Staats v. Cobb
| Decision Date | 09 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. CIV-11-417-D,CIV-11-417-D |
| Parties | SHAWN NELSON STAATS, Plaintiff, v. ROBIN COBB, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Before the Court is Defendants' motion [Doc. No. 36] to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Plaintiff, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, responded to the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.
Background:
Plaintiff, a former inmate supervised by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("DOC"), brings this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because the DOC did not properly calculate the sentence he served, resulting in a lengthier incarceration than was called for by the judgment entered against him. More specifically, he alleges that an amended judgment entered by the District Court of McClain County provided that the sentence it imposed was intended to run concurrent with a prior sentence resulting from his conviction in the District Court of Oklahoma County. According to Plaintiff, the McClain County amended judgment also provided that the DOC was to retroactively award earned credits on his sentence if he actually served the time imposed by the Oklahoma County District Court. Although his sentences ran concurrently, Plaintiff was not awarded retroactive earned credits. According to Plaintiff, the alleged improper calculation of his release date resulted in his unlawful incarceration for approximately ten months. Plaintiff contends that the failure to properly calculate his releasedate constitutes a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and caused him to incur damages consisting of lost wages that would have been earned had he been released at the proper time. He also seeks punitive damages.
Named as defendants are Robin Cobb, Janet Dowling,1 Becky Guffy, Justin Jones, Mike Rogers, and Jim Rabon. All are officials of the DOC,2 and all are sued in both their official and individual capacities.
Defendants jointly seek dismissal, asserting 1) to the extent they are sued in their official capacities, they are immune from liability pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment; 2) to the extent they are sued in their individual capacities, dismissal is required because Plaintiff has failed to allege that they personally participated in the alleged violations of his rights; and 3) even if the individual capacity claims had been adequately alleged, those claims should be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity.
Standard of review:
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is proper "if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the complaint does not contain 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The question to be decided is "whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court considers only "well pleaded" allegations; conclusory allegations not supported by factual contentions are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990).
Where, as here, the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings most liberally in his favor. Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1474 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The liberal treatment afforded a pro se plaintiff does not, however, relieve him of the burden of alleging facts sufficient to permit the Court to conclude that he could arguably prevail on a valid legal theory; the Court will not supply additional facts, nor construct a legal theory for a plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Application:
1. Official capacity claims:
Although Defendants assert Rule 12(b)(6) as the basis for dismissal of the official capacity claims asserted against them, dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is generally analyzed according to Rule 12 (b)(1), as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claimsbarred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, a state and its entities are immune from suit by a private individual. "'[N]onconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court."' Opala v. Watt, 454 F.3d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (1999)). Eleventh Amendment immunity protects a state or an entity which is an "arm of the state," Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)), and also bars claims against state officials sued in their official capacities. Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002); Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
As Defendants acknowledge in their motion, an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity exists where a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760 (10th Cir. 2010). A claim seeking retrospective injunctive relief, however, "does not fall into the Ex Parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity." Buchheit v. Green, 2012 WL 5909036, at * 1 (10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2012) (unpublished opinion). An injunction seeks retrospective relief where a plaintiff seeks to remedy past injuries. Id. Where a plaintiff seeks only "to redress alleged past harms rather than prevent prospective violations of federal law, we can only reasonably categorize such relief as retrospective." Buchheit, 2012 WL 5909036, at * 1. Even if a plaintiff characterizes a request for injunctive relief as prospective, the claim is barred if the requested relief is designed to undo a past harm that cannot be remedied by federal court action. See Opala, 454 F.3d at 1160. Determiningwhether a request for injunctive relief is prospective requires a "straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quotation omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff seeks money damages for the harm allegedly resulting from the delay in his release from confinement. Although he also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, that relief cannot be prospective because the harm about which he complains has already occurred. Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, and the past conduct about which he complains cannot occur again. Accordingly, the only equitable relief he seeks is a determination by this Court that Defendants' past conduct violated his rights, not that their future conduct could constitute a violation. Thus, Plaintiff's only equitable claims seek retrospective relief, and do not qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Plaintiff's claims for relief against Defendants in their official capacities are claims for money damages, and those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The motion to dismiss the claims asserted against all defendants in their official capacities is GRANTED.
2. Individual capacity claims
The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, bar claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities. Thus, a plaintiff may pursue his money damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities because any resulting damages would not be assessed against the state, but would instead be assessed against the individual defendants.
In this case, Defendants argue that the individual-capacity claims must also be dismissed for two reasons. First, they argue the Amended Complaint fails to state plausible claims for reliefagainst four defendants because it does not allege facts to show how each allegedly personally participated in the claimed constitutional rights violations. Second, they contend that, even if plausible claims for relief had been alleged, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability as to those claims.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Cobb, Dowling, Rogers, and Jones because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that these defendants personally participated in the alleged violation of his rights. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff cannot do so because Cobb, Dowling, Rogers, and Jones were not authorized to participate in the administration of his sentence or the application of earned credits.
To impose § 1983 liability on a state actor, a plaintiff must show that such actor personally participated in the alleged violation of federal rights. Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). "Personal participation is an essential allegation in a Section 1983 claim." Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that "complaints in § 1983 cases against individual government actors...
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