St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 85715
| Citation | 675 So.2d 590 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 85715,85715 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly S260 ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Respondent. |
Scott H. Michaud and James T. Ferrara of Michaud, Buschmann, Fox, Ferrara & Mittelmark, P.A., Boca Raton, for petitioner.
Daniel S. Pearson, Lucinda A. Hoffmann and Lenore C. Smith of Holland & Knight, Miami, for respondent.
We have before us Indemnity Insurance Company of North America's (IINA) motion to strike St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company's (St. Paul) notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction as untimely and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.120. We deny IINA's motion and hold that St. Paul's notice was timely.
IINA, an excess coverage carrier, sued Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association ("JUA") 1 and St. Paul 2 for bad faith in the investigation, evaluation, and negotiation of a malpractice claim against Miami Children's Hospital that resulted in a claim against IINA for which it paid $750,000. A jury returned a verdict against JUA and St. Paul, and the trial court entered judgments against them jointly and severally.
On January 18, 1995, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, and JUA filed a motion for rehearing which was denied April 20, 1995. Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). St. Paul took no action with respect to the district court's affirmance until May 12, 1995, when it filed a notice to invoke this Court's discretionary jurisdiction.
IINA claims that St. Paul's notice was untimely because it was due "within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed" but was not filed until 114 days after the district court opinion. Fla. R.App. P. 9.120(b). IINA further asserts that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g)(1) controls here, and pursuant to the rule, JUA's motion for rehearing suspended rendition of the district court's order for JUA, but not for St. Paul. We disagree. Subdivision (g)(1) of rule 9.020 discusses the delay of rendition of an order in the context of post-trial motions and does not apply to the procedure to be used for appellate motions. Rule 9.020(g) was amended in 1992 to clarify the procedure to be followed in multiparty litigation, and states in pertinent part:
(g) Rendition (of an Order). An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal. However, unless another applicable rule of procedure specifically provides to the contrary, if a final order has been entered and there has been filed in the lower tribunal an authorized and timely motion for new trial or rehearing, clarification, or certification; to alter or amend; for judgment not withstanding verdict or in accordance with prior motion for directed verdict, or in arrest of judgment; or a challenge to the verdict, the following exceptions apply:
(1) If such a motion or motions have been filed, the final order shall not be deemed rendered with respect to any claim between the movant and any party against whom relief is sought by the motion or motions until the filing of a signed, written order disposing of all such motions between such parties.
In In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So.2d 516 (Fla.1992), this Court explained that the 1992 amendment limits the scope of the rule to "authorized post-trial motions":
Subdivision (g) is further amended to clarify that, in a multiparty situation, a single order can be "rendered" at different times depending upon when the trial court resolved authorized post-trial motions between particular parties.
The Court based its explanation on the Report of The Florida Bar Appellate Court Rules Committee which indicated that in formulating the amendment, the committee contemplated an application of this rule solely to post-trial motions. In its report, the committee referred only to post-trial motions and a trial court's resolution of those...
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AMEND. TO FLA. RULES OF APPELLATE PROC., SC00-718.
...language of this proposed subdivision is facially consistent with this Court's holding in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 675 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1996), the committee's underlying intent in proposing this subdivision exceeds the scope of St. Pau......
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...filed under rule 9.330(a)(1)(D) tolls rendition of an appellate order. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 675 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla. 1996) ("[A] district court's order is not 'rendered' until there has been a disposition of all motions relative to that order.");......
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Dodgen v. Grijalva
...under rule 9.330(a)(2)(D) tolls rendition of an appellate order. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 8 675 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla. 1996) ("[A] district court's order is not 'rendered' until there has been a disposition of all motions relative to that order."); see......
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