St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 30 October 1984 |
Citation | 208 Cal.Rptr. 5,161 Cal.App.3d 1199 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, County of Yuba, Respondent, COUNTY OF YUBA, a political subdivision of the State of California; Bill J. Crenshaw and Albert T. Fuhs, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 24132. |
Craig E. Farmer, George E. Murphy, and Bolling, Walter & Gawthrop, Sacramento, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Dennis A. Barlow, Yuba County Counsel, and Timothy P. Hayes, Chief Deputy, County Counsel, Marysville, for real parties in interest.
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondent superior court to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment, and to enter a new order granting the motion.
On May 10, 1983, real party in interest, Albert T. Fuhs, commenced an action against real parties in interest, County of Yuba (County) and Bill J. Crenshaw, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with the County. At the time of the termination, there existed a policy of insurance issued to the County by petitioner. On September 12, 1983, petitioner initiated the underlying action, seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no obligation to indemnify the County or Crenshaw for their liability, if any, by reason of the termination of Fuhs' employment, and that it has no obligation to defend the County or Crenshaw in the action brought by Fuhs.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by respondent court. On June 25, 1984, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking mandamus relief. On August 2, we notified the parties that we were considering issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance, and that any opposition to the petition was to be filed on or before August 17. Opposition to the petition was filed on August 14. We shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate.
The insurance policy states that it provides "Comprehensive General Liability Protection," covering the County "and other persons protected under [the] agreement against claims for bodily injury or damage to tangible property resulting from an accidental event." The policy further states that "the accidental event ... must be something [the insured] didn't expect or intend to happen." Petitioner contends, inter alia, that, since Fuhs' claims do not arise from an "accidental event," there is no coverage under the policy and petitioner is not obligated to defend the County or Crenshaw in the action brought by Fuhs.
In general, (Emphasis in original; citations omitted; Miller v. Elite Ins. Co. (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 739, 753, 161 Cal.Rptr. 322.)
Here, the express terms of the policy extend coverage only for claims against the insured "resulting from an accidental event." In its plain and ordinary sense, "accidental" means "arising from extrinsic causes[;] occurring unexpectedly or by chance[; or] happening without intent or through carelessness." (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dict. (1983) p. 49.) The policy itself states that "the accidental event ... must be something [the insured] didn't expect or intend to happen."
Fuhs' claims against the County and Crenshaw are based on allegations that they wrongfully discharged him and deprived him of the benefit of being rehired by the subterfuge of purporting to eliminate his position as Building Inspector I. The conduct of the County and Crenshaw which assertedly gave rise to Fuhs' claims must be deemed to have been purposeful. The termination of Fuhs' employment was not an unintentional, unexpected, chance occurrence, and thus there is no potential liability under the insurance policy and petitioner owes no obligation to defend the County or Crenshaw. 1 1 Consequently, petitioner is entitled to summary judgment. This conclusion obviates the need to consider any other issues presented by the petition for writ of mandate.
The petition has been served on respondent court and real parties in interest. Having received opposition to the petition and having advised the parties that we were considering the issuance of a peremptory writ without first issuing an alternative writ, this court is empowered to issue a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 203...
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