St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State
| Decision Date | 09 March 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 35380,35380 |
| Citation | 57 Wn.2d 807,360 P.2d 142 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | ST. PAUL AND TACOMA LUMBER COMPANY, a Washington corporation, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, Respondent. |
Grosscup, Ambler, Stephan & Miller, Seattle, for appellant.
John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., E. P. Donnelly, H. T. Hartinger, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
The plaintiff, St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, purchased certain real property in Pierce County at a tax title sale held in that county on February 7, 1949. In 1956, the plaintiff discovered for the first time that the state of Washington claimed title to the property under and escheat order which had been entered on December 22, 1924, in the probate of the estate of one Joseph Truckey, in the Superior Court for Kitsap County. The order of escheat was filed in Pierce County in 1958. Thereafter, on May 7, 1958, plaintiff brought this action in the Superior Court for Pierce County to quiet title to the property in question. The trial court entered an order quieting title in the state from which the plaintiff appeals.
The facts are as follows: Joseph Truckey, a resident of Kitsap County, died intestate and without heirs on March 5, 1922, at which time he owned the Northwest Quarter of Section 24, Township 18 North, Range 6, E.W.M., situated in Pierce County, Washington. Under the statutes then applicable, the real estate taxes assessed upon this property by Pierce County for the year 1922 were levied October 1, 1922 and became a lien on March 1, 1922.
Thereafter, and sometime prior to 1924, by reason of the inability of the administratrix to sell the property for the amount of the taxes which had accrued, she entered into an agreement with the state of Washington whereby an order was entered in the probate proceeding on December 22, 1924, escheating the property to the state 'subject to all taxes against the same,' and discharging the administratrix.
The appellant contends that the tax lien survived the order of escheat. We agree. The statutes material here regarding escheats are as follows:
RCW 11.08.021. 'Whenever any person possessed of any property within this state shall die intestate leaving no heirs, such property shall escheat to, and the title thereto immediately vest in the state of Washington, subject, however, to existing liens thereon, the payments of decedent's debts, and the expenses of administration.' (Italics ours.)
The respondent's position is that the legislature intended the italicized portion of RCW 11.08.021 to apply only to private liens, and that when the state acquires title to real property, accrued tax liens become merged in the title, citing Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 1945, 22 Wash.2d 532, 156 P.2d 907, 158 A.L.R. 555, Reid v. State ex rel. Thompson, 1881, 74 Ind. 252 and Schmitz v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 1951, 55 N.M. 320, 232 P.2d 986. We see no merit in this argument. No language in RCW 11.08.021 distinguishes between public and private liens and the respondent points to nothing which would suggest that the legislature intended anything but the ordinary meaning of the words used. We may not read into a statute language which does not appear when the statute is clear and unambiguous.
We believe the question whether tax liens survive an escheat order was settled in the case of In re Graley's Estate, 1935, 183 Wash. 268, 48 P.2d 634, 637. That case involved the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of real property remaining in the hands of an administrator after the entry of an order of escheat. The question was whether or not the administrator should pay taxes levied after the death of the intestate but before the entry of the escheat order. It was contended that the state acquired title at the time of the death of the intestate and, therefore, since no tax can be levied upon property owned by the state, no tax obligation existed. In answer to this we said:
'* * * the words 'immediately vest in the state of Washington,' as used in * * * [RCW 11.08.021], can only refer to the date of the escheat as declared by the order entered pursuant to * * * [RCW 11.08.030].
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'* * * the title of the state of Washington to the property * * * as declared by the decree of escheat, in so far as the general taxes * * * are concerned, dates from the entry of the decree, and does not relate back to the date of [the owner's] death, so as to defeat the county's lien for the taxes above referred to.'
We further said:
'Here we have conflicting claims presented by different branches of the state government--on the one hand, the claim of the county for general taxes; on the other, the claim of the supervisor on behalf of the common schools.
Generally speaking, the claim of the state through a county for taxes is superior to other claims. The county officials must make the levy to meet the estimated county expenses. They cannot allow for a sinking fund to take care of property which may later escape taxation, and taxes which are thereafter removed from the rolls necessarily create a deficiency, which later must be paid by other property. In this case, the county officials had no possible way of even guessing that the state would ever have any claim to the real property left by Mr. Graley. They could only proceed in an orderly manner to assess the same, as required by law.'
By the express language of RCW 11.08.021 and by our construction thereof in the Graley case, it is now settled in this state that real estate taxes, which are levied prior to the time title vests in the state by entry of an escheat order, survive the escheat of title to the state.
The respondent argues that admitting the tax liens survive, they could not be enforced against the state's interest by a foreclosure sale, citing State v. Frost, 1901, 25 Wash. 134, 64 P. 902; Port of Seattle v. Yesler Estate, 1915, 83 Wash. 166, 145 P. 209; Gasaway v. City of Seattle, 1909, 52 Wash. 444, 100 P. 991, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 68; Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 1945, 22 Wash.2d 532, 156 P.2d 907, 158 A.L.R. 555; Wingard v. Pierce County, 1945, 23 Wash.2d 296, 160 P.2d 1009; City of Bellingham v. Whatcom County, 1952, 40 Wash.2d 669, 245 P.2d 1016; In re City of Seattle, 1953, 43 Wash.2d 445, 261 P.2d 416. An examination of these cases will disclose that they do not involve the sale of property for the nonpayment of real estate taxes as against the interest of the state where it has acquired title under our eacheat statutes. On the other hand we held, in Payallup v. Lakin, 1907, 45 Wash. 368, 88 P. 578, 579, that property upon which a tax lien existed could be sold in foreclosure by the county even though it had been acquired subsequently by a municipality. We said:
The same reasoning should apply in the enforcement of tax liens against property of the state obtained under our escheat statutes. In preserving lien holders' rights under RCW 11.08.021, it must be presumed that the legislature intended that such lien holders have the means to enforce those rights. Pierce County, as a tax lien holder, was therefore entitled to maintain the statutory method of enforcing its lien claim against the state, i. e.,...
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