St. Stephen's Club v. Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 28 October 1953
• Docket Number: No. 33424,33424
• Citation: 52 O.O. 3,160 Ohio St. 194,115 N.E.2d 385
• Parties: , 52 O.O. 3 ST. STEPHEN'S CLUB v. YOUNGSTOWN METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 194

160 Ohio St. 194

115 N.E.2d 385, 52 O.O. 3

ST. STEPHEN'S CLUB v. YOUNGSTOWN METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY.

No. 33424.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Oct. 28, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The construction of a project which combines low-rent housing and slum elimination in accordance with the provisions of Sections 1078-29 to 1978- 49a, General Code (Section 3735.27 to 3735.50, Revised Code), is conducive to the public welfare, and the provisions of Section 1078-34a, General Code (Section 3735.32, Revised Code), granting the right of eminent domain to a public housing authority to be exercised in connection with the construction of such a project are not repugnant to Section 19 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio.

2. Where a project to be constructed under the authority of and pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1078-29 to 1078-49a, General Code (Sections 3735.27 to 3735.50, Revised Code), will combine slum elimination and construction of low-rent housing units, the housing authority, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the location of the housing units so to be constructed and may, in the exercise of such discretion, cause the construction of such low-rent housing units elsewhere than in the area occupied by the slum which is to be eliminated.

3. City zoning which would prevent construction of low-rent housing units in the area selected by the housing authority will not prevent or invalidate the appropriation of the selected area in a proceeding therefor brought by the housing authority, where an agreement has been made, in advance of the appropriation proceeding, between the city and the housing authority which requires the city to effect such change in zoning as may be necessary for such construction, but the court should enjoin payment of compensation and taking possession by the housing authority until the city has effected the required rezoning.

The issues of this case arise out of the effort of the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority to appropriate 18.028 acres of land belonging to St. Stephen's Club on which to construct a multiple-family-unit low-rent housing project.

St. Stephen's Club is a nonprofit corporation. It owns a tract of about 26 acres of land in the city of Youngstown, which it has developed and used as a recreation site for its members and for children of the neighborhood. This tract of land is bounded on three sides by privately owned single-family dwellings. The area is zoned 'residential A' and is not a slum area.

After the usual preliminary negotiations, the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority on December 11, 1952, entered into the annual contributions contract with the Public Housing Administration in compliance with federal statutes. This contract provides that the Public Housing Administration will advance $3,549,587 for the construction of 304 units. By ordinance, the city of Youngstown authorized the execution of an agreement, known as the co-operation agreement, between the city and the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority. Such agreement was executed.

Paragraph four of that agreement provides in part:

'The city agrees that, subsequent to the date of initiation (at defined in the act) of each project and within five years after the completion thereof, or such further period as may be approved by the PHA, and in addition to the number of unsafe or insanitary dwelling units which the city is obligated to eliminate as a part of the low-rent housing project heretofore undertaken by the local authority and identified as project No. Ohio-2-1, there has been or will be elimination (as approved by PHA) by demolition, condemnation, effective closing, or compulsory repair or improvement, of unsafe or insanitary dwelling units situated in the locality or metropolitan area of the city substantially equal in number to the number of newly constructed dwelling units provided by such project * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Paragraph five of the co-operation agreement provides that the city shall 'make such changes in any zoning of the site and surrounding territory of such project as are reasonable and necessary for the development and protection of the project and the general area.'

Thereupon the Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority instituted a proceeding in the Common Pleas Court (being case No. 139541 therein) to appropriate the land in question. That appropriation proceeding was unsuccessfully opposed and it resulted in a determination of $27,000 as the compensation for the land to be appropriated.

Thereupon the instant proceeding was instituted in the Common Pleas Court (as case No. 139607 therein) for an order permanently enjoining the Metropolitan Housing Authority from proceeding with the appropriation proceeding, on the following three grounds:

'(a) The use to which it proposes to put said property is not a public use, and under Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution of Ohio, private property may be taken only for a public use.

'(b) Even if defendant has the right of eminent domain under the Constitution of the state of Ohio, nevertheless, it does not have the right to appropriate defendant's property in this instance for the reason that the applicable statutes limit its right of eminent domain to property comprising or located in slum areas.

'(c) Even assuming that defendant does have the power of eminent domain and may exercise the same beyond slum areas, nevertheless, it does not have a right to appropriate plaintiff's property for the reason that it is located in an area within the city of Youngstown which by the proper local authorities has been classified as 'Residential A,' and in such area only single-family dwellings may be erected save and except where the Planning Commission of the City of Youngstown permits the erection of a two-family dwelling; plaintiff says that the project which defendant proposes to erect will be an integrated project consisting of approximately three hundred (300) separate units housing from four to six families each.'

The trial court found the issues in favor of the defendant except that payment of the compensation and possession of the land were enjoined until adequate zoning changes have been made by the city as contemplated in the co-operation agreement.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court was affirmed, 115 N.E.2d 82.

The cause is in this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

John W. Matasy, Manchester, Bennett, Powers & Ullman and John H. Ranz, Youngstown, for appellant.

Hammond & Hammond and C. J. Hoyt, Youngstown, for appellee.

MIDDLETON, Judge.

The constitutional question raised is stated by the plaintiff-appellant as follows:

'1. Is the use of land by a metropolitan housing authority for the erection and operation of a multiple-unit housing project, occupation of which is restricted to persons of a certain minimum income, a public use?

'2. Is G. C. 1078-34a which purports to authorize appropriation of private property for such use by a metropolitan housing authority violative of Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution?'

The defendant-appellee asserts that the above statement of the issue is incomplete in that it fails to include the fact that slum elimination is an integral and necessary element in the housing project, and that slum elimination is required both under defendant's contract with the city and under its contract with the Public Housing Administration.

The plaintiff and defendant agree that a second question is raised, to wit: May such appropriation be had even though the land is not presently appropriately zoned but where the housing authority has a contract with the city of Youngstown by which the city agrees to rezone the site to permit said construction?

The plaintiff states that the constitutionality of the Ohio Housing Authority Law as a whole is not challenged in this proceeding. It does specifically challenge the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 1078-34a, General Code, Section 3735.32, Revised Code, which are:

'A housing authority shall have special power to appropriate, enter upon and hold real estate within its territorial limits, and such authority is hereby authorized to acquire the fee simple title or a lesser interest, as it may elect, in any property within its territorial limits which it shall deem necessary to appropriate for the purposes of the housing authority. * * *'

The 'purposes' of the housing authority were defined by Section 1078-34, General Code, Section 3735.31, Revised Code, as follows:

'An authority created under this act shall constitute a body corporate and politic, and for the purposes of (1) clearing, planning and rebuilding slum areas within the district wherein the authority is created, or (2) providing safe and sanitary housing accommodations to families of low income within such district or (3) accomplishing a combination of the foregoing, shall have the following powers in addition to others herein specifically granted * * *.'

The plaintiff urges as a major proposition in support of its position that the land here being condemned is in no sense a slum or blighted area, and it asserts, therefore, that the whole purpose of the appropriation is the erection of a low-rent housing project on that land.

Our first task is to construe Section 19, Article I of the Constitution of Ohio, which reads:

'Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. * * * where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by deposit of money; and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner.'

It is to be noted at the outset that the present proceeding does not involve the question of exemption from taxation.

Although exclusive public use may be required for tax...