeal. |
| Parties | Edward F. St. Onge v. USAA Federal Savings Bank et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
Justice Indeglia, for the Court. The plaintiff, Edward St. Onge, appeals pro se from the dismissal of his claims against the defendants, USAA Federal Savings Bank (USAA) and Charles Baird (Baird), for lack of personal jurisdiction. This case came before the Supreme Court on November 6, 2019, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the orders of the Superior Court.
This dispute arose from an alleged oral agreement between plaintiff and Baird, with whom plaintiff was a long-time friend. The plaintiff is a resident of Rhode Island, and Baird is a resident of Florida. According to the complaint, Baird sought plaintiff's help resolving a will dispute in Florida. In the disputed will, which was handwritten, Baird was named sole beneficiary. The plaintiff alleged that, after Baird's repeated requests for his assistance, hefinally contracted with Baird on or about April 15, 2015, to perform certain consulting and other services regarding the will dispute.1 In return for his services, plaintiff alleged, he would be reimbursed by Baird for expenses that plaintiff advanced and the fair market value of his services, should Baird prevail; plaintiff would earn nothing if Baird did not prevail.
From mid-April 2015 until May 31, 2016, plaintiff alleged, he performed "numerous services" for Baird, which included traveling to and from Florida, at plaintiff's own expense. The plaintiff asserts that he assisted Baird in "interview[ing], select[ing], secur[ing,] and oversee[ing] legal services from a Florida attorney." After assisting Baird in securing an attorney, plaintiff continued to work with Baird, he alleged, "to help him successfully prevail in the [w]ill contest as well as inventorying and evaluating claims of alleged creditors and negotiating favorable settlement of numerous outstanding debts of the [inherited] Estate." The plaintiff alleged that he performed the work for Baird in both Rhode Island and Florida, always traveling at plaintiff's own expense.
After prevailing in the will dispute, and after the creditors' window of time to file claims against the estate had expired, Baird transferred $40,000 from the estate to his personal checking account at USAA. USAA is a bank that is incorporated in Texas and based in San Antonio. The plaintiff alleges that the bulk of that money, by agreement of Baird, was to be paid to plaintiff for his services and, at Baird's direction, plaintiff was authorized to pay an agreed-upon total of $25,355.67 from Baird's USAA account to plaintiff's credit-card accounts directly. Thereafter, the funds were paid to five different national credit-card accounts belonging to plaintiff. However, on June 28, 2016, USAA rescinded all the credit-card payments, without notice toplaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that Baird executed a check from his USAA account to plaintiff in the amount of $9,644.33 and that the check was returned and marked "Not Authorized."
The plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court on September 7, 2016, against both Baird and USAA, seeking to recover the rescinded funds plus interest, costs, and consequential damages. Baird filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. An order granting the motion was entered on January 28, 2017.2 A default judgment was entered against USAA for failing to defend against the action but was later vacated on the ground that the Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over USAA. USAA then moved to dismiss the claim against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was granted. That order was entered on June 29, 2018. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on July 17, 2018.3
When reviewing a challenge to personal jurisdiction, "[w]e examine the pleadings, accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, and view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Cassidy v. Lonquist Management Co., LLC, 920 A.2d 228, 232 (R.I. 2007). The question of personal jurisdiction presents a "mixed question[] of law and fact[.]" Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661, 665 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232). While mixed questions of law and fact usually require more deferential treatment to the trial justice's findings of fact, "when deciding mixed questions of law and fact that involve constitutional issues, our review is de novo." Id. (quoting Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232). We therefore review a challenge to personal jurisdiction de novo. See, e.g., id.
The issue before us is whether plaintiff has alleged "'sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction,' in order to overcome [USAA's] motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 231-32 (quoting Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113, 1118 (R.I. 2003)). In reviewing the record, we accept the facts alleged by plaintiff as true and view disputed facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Id. at 232.
"To establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island, a plaintiff's allegations must satisfy the demands of Rhode Island's long-arm statute, [G.L. 1956] § 9-5-33."Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232. That statute provides that "[e]very foreign corporation * * * that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island * * * in every case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States." Section 9-5-33(a). "This language has been interpreted to mean that Rhode Island courts may exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants within the parameters set forth by the United States Constitution." McKenney v. Kenyon Piece Dye Works, Inc., 582 A.2d 107, 108 (R.I. 1990).
The forum court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant when either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction is alleged and proven by the plaintiff. See Hawes, 184 A.3d at 670. In the present case, plaintiff asserts that the Superior Court has both general and specific jurisdiction over USAA.
We begin by addressing plaintiff's argument with regard to general jurisdiction over USAA. In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), the United States Supreme Court established that a court has general jurisdiction over a corporation in the state in which it is incorporated, where it has its principal place of business, and where the "corporation's 'affiliations with the [s]tate are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.'" Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Where a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant, it may hear any claim involving that defendant, regardless of whether or not the claim arose out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 233.
The plaintiff asserts that USAA is "at home" in Rhode Island, and that the Superior Court has general jurisdiction over USAA because of "sweeping changes" that he alleges have occurred in the banking industry after Daimler was published in 2014, which changes, according to plaintiff, would allow for a Rhode Island court to have general jurisdiction over USAA. Specifically, he points to direct-deposit and online banking services, as well as advertising by USAA in Rhode Island, to support this contention. He further argues that "USAA is at least as much 'at home' in Rhode Island as it is in any other [s]tate, excepting Texas."
This approach, however, ignores the developing body of law created by Daimler that general jurisdiction will be exercised only where a defendant is "at home" in the forum state, either through incorporation, principal place of business, or, in rare circumstances, where the defendant is "essentially at home." Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139; see, e.g., BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 626 (2nd Cir. 2016). Here, USAA is incorporated in Texas. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that USAA has its "corporate headquarters" in Texas, an allegation that is confirmed by USAA's statement submitted to this Court pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. Clearly, personal jurisdiction does not exist under the first two principles, because USAA is not incorporated in Rhode Island, nor is its principal place of business located in the state. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
Regarding the third principle, "essentially at home[,]" Daimler stands for the proposition that this is a high standard of limited applicability. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 133 n.11 (). We decline to hold that mere advertising and online banking options in...
To continue reading
Request your trial