Wood v. Summit County Fiscal Office, No. 5:06CV2591.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:06CV2591. |
| Citation | 579 F.Supp.2d 935 |
| Parties | Thomas WOOD, Plaintiff, v. SUMMIT COUNTY FISCAL OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Kenneth D. Myers, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
Corina S. Gaffney, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Akron, OH, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Summit County Fiscal Office and Defendant John Donofrio's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56. (Dkt.# 49). On August 13, 2008, Magistrate Judge James S. Gallas issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.# 60). For the following reasons, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
On January 24, 2005, Plaintiff Thomas Wood ("Wood") filed an internal complaint with the Summit County Fiscal Office, complaining of Defendant Summit County Fiscal Office's ("SCFO") failure to promote Wood and give him a raise. (Defendants' Ex. 2). On February 11, 2005, Wood filed a second internal complaint with SCFO's Appointing Authority, making the same allegations. (Defendants' Ex. 3). Both of these grievances were resolved in favor of Summit County.
On June 24, 2005 Wood filed a complaint with the Summit County Equal Employment Office ("EEO") alleging age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and violation of equal pay for equal work requirements. (Defendants' Ex. 4). On October 13, 2005, the EEO notified Wood that they did not find evidence to support any of Wood's complaints. (Defendants' Ex. 5).
On January 2005, SCFO issued a directive to employees that they were not to reenter their work area without specific permission after using their magnetic key cards to "swipe-out." (Davis Aff. ¶ 7). In October, 2005, Wood's coworker, June Garey witnessed Wood in the office one evening between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. after he had swiped out. (Garey Dep. at 53-54).
Wood was subsequently placed on paid administrative leave for misconduct. (Plaintiff's Ex. I). On October 13, 2005, Wood was escorted from his office by a sheriff's deputy. Id. Wood's removal from the building took place on the same day Wood learned that his internal complaints had been denied. (Plaintiff's Ex. C). Wood was also provided notice that he had been recommended for disciplinary action, which could result in termination. (Defendants' Ex. 6). The notice stated that the recommendation was based on allegations of misconduct, which constituted a Group III Offense of the Summit County Personnel Policy and Procedures manual. Id. The Policy and Procedures manual defined Group III offenses as "those infractions which are of a very serious nature or possibly a criminal nature..." (Defendants' Ex. 1).
SCFO requested that the Summit County Sheriff investigate Wood's allegedly unauthorized presence in the building. (Brown Dep. at 11). Detective David Brown ("Det.Brown") was assigned to investigate Wood. Id. On October 17, 2005, Wood received an e-mail from Mary Rowlands ("Ms.Rowlands"), SCFO's legal counsel, informing Wood that his "repeated unauthorized presence in the Fiscal Office [had] been referred to the Summit County Sheriff for investigation." (Defendants' Ex. 7).
On October 21, 2005, Ms. Rowlands sent a letter to Wood's attorney stating that if Wood did not meet with Det. Brown by October 26, 2005, Wood would be placed on unpaid administrative leave. (Defendants' Ex. 10). Ms. Rowlands stated: "While the Fiscal Office cannot, nor would not, require Mr. Wood to waive his 5th Amendment privilege, his cooperation, or lack thereof, in this process will be a factor in any employment action affecting him." Id.
On October 24, 2005, Ms. Rowlands sent another letter to Wood's attorney stating: "The Fiscal Office has referred this matter to the sheriff for investigation into suspected criminal conduct." Ms. Rowlands went on to state that failure to cooperate would be "considered" as stated in the Ms. Rowland's October 21 letter. Finally, the letter informed Wood that he would be placed on unpaid leave beginning October 27, 2005, if he had not been interviewed by Det. Brown by that time. (Plaintiff's Ex L).
On October 26, 2005, SCFO sent a "Notice of Intent to Discipline" ("Disciplinary Memo") informing Wood that he had been recommended for disciplinary action which could lead to his termination. The Disciplinary Memo alleged: "insubordination, a violation of the Summit County Fiscal Office Personnel policy and Procedures Manual, Section 8.3, Group III Offense, # 12." (Defendants' Ex. 11). The Disciplinary Memo also informed Wood of his right to a pre-disciplinary hearing, which was scheduled for October 31, 2005. Id.
Wood waived his opportunity for a pre-disciplinary conference in a letter dated October 30, 2005. (Defendants' Ex. 12). On October 31, 2005, a pre-disciplinary conference was held without Wood in attendance. The pre-disciplinary conference hearing officer determined that there was cause to discipline Wood for insubordination. (Defendants' Ex. 13).
On November 9, 2005, SCFO sent a letter to Wood informing him that as a result of the hearing findings, he was suspended without pay for thirty (30) consecutive days during which time the Fiscal Officer would finalize a decision regarding Wood's employment status. (Plaintiff's Ex. P). On December 2, 2005, SCFO sent Wood a letter informing him that he was being terminated from employment. (Plaintiff's Ex. Q).
Wood appealed his termination to the Summit County Human Resources Commission ("HRC"). (Defendants' Ex. 19). A full post-termination evidentiary hearing was held on February 22, 2006. Wood attended the hearing and was represented by counsel. Id. On April 12, 2006, Wood filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging age discrimination and retaliation. (Defendants' Ex. 16). On July 12, 2006, HRC affirmed Wood's termination. (Defendants' Ex. 20). Wood failed to appeal HRC's decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas as permitted by Ohio Revised Code 2509, et seq. Wood filed the instant Complaint on October 25, 2006.
When reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding a motion for summary judgment, this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72. If a party fails to make a specific objection on a particular issue, that issue is waived. Id.
Wood timely filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.# 61). For the following reasons, the Court finds that each objection is without merit.
Wood objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Wood's age discrimination claims are time barred. Under federal law, Wood was required to file his complaint alleging unlawful discrimination within 300 days after SCFO's alleged unlawful practice occurred. 29 U.S.C § 626(d). Under Ohio law, Wood was required to file within 180 days. Ohio Rev. Code 4112.02(N). Wood's complaint was filed with the EEOC on April 12, 2006. (Defendants' Exhibit 16). The Magistrate Judge therefore correctly recommended dismissal of all federal claims that occurred before June of 2005 in addition to all of Wood's state claims.
Wood contends that the relevant statutes of limitations should be tolled on equitable grounds. However, time limitations may be tolled only when "compelling circumstances" exist. Leeds v. Potter, 249 Fed.Appx. 442, 446 (6th Cir.2007); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989). The Sixth Circuit has set forth five factors for courts to consider to determine whether compelling circumstances exist: (1) whether the plaintiff had actual notice of the time restraint; (2) whether the plaintiff had constructive notice of the time restraint; (3) the degree of diligence exerted in pursuing his rights; (4) the degree of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the reasonableness of plaintiff's ignorance of the time constraint. Leeds, at 446-447.
In the instant case, Wood has not shown that compelling circumstances exist to justify tolling the relevant statutes of limitations. Wood was aware of or should have been aware of these time limitations. He has failed to state any facts to the contrary. Instead, Wood states that he was not represented by counsel when he filed his allegations of age discrimination. (Defendants' Ex. 5). There is no evidence in the record, however, that defendants, or anyone else, prevented Wood from hiring an attorney earlier in the process.
Wood fails to identify any "age-related" claims that occurred after the appropriate time limitations had passed, and Wood has failed to identify compelling circumstances to warrant tolling the time limitations. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge properly granted summary judgment on Wood's federal and state age discrimination claims.
Wood objects to the Magistrate Judge's rejection of Wood's retaliation claims. The Magistrate Judge correctly ruled, however, that most of Wood's retaliation complaints—refusal to promote, pay inequity, change of cubicle, and change in work hours—are time barred. In addition, Wood has failed to present material facts supporting his remaining retaliation claims (unpaid leave, discharge, and refusal to pay Wood for unused vacation).
In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Wood must show: (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that his employer had knowledge of his protected conduct; (3) that his employer took an adverse...
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