St. Surin v. State, 98-2379.
Decision Date | 24 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-2379.,98-2379. |
Parties | Jean Claude ST. SURIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
William Dale Whitice, Coconut Grove, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before JORGENSON, GERSTEN, and GREEN, JJ.
The appellant, Jean Claude St. Surin, was convicted of robbery without a firearm after a jury trial and was given an enhanced sentence due to the trial court's determination that an aggravating factor existed. His sole argument on this appeal is that the trial court erred in imposing an upward departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0016(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1997)1 based upon the aggravating factor that his commission of the robbery in this case occurred within six months of his release from a juvenile probationary sentence. We disagree and affirm.
Pursuant to section 921.0016(3)(e), a trial court may impose an upward departure sentence if the offense before the court for disposition was committed within 6 months after the defendant was discharged from a release program as defined in section 921.0011(6), Florida Statutes (1997). Prior to 1995, section 921.0011(6) specifically defined release program as follows:
§ 921.0011(6), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). In 1995, however, the Florida Legislature amended this section to its current form as follows:
§ 921.0011, Fla. Stat. (1997).
Based upon this amendment, the appellant first asserts that there is currently no statutory definition of "release program" as referenced in section 921.0016(3)(e) and in the absence of such a definition, the trial court was without authority to impose a departure sentence pursuant to this section. Alternatively, the appellant appears to argue that section 921.0016(3)(e) is ambiguous and susceptible to differing interpretations as to whether the legislature intended to include juvenile probation within its purview. Thus, the appellant maintains that under the rule of lenity, this criminal statute must be construed most favorably to him as the accused. See Cabal v. State, 678 So.2d 315, 318 (Fla.1996)
; Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Fla.1992); Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991). We disagree with both such arguments.
Criminal statutes must assuredly be strictly construed, but they are not to be construed so strictly as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. In other words, such strict construction is subordinate to the rule that the intention of the lawmakers must be given effect. See State v. Rivkind, 350 So.2d 575, 576-77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (citing George v. State, 203 So.2d 173, 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)). In this case, the fact that the legislature has elected to delete a specific statutory definition of the term "release program" in section 921.0011(6)(e) and instead define this term by reference to the term "community sanction" in that section does not, in our opinion, render the appellant's enhanced sentence invalid. Cf. State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 537 (Fla.1997)
( ); see also State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) ( ). It would have perhaps been the better or clearer course if the legislature had continued to maintain an explicit statutory definition for "release program" as opposed to redefining it in terms of a "community sanction." However, we believe that the legislative's choice or means of defining "release program" for purposes of section 921.0016(3)(e) was well within its prerogative. See e.g. State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997) ) . Moreover and most importantly, since probation was included in the term "release program" in the former section 921.0011(6), and is currently included in the term "community sanction" in the present section 921.0011(6), the legislature clearly intended a recent release from a probationary term to be a consideration in a trial a court's determination of whether to impose an enhanced sentence. We therefore find the appellant's first challenge to this statute to be without merit.
Equally without merit, we think, is the appellant's alternative argument that section 921.0016(3)(e) is susceptible to differing interpretations as to whether the legislature intended to include both juvenile and adult probationary sentences within its scope. If the legislature had...
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...with approval in State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997); L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1997); St. Surin v. State, 745 So.2d 514, 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); State v. De La Llana, 693 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); State v. Campbell, 664 So.2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995......
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