Stack v. Franklin County Sheriff Jim Karnes

• Decision Date: 29 October 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:10–cv–00621.
• Citation: 750 F.Supp.2d 892
• Parties: Charles STACK, Plaintiff,v.Franklin County Sheriff Jim KARNES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

750 F.Supp.2d 892

Charles STACK, Plaintiff,

v.Franklin County Sheriff Jim KARNES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:10–cv–00621.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Oct. 29, 2010.

Matthew S. Halley, Matthew S. Halley Attorney at Law, Jason C. Blum, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.Stuart D. Baker, John V. Jackson, II, Sutter, O'Connell, Mannion & Sarchione, Cleveland, OH, Mary Jane Martin, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY L. FROST, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. # 6) and Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition (Doc. # 16). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

On June 13, 2009, Plaintiff, Charles Stack, was arrested, taken into custody, and transported to Franklin County Corrections Center I. Plaintiff, a diabetic, alleges that on numerous occasions he alerted employees at the jail of his medical status and his need for his insulin medicine. As a result of ignoring Plaintiff's requests for the insulin medication, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries and had to receive medical care.

Plaintiff initiated the immediate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.¹ (Doc. # 3.) Thereafter, Defendants Franklin County and Franklin County Board of Commissioners, together, filed the motion to dismiss (Doc. # 6) which is now ripe for consideration.

II. Discussion

A. Standard Involved

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires an assessment of whether the party asserting a claim has set forth a claim upon which the Court may grant relief. This Court must construe the pleading in favor of the party asserting a claim, accept the factual allegations contained in that party's pleading as true, and determine whether the factual allegations present a plausible claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court has explained, however, that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Moreover, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950.

To be considered plausible, a claim must be more than merely conceivable. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007). What this means is that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The factual allegations of a pleading “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. See also Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir.2008).

B. Analysis

1. Defendant Franklin County

Defendants first argue that a 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate as to Defendant Franklin County because it is not sui juris and thus, lacks the capacity to sue or be sued without explicit statutory authorization. More specifically, Defendants rely on Section 301.22 of the Ohio Revised Code for the proposition that the only counties that can be sued or are capable of suing are those that adopt a charter or alternative form of government, which Franklin County has not done. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 301.22. In turn, Plaintiff asserts that the fact that Defendant Franklin County is not sui juris under Ohio law is irrelevant, as his allegations regarding Defendant Franklin County are nevertheless sufficient to make it amenable to suit under § 1983. (Doc. # 16, at 3.) Plaintiff relies on the United State Supreme Court case Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. for the principle that a municipality or other local government body, such as Franklin County, becomes a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 when implementing an unconstitutional policy or custom. 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Thus, the issue before the Court is whether a county's lack of capacity to sue or be sued under Section 301.22 precludes the ability of such county to become amenable to a § 1983 claim pursuant to Monell. Ohio federal courts have dealt with this issue inconsistently. Compare Turner v. City of Toledo, 671 F.Supp.2d 967, 970–74 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (stating that a county's sui juris status, or lack thereof, does not preclude application of § 1983); Wood v. Summit County Fiscal Office, 579 F.Supp.2d 935, 964 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (accepting that Summit County can be sued on a Monell claim, without specifically addressing the underlying Section 301.22 issue); Jerry v. Lake County/Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 1:09–CV–2079, 2010 WL 3069561, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77135 (N.D.Ohio July 31, 2010) (implicating that a Monell inquiry is separate from that of being sui juris ), and Sanford v. County of Lucas, No. 3:07–CV–3588, 2009 WL 723227, at *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20774, at *8–9 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 16, 2009) (holding that Section 301.22 has no bearing on the applicability of § 1983), with Newman v. Telb, No. 3:08–CV–711, 2010 WL 3666593, at *3–4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96994, at *8–9 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 16, 2010) (dismissing a Monell claim against Lucas County for lack of sui juris status), Clellan v. Karnes, No. 2:09–CV–930, 2010 WL 3470534, at *3–4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90991, at *10–11 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 2, 2010) (dismissing a Monell claim against Franklin County for lack of sui juris status), Marin v. Cleveland Clinic, No. 1:09–CV–2090, 2010 WL 359699, at *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7708, at *10 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 29, 2010) (dismissing a Monell claim against Cuyahoga County for lack of sui juris status), and Alkrie v. Irving, No. 5:96–CV–2687, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17856, at *17 n. 9 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 25, 2003) (stating that “Holmes County Court cannot be sued as it is not sui juris; therefore, it is irrelevant whether it could be considered a ‘person’ under § 1983. Without deciding that issue, this Court will say that, intuitively, it seems unlikely that a non- sui-juris entity could be a person [ ]”) (italics added).

Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has not directly dealt with this issue. See Petty v. County of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347–48 (6th Cir.2007) (implying that an Ohio county need not meet the dictates of Section 301.22 to be amenable to suit). Contra Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir.1997) (implying that an Ohio county must meet the dictates of Section 301.22 to be amenable to a § 1983 claim). In Petty, the Sixth Circuit addressed a lower court's dismissal of Franklin County for failure to allege a sufficient Monell custom or policy. Petty, 478 F.3d at 347. The court held that the lower court's dismissal was invalid and the Monell claim should have been addressed at summary judgment. Id. (noting that the error was nevertheless harmless as summary judgment was appropriate). Thus, the Sixth Circuit, in recognizing that a Monell claim against Franklin County could be appropriately considered at summary judgment, implicitly acknowledged that Franklin County's lack of being sui juris under Ohio law has no bearing on their amenability to suit under § 1983 and Monell. See id.

Because of the inconsistent manner in which Ohio district courts have dealt with this issue and because the Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue, this Court will consider it in depth. To determine whether a county that lacks the capacity to be sued under state law is nevertheless subject to suit under § 1983 and Monell, the Court must first address the “non- sui juris” nature of counties under Ohio law. In pertinent part, Ohio law dictates that “political subdivision” refers to “municipal corporations, townships, counties, school districts, and all other bodies corporate and politic [.]” Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.01(B) (emphasis added). Such entities, while not being included as “part of the state,” are nevertheless afforded immunity. Id. at (A), (B).

Absent explicit statutory authorization suggesting otherwise, Ohio counties, by retaining their sovereignty from the state, generally cannot be sued. See Pancake v. Wakefield, 102 Ohio App. 5, 7, 140 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Athens Cty.1956). Section 301.22 states that “[e]very county adopting a charter or an alternative form of government ... is capable of suing and being sued[.]” § 301.22. In effect, Sections 301.22 and 2743.01, collectively, operate to provide immunity to a county so long as they do not adopt a charter or an alternative form of government. See §§ 301.22, 2743.01(B).

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two prongs: (1) a constitutional deprivation; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 491–92 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.1992)) (emphasis added). As a general rule, local governments and counties are not “persons” under § 1983 and thus, not subject to suit, even where acting under color of state law. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. However, where “execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [complained of] injury [,]” municipalities and other local governments are considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. This...