Staats v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 11 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. C--572,C--572
• Citation: 539 P.2d 1233
• Parties: Richard W. STAATS, Petitioner, v. Wanda Caroline SANCHEZ, a minor, by and through her mother and next friend,Mary Sanchez, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1233

539 P.2d 1233

189 Colo. 228

Richard W. STAATS, Petitioner, v. Wanda Caroline SANCHEZ, a minor, by and through her mother and next friend,Mary Sanchez, et al., Respondents.

No. C--572.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Aug. 11, 1975.

Madden & Strate, P.C., George L. Strate, Robert L. McGahey, Jr., Denver, for petitioner.

Litvak, Schwartz & Karsh, a Professional Corp., Alan E. Karsh, Denver, for respondents.

LEE, Justice.

Certiorari to the court of appeals was granted to review the decision in that court of Sanchez v. Staats, 34 Colo.App. 243, 526 P.2d 672. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

The negligence claim for damages of Wanda Caroline Sanchez, respondent-plaintiff, against petitioner-defendant arose out of an automobile collision which occurred on East 39th Avenue in Denver on July 6, 1970. The facts giving rise to plaintiff's claim are set forth in detail in the opinion of the court of appeals and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to relate that the left front of plaintiff's vehicle, which was proceeding westerly on East 39th Avenue, collided with the left front of defendant's vehicle, which had just made a right turn out of an alley onto East 39th Avenue and was then proceeding easterly. The evidence tended to show that the easterly view from the alley was somewhat obstructed by a camper which was parked at the curb to the right of the point of exit from the alley. Likewise, the same visual impediment existed for plaintiff proceeding westerly on East 39th Avenue toward the alley.

By answer, defendant asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.

At the conclusion of the entire evidence, the district court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence and was also guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence raised factual issues as to negligence and contributory negligence which should have been resolved by the jury and not by the court. We agree with this conclusion.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence bearing upon defendant's negligence was: he exited from the alley when plaintiff's vehicle was close enough to constitute a hazard; his view of traffic in the street was obstructed; and he made an admission against interest, 'I never even saw her because of the truck (camper).' This evidence would justify a reasonable inference that defendant was not operating his vehicle in a reasonably prudent manner at the time and place of the accident. The evaluation of this evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom were certainly for the jury under proper instructions of the...